Index: crypto/p224_spake.h |
diff --git a/crypto/p224_spake.h b/crypto/p224_spake.h |
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+// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
+// found in the LICENSE file. |
+ |
+#ifndef CRYPTO_P224_SPAKE_H_ |
+#define CRYPTO_P224_SPAKE_H_ |
+#pragma once |
+ |
+#include <base/string_piece.h> |
+#include <crypto/p224.h> |
+#include <crypto/sha2.h> |
+ |
+namespace crypto { |
+ |
+// P224EncryptedKeyExchange provides a means to authenticate an |
+// encrypted transport using a low-entropy, shared secret. |
+// |
+// You need a value derived from the master secret of the connection in order |
+// to bind the authentication to the encrypted channel. It's the |session| |
+// argument to the constructor and can be of any length. |
+// |
+// The password can be low entropy as authenticating with an attacker only |
+// gives the attacker a one-shot password oracle. No other information about |
+// the password is leaked. (However, you must be sure to limit the number of |
+// permitted authentication attempts otherwise they get many one-shot oracles.) |
+// |
+// The protocol requires several RTTs (actually two, but you shouldn't assume |
+// that.) To use the object, call GetMessage() and pass that message to the |
+// peer. Get a message from the peer and feed it into ProcessMessage. Then |
+// examine the return value of ProcessMessage: |
+// kResultPending: Another round is required. Call GetMessage and repeat. |
+// kResultFailed: The authentication has failed. You can get a human readable |
+// error message by calling error(). |
+// kResultSuccess: The authentication was successful. |
+// |
+// In each exchange, each peer always sends a message. |
+class CRYPTO_EXPORT P224EncryptedKeyExchange { |
+ public: |
+ enum Result { |
+ kResultPending, |
+ kResultFailed, |
+ kResultSuccess, |
+ }; |
+ |
+ // PeerType's values are named client and server due to convention. But |
+ // they could be called "A" and "B" as far as the protocol is concerned so |
+ // long as the two parties don't both get the same label. |
+ enum PeerType { |
+ kPeerTypeClient, |
+ kPeerTypeServer, |
+ }; |
+ |
+ // peer_type: the type of the local authentication party. |
+ // password: a, possibly low-entropy, mutually known password. |
+ // session: a value securely derived from the connection's master secret. |
+ // Both parties to the authentication must pass the same value. For the |
+ // case of a TLS connection, see RFC 5705. |
+ P224EncryptedKeyExchange(PeerType peer_type, |
+ const base::StringPiece& password, |
+ const base::StringPiece& session); |
+ |
+ // GetMessage returns a byte string which must be passed to the other party |
+ // in the authentication. |
+ const std::string& GetMessage(); |
+ |
+ // ProcessMessage processes a message which must have been generated by a |
+ // call to GetMessage() by the other party. |
+ Result ProcessMessage(const base::StringPiece& message); |
+ |
+ // In the event that ProcessMessage() returns kResultFailed, error will |
+ // return a human readable error message. |
+ const std::string& error() const; |
+ |
+ private: |
+ // The authentication state machine is very simple and each party proceeds |
+ // through each of these states, in order. |
+ enum State { |
+ kStateInitial, |
+ kStateRecvDH, |
+ kStateSendHash, |
+ kStateRecvHash, |
+ kStateDone, |
+ }; |
+ |
+ State state_; |
+ const bool is_server_; |
+ // next_message_ contains a value for GetMessage() to return. |
+ std::string next_message_; |
+ std::string error_; |
+ |
+ // CalculateHash computes the verification hash for the given peer and writes |
+ // |kSHA256Length| bytes at |out_digest|. |
+ void CalculateHash( |
+ PeerType peer_type, |
+ const std::string& client_masked_dh, |
+ const std::string& server_masked_dh, |
+ const std::string& k, |
+ uint8* out_digest); |
+ |
+ // x_ is the secret Diffie-Hellman exponent (see paper referenced in .cc |
+ // file). |
+ uint8 x_[p224::kScalarBytes]; |
+ // pw_ is SHA256(P(password), P(session))[:28] where P() prepends a uint32, |
+ // big-endian length prefix (see paper refereneced in .cc file). |
+ uint8 pw_[p224::kScalarBytes]; |
+ // expected_authenticator_ is used to store the hash value expected from the |
+ // other party. |
+ uint8 expected_authenticator_[kSHA256Length]; |
+}; |
+ |
+} // namespace crypto |
+ |
+#endif // CRYPTO_P224_SPAKE_H_ |