Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with.

openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c

-/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
+/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
  * 
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
@@ skipping 37 matching lines @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  * 
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ skipping 44 matching lines @@
  * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
  *
  * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
  * license provided above.
  *
  * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
  * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
  *
  */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
 
 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #endif
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
 #endif
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
-#include "fnv1a64.h"
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
 
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-static int ssl3_snap_start_evaluate_handshake(SSL* s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
-#endif
-
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
         {
         if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
                 return(SSLv3_server_method());
         else
                 return(NULL);
         }
 
 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
                         ssl3_accept,
                         ssl_undefined_function,
                         ssl3_get_server_method)
 
 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
         {
         BUF_MEM *buf;
-        unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+        unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
         int ret= -1;
         int new_state,state,skip=0;
 
         RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
         ERR_clear_error();
         clear_sys_error();
 
         if (s->info_callback != NULL)
                 cb=s->info_callback;
@@ skipping 50 matching lines @@
                                 s->init_buf=buf;
                                 }
 
                         if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
                                 {
                                 ret= -1;
                                 goto end;
                                 }
 
                         s->init_num=0;
+                        s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
 
                         if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
                                 {
                                 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
                                  * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
                                  */
                                 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
                                 
                                 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
@@ skipping 37 matching lines @@
                         s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
                         break;
 
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
 
                         s->shutdown=0;
                         ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
                         if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+                        
                         s->new_session = 2;
                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
                         s->init_num=0;
                         break;
 
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
                         ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
-                        if (ret == SERVER_RANDOM_VALIDATION_PENDING)
-                                {
-                                s->rwstate = SSL_SERVER_RANDOM_VALIDATE;
-                                s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-                                s->init_num = 0;
-                                goto end;
-                                }
                         if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-                        if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK) != SSL_kRSA &&
-                            (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK) != SSL_kKRB5 &&
-                            (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK) != SSL_kDHr &&
-                            (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK) != SSL_kDHd &&
-                            (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK) != SSL_kECDH &&
-                            s->s3->snap_start_requested)
-                                {
-                                /* There's no point in carrying on with a Snap
-                                 * Start handshake if we're using a cipher
-                                 * suite which is going to send a
-                                 * ServerKeyExchange message. */
-                                ssl3_snap_start_reset_for_recovery(s);
-                                s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-                                break;
-                                }
-
                         if (s->hit)
                                 {
-                                if (ssl3_snap_start_evaluate_handshake(s))
-                                        break;
-
                                 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
                                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
                                 else
                                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
                                 }
 #else
                         if (s->hit)
                                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
 #endif
                         else
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
                         s->init_num=0;
                         break;
 
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
-                        /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
-                        if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
-                                && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
+                        /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+                        /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
+                        if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+                                && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+                                && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
                                 {
                                 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
                                 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                                 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
                                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
                                 else
                                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
                                 }
                         else
                                 {
                                 skip = 1;
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
                                 }
 #else
                                 }
                         else
                                 skip=1;
 
                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
 #endif
                         s->init_num=0;
                         break;
 
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-                        l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+                        alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
                         /* clear this, it may get reset by
                          * send_server_key_exchange */
                         if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-                                && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
+                                && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
                                 )
                                 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
                                  * even when forbidden by protocol specs
                                  * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
                                  * be able to handle this) */
                                 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
                         else
                                 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
 
 
                         /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
                          * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
                          *
+                         * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
+                         *
                          * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
                          * message only if the cipher suite is either
                          * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
-                         * server certificate contains the server's 
+                         * server certificate contains the server's
                          * public key for key exchange.
                          */
                         if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
-                            || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
-                            || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
-                            || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
+                        /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+                         * hint if provided */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+                            || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+                            || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
+                            || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+                            || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
                                 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
                                     || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
                                         && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
                                         )
                                     )
                                 )
                             )
                                 {
                                 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
                                 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                                 }
                         else
                                 skip=1;
 
                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
                         s->init_num=0;
                         break;
 
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
                         if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
                                 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
                                 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
                                  * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
                                 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
                                  (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
                                 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
                                  * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
                                  * and in RFC 2246): */
-                                ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
+                                ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
                                  /* ... except when the application insists on verification
                                   * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
                                  !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
-                                 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
-                                (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
+                                 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+                                (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+                                /* With normal PSK Certificates and
+                                 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+                                || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
                                 {
                                 /* no cert request */
                                 skip=1;
                                 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
                                 }
                         else
                                 {
                                 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
                                 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
                                 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
 #else
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
                                 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
 #endif
                                 s->init_num=0;
                                 }
                         break;
 
