OLD | NEW |
| (Empty) |
1 // Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
4 | |
5 #include "chrome/common/sandbox_policy.h" | |
6 | |
7 #include <string> | |
8 | |
9 #include "base/command_line.h" | |
10 #include "base/debug/debugger.h" | |
11 #include "base/debug/trace_event.h" | |
12 #include "base/file_util.h" | |
13 #include "base/logging.h" | |
14 #include "base/path_service.h" | |
15 #include "base/process_util.h" | |
16 #include "base/stringprintf.h" | |
17 #include "base/string_util.h" | |
18 #include "base/win/windows_version.h" | |
19 #include "content/browser/content_browser_client.h" | |
20 #include "content/common/content_switches.h" | |
21 #include "content/common/child_process_info.h" | |
22 #include "content/common/debug_flags.h" | |
23 #include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" | |
24 | |
25 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL; | |
26 | |
27 namespace { | |
28 | |
29 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes | |
30 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short | |
31 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension. | |
32 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = { | |
33 L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. | |
34 L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown. | |
35 L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8. | |
36 L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator. | |
37 L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth. | |
38 L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security. | |
39 L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris. | |
40 L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock. | |
41 L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5. | |
42 L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus. | |
43 L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector. | |
44 L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter. | |
45 L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter. | |
46 L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus. | |
47 L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic). | |
48 L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. | |
49 L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro). | |
50 L"libdivx.dll", // DivX. | |
51 L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam. | |
52 L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library). | |
53 L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour. | |
54 L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus. | |
55 L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX. | |
56 L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008. | |
57 L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older). | |
58 L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor. | |
59 L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security. | |
60 L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. | |
61 L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus. | |
62 L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus. | |
63 L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor. | |
64 L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems. | |
65 L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. | |
66 L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. | |
67 L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport. | |
68 L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone. | |
69 L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport. | |
70 L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. | |
71 L"rpmainbrowserrecordplugin.dll", // RealPlayer. | |
72 L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. | |
73 L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor. | |
74 L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown. | |
75 L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2. | |
76 L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard). | |
77 L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6. | |
78 L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5. | |
79 L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX. | |
80 L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface. | |
81 L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus. | |
82 L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools). | |
83 L"ycwebcamerasource.ax", // Cyberlink Camera helper. | |
84 L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. | |
85 L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. | |
86 L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006. | |
87 }; | |
88 | |
89 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|. | |
90 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also | |
91 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders. | |
92 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children, | |
93 sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, | |
94 sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { | |
95 FilePath directory; | |
96 if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory)) | |
97 return false; | |
98 | |
99 if (sub_dir) { | |
100 directory = directory.Append(sub_dir); | |
101 file_util::AbsolutePath(&directory); | |
102 } | |
103 | |
104 sandbox::ResultCode result; | |
105 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, | |
106 directory.value().c_str()); | |
107 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) | |
108 return false; | |
109 | |
110 std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\"; | |
111 if (children) | |
112 directory_str += L"*"; | |
113 // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator. | |
114 | |
115 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, | |
116 directory_str.c_str()); | |
117 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) | |
118 return false; | |
119 | |
120 return true; | |
121 } | |
122 | |
123 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|. | |
124 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys. | |
125 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key, | |
126 sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, | |
127 sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { | |
128 sandbox::ResultCode result; | |
129 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, | |
130 key.c_str()); | |
131 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) | |
132 return false; | |
133 | |
134 key += L"\\*"; | |
135 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, | |
136 key.c_str()); | |
137 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) | |
138 return false; | |
139 | |
140 return true; | |
141 } | |
142 | |
143 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|. | |
144 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) { | |
145 wchar_t path[MAX_PATH]; | |
146 DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path)); | |
