| Index: chrome/common/sandbox_policy.cc
|
| ===================================================================
|
| --- chrome/common/sandbox_policy.cc (revision 86986)
|
| +++ chrome/common/sandbox_policy.cc (working copy)
|
| @@ -14,12 +14,10 @@
|
| #include "base/path_service.h"
|
| #include "base/process_util.h"
|
| #include "base/stringprintf.h"
|
| -#include "base/string_number_conversions.h"
|
| #include "base/string_util.h"
|
| #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
|
| -#include "chrome/common/chrome_constants.h"
|
| -#include "chrome/common/chrome_paths.h"
|
| -#include "chrome/common/chrome_switches.h"
|
| +#include "content/browser/content_browser_client.h"
|
| +#include "content/common/content_switches.h"
|
| #include "content/common/child_process_info.h"
|
| #include "content/common/debug_flags.h"
|
| #include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h"
|
| @@ -88,36 +86,6 @@
|
| L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006.
|
| };
|
|
|
| -enum PluginPolicyCategory {
|
| - PLUGIN_GROUP_TRUSTED,
|
| - PLUGIN_GROUP_UNTRUSTED,
|
| -};
|
| -
|
| -// Returns the policy category for the plugin dll.
|
| -PluginPolicyCategory GetPolicyCategoryForPlugin(
|
| - const std::wstring& dll,
|
| - const std::wstring& list) {
|
| - std::wstring filename = FilePath(dll).BaseName().value();
|
| - std::wstring plugin_dll = StringToLowerASCII(filename);
|
| - std::wstring trusted_plugins = StringToLowerASCII(list);
|
| -
|
| - size_t pos = 0;
|
| - size_t end_item = 0;
|
| - while (end_item != std::wstring::npos) {
|
| - end_item = list.find(L",", pos);
|
| -
|
| - size_t size_item = (end_item == std::wstring::npos) ? end_item :
|
| - end_item - pos;
|
| - std::wstring item = list.substr(pos, size_item);
|
| - if (!item.empty() && item == plugin_dll)
|
| - return PLUGIN_GROUP_TRUSTED;
|
| -
|
| - pos = end_item + 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return PLUGIN_GROUP_UNTRUSTED;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
|
| // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
|
| // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
|
| @@ -246,7 +214,7 @@
|
| // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
|
| #ifndef NDEBUG
|
| FilePath app_dir;
|
| - if (!PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_APP, &app_dir))
|
| + if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
|
| return false;
|
|
|
| wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
|
| @@ -268,247 +236,6 @@
|
| return true;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -// Creates a sandbox without any restriction.
|
| -bool ApplyPolicyForTrustedPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
|
| - policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
|
| - policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED, sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED);
|
| - return true;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -// Creates a sandbox with the plugin running in a restricted environment.
|
| -// Only the "Users" and "Everyone" groups are enabled in the token. The User SID
|
| -// is disabled.
|
| -bool ApplyPolicyForUntrustedPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
|
| - policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
|
| -
|
| - sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
|
| - if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
|
| - // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main token
|
| - // is restricted.
|
| - initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
|
| - }
|
| - policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
|
| - policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_TEMP, NULL, true,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_IE_INTERNET_CACHE, NULL, true,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_APP_DATA, NULL, true,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_PROFILE, NULL, false, /*not recursive*/
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_APP_DATA, L"Adobe", true,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_APP_DATA, L"Macromedia", true,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_LOCAL_APP_DATA, NULL, true,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\ADOBE",
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\MACROMEDIA",
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_VISTA) {
|
| - if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\AppDataLow",
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_LOCAL_APP_DATA_LOW, NULL, true,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - // DIR_APP_DATA is AppData\Roaming, but Adobe needs to do a directory
|
| - // listing in AppData directly, so we add a non-recursive policy for
|
| - // AppData itself.
|
| - if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_APP_DATA, L"..", false,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return true;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -// Launches the privileged flash broker, used when flash is sandboxed.
|
| -// The broker is the same flash dll, except that it uses a different
|
| -// entrypoint (BrokerMain) and it is hosted in windows' generic surrogate
|
| -// process rundll32. After launching the broker we need to pass to
|
| -// the flash plugin the process id of the broker via the command line
|
| -// using --flash-broker=pid.
|
| -// More info about rundll32 at http://support.microsoft.com/kb/164787.
|
| -bool LoadFlashBroker(const FilePath& plugin_path, CommandLine* cmd_line) {
|
| - FilePath rundll;
|
| - if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_SYSTEM, &rundll))
|
| - return false;
|
| - rundll = rundll.AppendASCII("rundll32.exe");
|
| - // Rundll32 cannot handle paths with spaces, so we use the short path.
|
| - wchar_t short_path[MAX_PATH];
|
| - if (0 == ::GetShortPathNameW(plugin_path.value().c_str(),
|
| - short_path, arraysize(short_path)))
|
| - return false;
|
| - // Here is the kicker, if the user has disabled 8.3 (short path) support
|
| - // on the volume GetShortPathNameW does not fail but simply returns the
|
| - // input path. In this case if the path had any spaces then rundll32 will
|
| - // incorrectly interpret its parameters. So we quote the path, even though
|
| - // the kb/164787 says you should not.