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
                         ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
                         if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
-                        if (s->s3->snap_start_requested)
-                                {
-                                if (ssl3_snap_start_evaluate_handshake(s))
-                                        break;
-                                s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-                                }
-                        else
-                                {
-                                        s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-                                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-                                }
-
+                        s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
                         s->init_num=0;
                         break;
                 
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
 
                         /* This code originally checked to see if
                          * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
                          * and then flushed. This caused problems
                          * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
                          * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
@@ skipping 28 matching lines @@
                                         if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                                         }
                                 s->init_num=0;
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
                         }
                         break;
 
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
                         ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
-                        if (ret <= 0) 
+                        if (ret <= 0)
                                 goto end;
                         if (ret == 2)
                                 {
                                 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
                                  * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
                                  * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
                                  * message is not sent.
+                                 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
+                                 * the client uses its key from the certificate
+                                 * for key exchange.
                                  */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
                                 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
                                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
                                 else
                                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
                                 s->init_num = 0;
                                 }
-                        else   
+                        else
                                 {
+                                int offset=0;
+                                int dgst_num;
+
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
                                 s->init_num=0;
 
                                 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
                                  * a client cert, it can be verified
-                                 */ 
-                                s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-                                    &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
-                                    &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
-                                s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
-                                    &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
-                                    &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+                                 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
+                                 * should be generalized. But it is next step
+                                 */
+                                if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+                                        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                                                return -1;
+                                for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)    
+                                        if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 
+                                                {
+                                                int dgst_size;
+
+                                                s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
+                                                dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+                                                if (dgst_size < 0)
+                                                        {
+                                                        ret = -1;
+                                                        goto end;
+                                                        }
+                                                offset+=dgst_size;
+                                                }               
                                 }
                         break;
 
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
 
                         /* we should decide if we expected this one */
                         ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
                         if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
                         if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
                         else
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
                         s->init_num=0;
                         break;
 
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
                         ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
                         if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                         s->init_num = 0;
                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
                         break;
+#endif
 
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
                         ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
                                 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
                         if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+                        if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+                        else if (s->hit)
+                                s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#else
                         if (s->hit)
                                 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-                        else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
 #endif
                         else
                                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
                         s->init_num=0;
                         break;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
                         ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
@@ skipping 38 matching lines @@
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
                 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
                         ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
                                 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
                                 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
                                 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
                         if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                         s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
                         if (s->hit)
                                 {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+                                s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
                                 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
                                         s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
                                 else
                                         s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
                                 }
                         else
                                 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
                         s->init_num=0;
                         break;
 
                 case SSL_ST_OK:
                         /* clean a few things up */
                         ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
 
@@ skipping 80 matching lines @@
 
         /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
         return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
         }
 
 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
         {
         int ok;
         long n;
 
+        /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+         * negotiation. */
+        if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
         /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
          * so permit appropriate message length */
         n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
                 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
                 -1,
                 s->max_cert_list,
                 &ok);
         if (!ok) return((int)n);
         s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
         if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
                 {
                 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
-                 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
-                 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
-                 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
+                 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
                 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
                         {
                         DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
                         s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
                         }
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+                if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+                        {
+                        EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+                        s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+                        }
+#endif
+                s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
                 return 2;
                 }
         return 1;
 }
 
 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         {
         int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
         unsigned int cookie_len;
         long n;
@@ skipping 29 matching lines @@
 
         /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
          * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
         s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
         p+=2;
 
         if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
             (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 
+                if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
                         {
                         /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
                         s->version = s->client_version;
                         }
                 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
                 goto f_err;
                 }
 