147 if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) { | |
148 // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway. | |
149 return false; | |
150 } | |
151 if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path))) | |
152 return false; | |
153 FilePath fname(path); | |
154 return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name); | |
155 } | |
156 | |
157 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist. | |
158 // To minimize the list we only add an unload policy only if the dll is | |
159 // also loaded in this process. All the injected dlls of interest do this. | |
160 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name, | |
161 sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { | |
162 HMODULE module = ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name); | |
163 if (!module) { | |
164 // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We use | |
165 // the most common case: 'thelongname.dll' becomes 'thelon~1.dll'. | |
166 std::wstring name(module_name); | |
167 size_t period = name.rfind(L'.'); | |
168 DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period); | |
169 DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period)); | |
170 if (period <= 8) | |
171 return; | |
172 std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + L"~1"; | |
173 alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size()); | |
174 module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str()); | |
175 if (!module) | |
176 return; | |
177 // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we | |
178 // want to make sure it is the right one. | |
179 if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name)) | |
180 return; | |
181 // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy. | |
182 policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str()); | |
183 } | |
184 policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name); | |
185 VLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name; | |
186 return; | |
187 } | |
188 | |
189 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash. | |
190 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module | |
191 // does not get a chance to execute any code. | |
192 void AddDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { | |
193 for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix) | |
194 BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], policy); | |
195 } | |
196 | |
197 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy. | |
198 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { | |
199 sandbox::ResultCode result; | |
200 | |
201 // Add the policy for the pipes | |
202 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, | |
203 sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, | |
204 L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*"); | |
205 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) | |
206 return false; | |
207 | |
208 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, | |
209 sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, | |
210 L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*"); | |
211 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) | |
212 return false; | |
213 | |
214 // Add the policy for debug message only in debug | |
215 #ifndef NDEBUG | |
216 FilePath app_dir; | |
217 if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir)) | |
218 return false; | |
219 | |
220 wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH]; | |
221 DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(), | |
222 long_path_buf, | |
223 MAX_PATH); | |
224 if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH) | |
225 return false; | |
226 | |
227 string16 debug_message(long_path_buf); | |
228 file_util::AppendToPath(&debug_message, L"debug_message.exe"); | |
229 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, | |
230 sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, | |
231 debug_message.c_str()); | |
232 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) | |
233 return false; | |
234 #endif // NDEBUG | |
235 | |
236 return true; | |
237 } | |
238 | |
239 // For the GPU process we gotten as far as USER_LIMITED. The next level | |
240 // which is USER_RESTRICTED breaks both the DirectX backend and the OpenGL | |
241 // backend. Note that the GPU process is connected to the interactive | |
242 // desktop. | |
243 // TODO(cpu): Lock down the sandbox more if possible. | |
244 // TODO(apatrick): Use D3D9Ex to render windowless. | |
245 bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine*, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { | |
246 policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0); | |
247 | |
248 if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { | |
249 policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, | |
250 sandbox::USER_LIMITED); | |
251 policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); | |
252 } else { | |
253 policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED, | |
254 sandbox::USER_LIMITED); | |
255 } | |
256 | |
257 AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy); | |
258 return true; | |
259 } | |
260 | |
261 void AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { | |
262 policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0); | |
263 | |
264 sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED; | |
265 if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { | |
266 // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main | |
267 // token is restricted. | |
268 initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS; | |
269 } | |
270 | |
271 policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN); | |
272 policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); | |
273 | |
274 bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch( | |
275 switches::kDisableAltWinstation); | |
276 | |
277 if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) { | |
278 DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer"; | |
279 } | |
280 | |
281 AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy); | |
282 } | |
283 | |
284 // The Pepper process as locked-down as a renderer execpt that it can | |
285 // create the server side of chrome pipes. | |
286 bool AddPolicyForPepperPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { | |
287 sandbox::ResultCode result; | |
288 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, | |
289 sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, | |
290 L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.*"); | |
291 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) { | |
292 NOTREACHED(); | |
293 return false; | |
294 } | |
295 AddPolicyForRenderer(policy); | |
296 return true; | |
297 } | |
298 | |
299 } // namespace | |
300 | |
301 namespace sandbox { | |
302 | |
303 void InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) { | |
