Revert 113823 - net: move pinning checks into the SSL socket.

net/url_request/url_request_http_job.cc

Index: net/url_request/url_request_http_job.cc
===================================================================
--- net/url_request/url_request_http_job.cc	(revision 113845)
+++ net/url_request/url_request_http_job.cc	(working copy)
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include "base/base_switches.h"
 #include "base/bind.h"
 #include "base/bind_helpers.h"
+#include "base/build_time.h"
 #include "base/command_line.h"
 #include "base/compiler_specific.h"
 #include "base/file_util.h"
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "net/base/sdch_manager.h"
 #include "net/base/ssl_cert_request_info.h"
 #include "net/base/ssl_config_service.h"
+#include "net/base/transport_security_state.h"
 #include "net/http/http_mac_signature.h"
 #include "net/http/http_request_headers.h"
 #include "net/http/http_response_headers.h"
@@ -659,19 +661,53 @@
   // Clear the IO_PENDING status
   SetStatus(URLRequestStatus());
 
-  if (result == ERR_SSL_PINNED_KEY_NOT_IN_CERT_CHAIN &&
-      transaction_->GetResponseInfo() != NULL) {
-    FraudulentCertificateReporter* reporter =
-      context_->fraudulent_certificate_reporter();
-    if (reporter != NULL) {
-      const SSLInfo& ssl_info = transaction_->GetResponseInfo()->ssl_info;
+#if defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
+  // Take care of any mandates for public key pinning.
+  //
+  // Pinning is only enabled for official builds to make sure that others don't
+  // end up with pins that cannot be easily updated.
+  //
+  // TODO(agl): we might have an issue here where a request for foo.example.com
+  // merges into a SPDY connection to www.example.com, and gets a different
+  // certificate.
+  if (transaction_->GetResponseInfo() != NULL) {
+    const SSLInfo& ssl_info = transaction_->GetResponseInfo()->ssl_info;
+    if (ssl_info.is_valid() &&
+        (result == OK || (IsCertificateError(result) &&
+                          IsCertStatusMinorError(ssl_info.cert_status))) &&
+        ssl_info.is_issued_by_known_root &&
+        context_->transport_security_state()) {
+      TransportSecurityState::DomainState domain_state;
       bool sni_available = SSLConfigService::IsSNIAvailable(
           context_->ssl_config_service());
-      const std::string& host = request_->url().host();
+      std::string host = request_->url().host();
 
-      reporter->SendReport(host, ssl_info, sni_available);
+      if (context_->transport_security_state()->HasPinsForHost(
+              &domain_state, host, sni_available)) {
+        if (!domain_state.IsChainOfPublicKeysPermitted(
+                ssl_info.public_key_hashes)) {
+          const base::Time build_time = base::GetBuildTime();
+          // Pins are not enforced if the build is sufficiently old. Chrome
+          // users should get updates every six weeks or so, but it's possible
+          // that some users will stop getting updates for some reason. We
+          // don't want those users building up as a pool of people with bad
+          // pins.
+          if ((base::Time::Now() - build_time).InDays() < 70 /* 10 weeks */) {
+            result = ERR_SSL_PINNED_KEY_NOT_IN_CERT_CHAIN;
+            UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.PublicKeyPinSuccess", false);
+            TransportSecurityState::ReportUMAOnPinFailure(host);
+            FraudulentCertificateReporter* reporter =
+                context_->fraudulent_certificate_reporter();
+            if (reporter != NULL)
+              reporter->SendReport(host, ssl_info, sni_available);
+          }
+        } else {
+          UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Net.PublicKeyPinSuccess", true);
+        }
+      }
     }
   }
+#endif
 
   if (result == OK) {
     scoped_refptr<HttpResponseHeaders> headers = GetResponseHeaders();