         /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
          * contain one, just return since we do not want to
@@ skipping 21 matching lines @@
         /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
          * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
          * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
          * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
          * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
          * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
          * an earlier library version)
          */
         if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
                 {
+                if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+                        {
+                        ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+                        goto err;
+                }
                 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
                         goto err;
                 }
         else
                 {
                 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
                 if (i == 1)
                         { /* previous session */
                         s->hit=1;
                         }
                 else if (i == -1)
                         goto err;
                 else /* i == 0 */
                         {
+                        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
+                                {
+                                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+                                goto err;
+                                }
                         if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
                                 goto err;
                         }
                 }
 
         p+=j;
 
         if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                 {
                 /* cookie stuff */
@@ skipping 82 matching lines @@
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
                         printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
                                 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
 #endif
                         if (c->id == id)
                                 {
                                 j=1;
                                 break;
                                 }
                         }
+/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
+ * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
+ */
+#if 0
                 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
                         {
                         /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
                          * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
                          * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
                          * preferences.  We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
                          * enabled, though. */
                         c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
                         if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
                                 {
                                 s->session->cipher = c;
                                 j = 1;
                                 }
                         }
+#endif
                 if (j == 0)
                         {
                         /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
                          * list if we are asked to reuse it */
                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
                         goto f_err;
                         }
                 }
 
@@ skipping 29 matching lines @@
                         {
                         /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
                         goto f_err;
                         }
                 }
                 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
                         goto err;
                 }
+
+        /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
+         * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
+         * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
+         * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
+        {
+                unsigned long Time;
+                unsigned char *pos;
+                Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);                 /* Time */
+                pos=s->s3->server_random;
+                l2n(Time,pos);
+                if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+                        {
+                        al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        goto f_err;
+                        }
+        }
+
+        if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+                {
+                SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
+
+                s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+                if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
+                        ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
+                        {
+                        s->hit=1;
+                        s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
+                        s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+                        ciphers=NULL;
+
+                        /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+                        pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+                        if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+                                {
+                                al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+                                goto f_err;
+                                }
+
+                        s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
+
+                        if (s->cipher_list)
+                                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+
+                        if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
+                                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+                        s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+                        s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+                        }
+                }
 #endif
+
         /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
          * options, we will now look for them.  We have i-1 compression
          * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
         s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-        if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
+        /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
+        if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+                {
+                int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+                /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
+                /* Can't disable compression */
+                if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+                        {
+                        al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+                        goto f_err;
+                        }
+                /* Look for resumed compression method */
+                for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
+                        {
+                        comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
+                        if (comp_id == comp->id)
+                                {
+                                s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+                                break;
+                                }
+                        }
+                if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+                        {
+                        al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+                        goto f_err;
+                        }
+                /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
+                for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
+                        {
+                        if (q[m] == comp_id)
+                                break;
+                        }
+                if (m >= i)
+                        {
+                        al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+                        goto f_err;
+                        }
+                }
+        else if (s->hit)
+                comp = NULL;
+        else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
                 { /* See if we have a match */
                 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
 
                 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
                 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
                         {
                         comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
                         v=comp->id;
                         for (o=0; o<i; o++)
                                 {
                                 if (v == q[o])
                                         {
                                         done=1;
                                         break;
                                         }
                                 }
                         if (done) break;
                         }
                 if (done)
                         s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
                 else
                         comp=NULL;
                 }
-#endif
-
-        /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
-#if 0   /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
-         * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
-         * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
-        if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+#else
+        /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+         * using compression.
+         */
+        if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
                 {
-                if (p < (d+n))
-                        {
-                        /* wrong number of bytes,
-                         * there could be more to follow */
-                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-                        goto f_err;
-                        }
+                al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+                goto f_err;
                 }
 #endif
 
         /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
          * pick a cipher */
 
         if (!s->hit)
                 {
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
                 s->session->compress_meth=0;
@@ skipping 28 matching lines @@
                 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
                 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
                 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
 
                 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
                         {
                         sk=s->session->ciphers;
                         for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
                                 {
                                 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
-                                if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
+                                if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
                                         nc=c;
                                 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
                                         ec=c;
                                 }
                         if (nc != NULL)
                                 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
                         else if (ec != NULL)
                                 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
                         else
                                 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
                         }
                 else
 #endif
                 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
                 }
+
+        if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                goto f_err;
         
         /* we now have the following setup. 
          * client_random
          * cipher_list          - our prefered list of ciphers
          * ciphers              - the clients prefered list of ciphers
          * compression          - basically ignored right now
          * ssl version is set   - sslv3
          * s->session           - The ssl session has been setup.
          * s->hit               - session reuse flag
          * s->tmp.new_cipher    - the new cipher to use.
          */
 
         if (ret < 0) ret=1;
         if (0)
                 {
 f_err:
                 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
                 }
 err:
         if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
         return(ret);
         }
 