304 // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread()); | |
305 // See <http://b/1287166>. | |
306 CHECK(broker_services); | |
307 CHECK(!g_broker_services); | |
308 broker_services->Init(); | |
309 g_broker_services = broker_services; | |
310 } | |
311 | |
312 base::ProcessHandle StartProcessWithAccess(CommandLine* cmd_line, | |
313 const FilePath& exposed_dir) { | |
314 base::ProcessHandle process = 0; | |
315 const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); | |
316 ChildProcessInfo::ProcessType type; | |
317 std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType); | |
318 if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) { | |
319 type = ChildProcessInfo::RENDER_PROCESS; | |
320 } else if (type_str == switches::kExtensionProcess) { | |
321 // Extensions are just renderers with another name. | |
322 type = ChildProcessInfo::RENDER_PROCESS; | |
323 } else if (type_str == switches::kPluginProcess) { | |
324 type = ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS; | |
325 } else if (type_str == switches::kWorkerProcess) { | |
326 type = ChildProcessInfo::WORKER_PROCESS; | |
327 } else if (type_str == switches::kNaClLoaderProcess) { | |
328 type = ChildProcessInfo::NACL_LOADER_PROCESS; | |
329 } else if (type_str == switches::kUtilityProcess) { | |
330 type = ChildProcessInfo::UTILITY_PROCESS; | |
331 } else if (type_str == switches::kNaClBrokerProcess) { | |
332 type = ChildProcessInfo::NACL_BROKER_PROCESS; | |
333 } else if (type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) { | |
334 type = ChildProcessInfo::GPU_PROCESS; | |
335 } else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) { | |
336 type = ChildProcessInfo::PPAPI_PLUGIN_PROCESS; | |
337 } else { | |
338 NOTREACHED(); | |
339 return 0; | |
340 } | |
341 | |
342 TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str); | |
343 | |
344 // To decide if the process is going to be sandboxed we have two cases. | |
345 // First case: all process types except the nacl broker, and the plugin | |
346 // process are sandboxed by default. | |
347 bool in_sandbox = | |
348 (type != ChildProcessInfo::NACL_BROKER_PROCESS) && | |
349 (type != ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS); | |
350 | |
351 // If it is the GPU process then it can be disabled by a command line flag. | |
352 if ((type == ChildProcessInfo::GPU_PROCESS) && | |
353 (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox))) { | |
354 in_sandbox = false; | |
355 VLOG(1) << "GPU sandbox is disabled"; | |
356 } | |
357 | |
358 if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) { | |
359 // The user has explicity opted-out from all sandboxing. | |
360 in_sandbox = false; | |
361 } | |
362 | |
363 #if !defined (GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD) | |
364 if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins)) { | |
365 // In process plugins won't work if the sandbox is enabled. | |
366 in_sandbox = false; | |
367 } | |
368 #endif | |
369 if (!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable3DAPIs) && | |
370 !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExperimentalWebGL) && | |
371 browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessWebGL)) { | |
372 // In process WebGL won't work if the sandbox is enabled. | |
373 in_sandbox = false; | |
374 } | |
375 | |
376 // Propagate the Chrome Frame flag to sandboxed processes if present. | |
377 if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) { | |
378 if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) { | |
379 cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame); | |
380 } | |
381 } | |
382 | |
383 bool child_needs_help = | |
384 DebugFlags::ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line, type, in_sandbox); | |
385 | |
386 // Prefetch hints on windows: | |
387 // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows | |
388 // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc. | |
389 cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", type)); | |
390 | |
391 sandbox::ResultCode result; | |
392 PROCESS_INFORMATION target = {0}; | |
393 sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy(); | |
394 | |
395 if (type == ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS && | |
396 !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) && | |
397 content::GetContentClient()->browser()->SandboxPlugin(cmd_line, policy)) { | |
398 in_sandbox = true; | |
399 AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy); | |
400 } | |
401 | |
402 if (!in_sandbox) { | |
403 policy->Release(); | |
404 base::LaunchApp(*cmd_line, false, false, &process); | |
405 return process; | |
406 } | |
407 | |
408 if (type == ChildProcessInfo::GPU_PROCESS) { | |
409 if (!AddPolicyForGPU(cmd_line, policy)) | |
410 return 0; | |
411 } else if (type == ChildProcessInfo::PPAPI_PLUGIN_PROCESS) { | |
412 if (!AddPolicyForPepperPlugin(policy)) | |
413 return 0; | |
414 } else { | |
415 AddPolicyForRenderer(policy); | |
416 | |
417 if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) { | |
418 // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into | |
419 // this subprocess. See | |
420 // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580 | |
421 cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer "); | |
422 } | |
423 } | |
424 | |
425 if (!exposed_dir.empty()) { | |
426 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, | |
427 sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, | |
428 exposed_dir.value().c_str()); | |
429 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) | |
430 return 0; | |
431 | |
432 FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*"); | |
433 result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, | |
434 sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, | |
435 exposed_files.value().c_str()); | |
436 if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) | |
437 return 0; | |
438 } | |
439 | |
440 if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) { | |
441 NOTREACHED(); | |
442 return 0; | |
443 } | |
444 | |
445 TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0); | |
446 | |
447 result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget( | |
448 cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(), | |
449 cmd_line->command_line_string().c_str(), | |
450 policy, &target); | |
451 policy->Release(); | |
452 | |
453 TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0); | |
454 | |
455 if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) | |
456 return 0; | |
457 | |
458 ResumeThread(target.hThread); | |
459 CloseHandle(target.hThread); | |
460 process = target.hProcess; | |
461 | |
462 // Help the process a little. It can't start the debugger by itself if | |
463 // the process is in a sandbox. | |
464 if (child_needs_help) | |
465 base::debug::SpawnDebuggerOnProcess(target.dwProcessId); | |
466 | |
467 return process; | |
468 } | |
469 | |
470 } // namespace sandbox | |
OLD | NEW |