 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
         {
         unsigned char *buf;
         unsigned char *p,*d;
         int i,sl;
-        unsigned long l,Time;
+        unsigned long l;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+        unsigned long Time;
+#endif
 
         if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
                 {
                 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-                if (!s->s3->snap_start_requested)
-                        {
-                        p=s->s3->server_random;
-                        Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);                 /* Time */
-                        l2n(Time,p);
-                        if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
-                                return -1;
-                        }
-                else if (s->s3->server_random_suggestion_valid == 0)
-                        {
-                        return SERVER_RANDOM_VALIDATION_PENDING;
-                        }
-
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+                p=s->s3->server_random;
+                /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
+                Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);                 /* Time */
+                l2n(Time,p);
+                if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+                        return -1;
+#endif
                 /* Do the message type and length last */
                 d=p= &(buf[4]);
 
                 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
                 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
 
                 /* Random stuff */
                 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 
@@ skipping 33 matching lines @@
                 /* put the compression method */
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
                         *(p++)=0;
 #else
                 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
                         *(p++)=0;
                 else
                         *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+                if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+                        return -1;
+                        }
                 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                         return -1;
                         }
 #endif
                 /* do the header */
                 l=(p-d);
                 d=buf;
                 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
@@ skipping 59 matching lines @@
         int n;
         CERT *cert;
         BIGNUM *r[4];
         int nr[4],kn;
         BUF_MEM *buf;
         EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
 
         EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
         if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
                 {
-                type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
+                type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
                 cert=s->cert;
 
                 buf=s->init_buf;
 
                 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
                 n=0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
                 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
                         {
                         rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
@@ skipping 33 matching lines @@
                                       SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
                         if (dhp == NULL)
                                 {
                                 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
                                 goto f_err;
                                 }
 
                         if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
                                 {
-                                DH_free(dh);
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
 
                         if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
 
@@ skipping 20 matching lines @@
                                         goto err;
                                         }
                                 }
                         r[0]=dh->p;
                         r[1]=dh->g;
                         r[2]=dh->pub_key;
                         }
                 else 
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-                        if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
+                        if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
                         {
                         const EC_GROUP *group;
 
                         ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
                         if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
                                 {
                                 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
                                       SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
                                       SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
                                 }
                         if (ecdhp == NULL)
                                 {
                                 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
                                 goto f_err;
                                 }
 
                         if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
                                 {
-                                EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
 
                         /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
                         if (ecdhp == NULL)
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
-                        if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
+                        if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
-                        ecdh = ecdhp;
 
                         s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
                         if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
                             (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
                             (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
                                 {
                                 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
                                     {
                                     SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                                     goto err;
@@ skipping 13 matching lines @@
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
 
                         /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
                          * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 
                          * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
                          */
                         if ((curve_id = 
-                            nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+                            tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
                             == 0)
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
 
                         /* Encode the public key.
                          * First check the size of encoding and
                          * allocate memory accordingly.
                          */
@@ skipping 36 matching lines @@
                         /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
                          * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
                          */
                         r[0]=NULL;
                         r[1]=NULL;
                         r[2]=NULL;
                         r[3]=NULL;
                         }
                 else 
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+                        if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+                                {
+                                /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
+                                n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+                                }
+                        else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
                         {
                         al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
                         goto f_err;
                         }
                 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
                         {
                         nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
                         n+=2+nr[i];
                         }
 
-                if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+                if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+                        && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
                         {
                         if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
                                 == NULL)
                                 {
                                 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                                 goto f_err;
                                 }
                         kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
                         }
                 else
@@ skipping 11 matching lines @@
                 p= &(d[4]);
 
                 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
                         {
                         s2n(nr[i],p);
                         BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
                         p+=nr[i];
                         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-                if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 
+                if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 
                         {
                         /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
                          * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
                          * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
                          * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
                          * the actual encoded point itself
                          */
                         *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
                         p += 1;
                         *p = 0;
                         p += 1;
                         *p = curve_id;
                         p += 1;
                         *p = encodedlen;
                         p += 1;
                         memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 
                             (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
                             encodedlen);
                         OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+                        encodedPoint = NULL;
                         p += encodedlen;
                         }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+                if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+                        {
+                        /* copy PSK identity hint */
+                        s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 
+                        strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+                        p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+                        }
+#endif
+
                 /* not anonymous */
                 if (pkey != NULL)
                         {
                         /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
                          * and p points to the space at the end. */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
                         if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
                                 {
                                 q=md_buf;
                                 j=0;
                                 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
                                         {
-                                        EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
-                                                EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
                                         EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
                                                 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
                                         EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                                         EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                                         EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
                                         EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
                                                 (unsigned int *)&i);
                                         q+=i;
                                         j+=i;
                                         }
@@ skipping 163 matching lines @@
         /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
         return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 err:
         return(-1);
         }
 
 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         {
         int i,al,ok;
         long n;
-        unsigned long l;
+        unsigned long alg_k;
         unsigned char *p;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
         RSA *rsa=NULL;
         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
         BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
         DH *dh_srvr;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-        KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+        KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
         EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
         EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
         EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
         BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
 #endif
 
         n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
                 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
                 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                 2048, /* ??? */
                 &ok);
 
         if (!ok) return((int)n);
         p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
 
-        l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+        alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-        if (l & SSL_kRSA)
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
                 {
                 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
                 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
                         {
                         if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
                                 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
                         /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
                          * be sent already */
                         if (rsa == NULL)
                                 {
@@ skipping 10 matching lines @@
                                 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
                                 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
                                 {
                                 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
                                 goto f_err;
                                 }
                         rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
                         }
 
-                /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
-                if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
-                    s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+                /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
+                if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                         {
                         n2s(p,i);
                         if (n != i+2)
                                 {
                                 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
                                         {
                                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
                                         goto err;
                                         }
                                 else
@@ skipping 53 matching lines @@
         
                 s->session->master_key_length=
                         s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                 s->session->master_key,
                                 p,i);
                 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
                 }
         else
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-                if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+                if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
                 {
                 n2s(p,i);
                 if (n != i+2)
                         {
                         if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
                         else
@@ skipping 26 matching lines @@
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
                         goto err;
                         }
 
                 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
 
                 if (i <= 0)
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                        BN_clear_free(pub);
                         goto err;
                         }
 
                 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
                 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
 
                 BN_clear_free(pub);
                 pub=NULL;
                 s->session->master_key_length=
                         s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                 s->session->master_key,p,i);
                 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
                 }
         else
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-        if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
-                {
-                krb5_error_code         krb5rc;
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+                {
+                krb5_error_code         krb5rc;
                 krb5_data               enc_ticket;
                 krb5_data               authenticator;
                 krb5_data               enc_pms;
-                KSSL_CTX                *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+                KSSL_CTX                *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
                 EVP_CIPHER_CTX          ciph_ctx;
-                EVP_CIPHER              *enc = NULL;
+                const EVP_CIPHER        *enc = NULL;
                 unsigned char           iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
                 unsigned char           pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
-                                               + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-                int                     padl, outl;
+                                               + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+                int                  padl, outl;
                 krb5_timestamp          authtime = 0;
                 krb5_ticket_times       ttimes;
 
                 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
 
-                if (!kssl_ctx)  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+                if (!kssl_ctx)  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
 
                 n2s(p,i);
                 enc_ticket.length = i;
 
-                if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
+                if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                         goto err;
                         }
 
                 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
                 p+=enc_ticket.length;
 
                 n2s(p,i);
                 authenticator.length = i;
 
-                if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
+                if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                         goto err;
                         }
 
                 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
                 p+=authenticator.length;
 
                 n2s(p,i);
@@ skipping 12 matching lines @@
                         }
 
                 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
                                                 enc_pms.length + 6))
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                         goto err;
                         }
 
-                if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+                if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
                                         &kssl_err)) != 0)
-                        {
+                        {
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-                        printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
-                                krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
-                        if (kssl_err.text)
-                                printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+                        printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+                                krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+                        if (kssl_err.text)
+                                printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
 #endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                                kssl_err.reason);
-                        goto err;
-                        }
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                kssl_err.reason);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
 
                 /*  Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
                 **  but will return authtime == 0.
                 */
                 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
                                         &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
                         {
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-                        printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
-                                krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
-                        if (kssl_err.text)
-                                printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+                        printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+                                krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+                        if (kssl_err.text)
+                                printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
 #endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                                kssl_err.reason);
-                        goto err;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                kssl_err.reason);
+                        goto err;
                         }
 
                 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
-                        goto err;
+                        goto err;
                         }
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-                kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+                kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
 #endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
                 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
-                if (enc == NULL)
-                    goto err;
+                if (enc == NULL)
+                    goto err;
 
                 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);       /* per RFC 1510 */
 
                 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                         goto err;
                         }
                 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
@@ skipping 26 matching lines @@
                     {
                     /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
                      * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
                      * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
                      * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
                      * the protocol version.
                      * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
                      * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
                      */
                     if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
-                        {
+                        {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
                         goto err;
                         }
                     }
 
                 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
 
-                s->session->master_key_length=
-                        s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-                                s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
+                s->session->master_key_length=
+                        s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
 
-                if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
-                        {
-                        size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
-                        if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 
-                                {
-                                s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
-                                memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
-                                }
-                        }
+                if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
+                        {
+                        size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+                        if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 
+                                {
+                                s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+                                memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
+                                }
+                        }
 
 
-                /*  Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+                /*  Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
                 **  but it caused problems for apache.
-                **  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
-                **  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
-                */
-                }
+                **  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+                **  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+                */
+                }
         else
 #endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-                if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
+                if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
                 {
                 int ret = 1;
                 int field_size = 0;
                 const EC_KEY   *tkey;
                 const EC_GROUP *group;
                 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
 
-                /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+                /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
                 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
                         {
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                             ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                        goto err;
+                        goto err;
                         }
 
                 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
-                if (l & SSL_kECDH) 
+                if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
                         { 
-                        /* use the certificate */
+                        /* use the certificate */
                         tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
                         }
                 else
                         {
                         /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
                          * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
                          */
                         tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
                         }
 
                 group    = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
                 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
 
                 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
                     !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                         goto err;
                         }
 
                 /* Let's get client's public key */
                 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                             ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                         goto err;
                         }
 
-                if (n == 0L) 
-                        {
+                if (n == 0L) 
+                        {
                         /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
 
-                         if (l & SSL_kECDHE) 
+                         if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
                                  {
                                  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
                                  goto f_err;
                                  }
-                        if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+                        if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
                             == NULL) || 
                             (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
-                                {
+                                {
                                 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
                                  * authentication using ECDH certificates
                                  * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
                                  * never executed. When that support is
                                  * added, we ought to ensure the key 
                                  * received in the certificate is 
                                  * authorized for key agreement.
                                  * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
                                  * the two ECDH shares are for the same
                                  * group.
                                  */
-                                al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                     SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
-                                goto f_err;
-                                }
+                                goto f_err;
+                                }
 
                         if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
                             EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                         ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
-                        ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
-                        }
-                else
-                        {
+                        ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
                         /* Get client's public key from encoded point
                          * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
                          */
                         if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                     ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
 
-                        /* Get encoded point length */
-                        i = *p; 
+                        /* Get encoded point length */
+                        i = *p; 
                         p += 1;
-                        if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 
+                        if (n != 1 + i)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                                goto err;
+                                }
+                        if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 
                             clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
                                 {
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                     ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
-                        /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
-                         * currently, so set it to the start 
-                         */ 
-                        p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-                        }
+                        /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
+                         * currently, so set it to the start 
+                         */ 
+                        p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+                        }
 
                 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
                 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
                 if (field_size <= 0)
                         {
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
                                ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                         goto err;
                         }
                 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
-                if (i <= 0)
-                        {
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                if (i <= 0)
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                             ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
-                        goto err;
-                        }
+                        goto err;
+                        }
 
                 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
                 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
-                if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
-                        EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+                EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
                 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+                EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+                s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 
 
                 /* Compute the master secret */
-                s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
+                s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
                     generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
                 
-                OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
-                return (ret);
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+                return (ret);
                 }
         else
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+                if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+                        {
+                        unsigned char *t = NULL;
+                        unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
+                        unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+                        int psk_err = 1;
+                        char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
+
+                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+                        n2s(p,i);
+                        if (n != i+2)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                        SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                                goto psk_err;
+                                }
+                        if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                        SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                                goto psk_err;
+                                }
+                        if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                       SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+                                goto psk_err;
+                                }
+
+                        /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
+                         * string for the callback */
+                        memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
+                        memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
+                        psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
+                                psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+                        OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
+
+                        if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                                goto psk_err;
+                                }
+                        else if (psk_len == 0)
+                                {
+                                /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                       SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+                                al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+                                goto psk_err;
+                                }
+
+                        /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+                        pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
+                        t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+                        memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+                        s2n(psk_len, t);
+                        memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+                        t+=psk_len;
+                        s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+                        if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+                                OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+                        s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+                        if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                                goto psk_err;
+                                }
+
+                        if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+                                OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+                        s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+                        if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+                                s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                        ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                                goto psk_err;
+                                }
+
+                        s->session->master_key_length=
+                                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                        s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+                        psk_err = 0;
+                psk_err:
+                        OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+                        if (psk_err != 0)
+                                goto f_err;
+                        }
+                else
+#endif
+                if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 
+                        {
+                        int ret = 0;
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+                        EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+                        unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
+                        size_t outlen=32, inlen;
+                        unsigned long alg_a;
+
+                        /* Get our certificate private key*/
+                        alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+                        if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
+                                pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
+                        else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+                                pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+
+                        pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
+                        EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+                        /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
+                         * use it for key exchange.  Don't mind errors from
+                         * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
+                         * a client certificate for authorization only. */
+                        client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+                        if (client_pub_pkey)
+                                {
+                                if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+                                        ERR_clear_error();
+                                }
+                        /* Decrypt session key */
+                        if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) 
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+                                goto gerr;
+                                }
+                        if (p[1] == 0x81)
+                                {
+                                start = p+3;
+                                inlen = p[2];
+                                }
+                        else if (p[1] < 0x80)
+                                {
+                                start = p+2;
+                                inlen = p[1];
+                                }
+                        else
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+                                goto gerr;
+                                }
+                        if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 
+
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+                                goto gerr;
+                                }
+                        /* Generate master secret */
+                        s->session->master_key_length=
+                                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                        s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
+                        /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+                        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+                                ret = 2;
+                        else
+                                ret = 1;
+                gerr:
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+                        if (ret)
+                                return ret;
+                        else
+                                goto err;
+                        }
+                else
                 {
                 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
                 goto f_err;
                 }
 
         return(1);
 f_err:
         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
 err:
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
         EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
         EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
         if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
                 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
         BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
 #endif
         return(-1);
         }
 
-/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
- * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
-int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
-        {
-        int ok;
-        unsigned proto_len, padding_len;
-        long n;
-        const unsigned char *p;
-
-        /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
-         * extension in their ClientHello */
-        if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
-                return -1;
-        }
-
-        n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-                SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
-                SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
-                SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
-                129,
-                &ok);
-
-        if (!ok)
-                return((int)n);
-
-        /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
-         * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
-         * by ssl3_get_finished). */
-        if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-                {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-                return -1;
-                }
-
-        if (n < 2)
-                return 0;  // The body must be > 1 bytes long */
-
-        p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
-        /* The payload looks like:
-         *   uint8 proto_len;
-         *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
-         *   uint8 padding_len;
-         *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
-         */
-        proto_len = p[0];
-        if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
-                return 0;
-        padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
-        if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
-                return 0;
-
-        s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
-        if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
-        s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
-
-        return 1;
-        }
-
 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
         {
         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
         unsigned char *p;
         int al,ok,ret=0;
         long n;
         int type=0,i,j;
         X509 *peer;
 
         n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ skipping 46 matching lines @@
 
         if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                 goto f_err;
                 }
 
         /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
         p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-        n2s(p,i);
-        n-=2;
-        if (i > n)
+        /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
+        /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
+         * signature without length field */
+        if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
+                pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
                 {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-                al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                goto f_err;
-                }
-
+                i=64;
+                } 
+        else 
+                {       
+                n2s(p,i);
+                n-=2;
+                if (i > n)
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                        goto f_err;
+                        }
+        }
         j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
         if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
                 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                 goto f_err;
                 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 
         if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
@@ skipping 42 matching lines @@
                         {
                         /* bad signature */
                         al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
                             SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
                         goto f_err;
                         }
                 }
         else
 #endif
+        if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
+                {   unsigned char signature[64];
+                        int idx;
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
+                        EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
+                        if (i!=64) {
+                                fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
+                        }       
+                        for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
+                                signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
+                        }       
+                        j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+                        if (j<=0) 
+                                {
+                                al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+                                        SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+                                goto f_err;
+                                }       
+                }
+        else    
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
                 goto f_err;
                 }
 
 
         ret=1;
         if (0)
                 {
@@ skipping 162 matching lines @@
         }
 
 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
         {
         unsigned long l;
         X509 *x;
 
         if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
                 {
                 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
-                if (x == NULL &&
-                        /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
-                        (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
-                                & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
-                        != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
+                if (x == NULL)
                         {
-                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                        return(0);
+                        /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+                        if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
+                            (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                                return(0);
+                                }
                         }
 
                 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
                 s->init_num=(int)l;
                 s->init_off=0;
                 }
 
         /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
         return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
         }
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
-static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
-{
-        /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
-         * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
-        switch (nid) {
-        case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
-                return 1;
-        case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
-                return 2;
-        case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
-                return 3;
-        case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
-                return 4;
-        case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
-                return 5;
-        case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
-                return 6;
-        case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
-                return 7;
-        case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
-                return 8;
-        case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
-                return 9;
-        case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
-                return 10;
-        case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
-                return 11;
-        case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
-                return 12;
-        case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
-                return 13;
-        case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
-                return 14;
-        case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
-                return 15;
-        case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
-                return 16;
-        case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
-                return 17;
-        case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
-                return 18;
-        case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
-                return 19;
-        case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
-                return 20;
-        case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
-                return 21;
-        case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
-                return 22;
-        case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
-                return 23;
-        case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
-                return 24;
-        case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */       
-                return 25;
-        default:
-                return 0;
-        }
-}
-#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
         {
         if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
                 {
                 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
                 int len, slen;
                 unsigned int hlen;
                 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
                 HMAC_CTX hctx;
@@ skipping 122 matching lines @@
                 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
                 /* number of bytes to write */
                 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
                 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
                 s->init_off = 0;
                 }
 
         /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
         return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
         }
-#endif
 
-/* ssl3_snap_start_evaluate_handshake verifies the Snap Start prediction (if
- * this is a Snap Start handshake). If it returns non-zero, then we are
- * entering recovery and |s->state| has been set accordingly. */
-static int ssl3_snap_start_evaluate_handshake(SSL* s)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
         {
-        unsigned char digest[8];
+        int ok;
+        unsigned proto_len, padding_len;
+        long n;
+        const unsigned char *p;
 
-        if (!s->s3->snap_start_requested)
+        /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
+         * extension in their ClientHello */
+        if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
+        n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+                SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+                SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
+                SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
+                514,  /* See the payload format below */
+                &ok);
+
+        if (!ok)
+                return((int)n);
+
+        /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
+         * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
+         * by ssl3_get_finished). */
+        if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
+        if (n < 2)
+                return 0;  /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+
+        p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+        /* The payload looks like:
+         *   uint8 proto_len;
+         *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
+         *   uint8 padding_len;
+         *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
+         */
+        proto_len = p[0];
+        if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
+                return 0;
+        padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
+        if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
                 return 0;
 
-        /* Drop the currently queued messages. Either we're entering recovery,
-         * in which case they're wrong, or we're doing snap start, in which
-         * case we don't want to send them. */
-        if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1 /* push new BIO */))
-                return -1;
+        s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
+        if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
+        s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
 
-        fnv1a64_final(digest, (FNV1A64*) s->s3->response_hash);
-
-        /* Turn off FNV hashing of handshake messages. */
-        s->s3->snap_start_requested = 0;
-
-        if (memcmp(digest, s->s3->predicted_response_hash, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
-                {
-                /* The predicted handshake didn't match. */
-                ssl3_snap_start_reset_for_recovery(s);
-                s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-                return 1;
-                }
-
-        return 0;
+        return 1;
         }
-
-/* ssl3_snap_start_reset_for_recovery is called is called when a Snap Start
- * handshake is impossible because either the application layer has rejected
- * the client's suggested server random, or predicated_response_hash failed to
- * match response_hash */
-int ssl3_snap_start_reset_for_recovery(SSL* s)
-        {
-        s->s3->snap_start_requested = 0;
-        s->s3->snap_start_records.left = 0;
-        s->init_num = 0;
-
-        /* Reset the handshake hash and hash in the original ClientHello. */
-        ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-        ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->s3->snap_start_client_hello.buf, s->s3->snap_start_client_hello.left);
-
-        OPENSSL_free(s->s3->snap_start_client_hello.buf);
-        s->s3->snap_start_client_hello.buf = NULL;
-
-        return 0;
-        }
+# endif
+#endif