|
| - std::wstring cmd_final =
|
| - base::StringPrintf(L"%ls \"%ls\",BrokerMain browser=chrome",
|
| - rundll.value().c_str(),
|
| - short_path);
|
| - base::ProcessHandle process;
|
| - if (!base::LaunchApp(cmd_final, false, true, &process))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("flash-broker",
|
| - base::Int64ToString(::GetProcessId(process)));
|
| -
|
| - // The flash broker, unders some circumstances can linger beyond the lifetime
|
| - // of the flash player, so we put it in a job object, when the browser
|
| - // terminates the job object is destroyed (by the OS) and the flash broker
|
| - // is terminated.
|
| - HANDLE job = ::CreateJobObjectW(NULL, NULL);
|
| - JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_limits = {0};
|
| - job_limits.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags =
|
| - JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE;
|
| - if (::SetInformationJobObject(job, JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation,
|
| - &job_limits, sizeof(job_limits))) {
|
| - ::AssignProcessToJobObject(job, process);
|
| - // Yes, we are leaking the object here. Read comment above.
|
| - } else {
|
| - ::CloseHandle(job);
|
| - return false;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ::CloseHandle(process);
|
| - return true;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -// Creates a sandbox for the built-in flash plugin running in a restricted
|
| -// environment. This policy is in continual flux as flash changes
|
| -// capabilities. For more information see bug 50796.
|
| -bool ApplyPolicyForBuiltInFlashPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
|
| - policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
|
| - // Vista and Win7 get a weaker token but have low integrity.
|
| - if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
|
| - policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
|
| - sandbox::USER_INTERACTIVE);
|
| - policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
|
| - } else {
|
| - policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
|
| - sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE",
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| - if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM",
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE",
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY,
|
| - policy))
|
| - return false;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
|
| - return true;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -// Returns true of the plugin specified in |cmd_line| is the built-in
|
| -// flash plugin and optionally returns its full path in |flash_path|
|
| -bool IsBuiltInFlash(const CommandLine* cmd_line, FilePath* flash_path) {
|
| - std::wstring plugin_dll = cmd_line->
|
| - GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kPluginPath);
|
| -
|
| - FilePath builtin_flash;
|
| - if (!PathService::Get(chrome::FILE_FLASH_PLUGIN, &builtin_flash))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - FilePath plugin_path(plugin_dll);
|
| - if (plugin_path != builtin_flash)
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - if (flash_path)
|
| - *flash_path = plugin_path;
|
| - return true;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -// Adds the custom policy rules for a given plugin. |trusted_plugins| contains
|
| -// the comma separate list of plugin dll names that should not be sandboxed.
|
| -bool AddPolicyForPlugin(CommandLine* cmd_line,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
|
| - std::wstring plugin_dll = cmd_line->
|
| - GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kPluginPath);
|
| - std::wstring trusted_plugins = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->
|
| - GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kTrustedPlugins);
|
| - // Add the policy for the pipes.
|
| - sandbox::ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
|
| - result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
|
| - L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.*");
|
| - if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
|
| - NOTREACHED();
|
| - return false;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - // The built-in flash gets a custom, more restricted sandbox.
|
| - FilePath flash_path;
|
| - if (IsBuiltInFlash(cmd_line, &flash_path)) {
|
| - // Spawn the flash broker and apply sandbox policy.
|
| - if (!LoadFlashBroker(flash_path, cmd_line)) {
|
| - // Could not start the broker, use a very weak policy instead.
|
| - DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to start flash broker";
|
| - return ApplyPolicyForTrustedPlugin(policy);
|
| - }
|
| - return ApplyPolicyForBuiltInFlashPlugin(policy);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - PluginPolicyCategory policy_category =
|
| - GetPolicyCategoryForPlugin(plugin_dll, trusted_plugins);
|
| -
|
| - switch (policy_category) {
|
| - case PLUGIN_GROUP_TRUSTED:
|
| - return ApplyPolicyForTrustedPlugin(policy);
|
| - case PLUGIN_GROUP_UNTRUSTED:
|
| - return ApplyPolicyForUntrustedPlugin(policy);
|
| - default:
|
| - NOTREACHED();
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return false;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| // For the GPU process we gotten as far as USER_LIMITED. The next level
|
| // which is USER_RESTRICTED breaks both the DirectX backend and the OpenGL
|
| // backend. Note that the GPU process is connected to the interactive
|
| @@ -621,18 +348,7 @@
|
| (type != ChildProcessInfo::NACL_BROKER_PROCESS) &&
|
| (type != ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS);
|
|
|
| - // Second case: If it is the plugin process then it depends on it being
|
| - // the built-in flash, the user forcing plugins into sandbox or the
|
| - // the user explicitly excluding flash from the sandbox.
|
| - if (!in_sandbox && (type == ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS)) {
|
| - in_sandbox = browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSafePlugins) ||
|
| - (IsBuiltInFlash(cmd_line, NULL) &&
|
| - (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) &&
|
| - !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableFlashSandbox));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - // Third case: If it is the GPU process then it can be disabled by a
|
| - // command line flag.
|
| + // If it is the GPU process then it can be disabled by a command line flag.
|
| if ((type == ChildProcessInfo::GPU_PROCESS) &&
|
| (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox))) {
|
| in_sandbox = false;
|
| @@ -672,19 +388,24 @@
|
| // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
|
| cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", type));
|
|
|
| + sandbox::ResultCode result;
|
| + PROCESS_INFORMATION target = {0};
|
| + sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
|
| +
|
| + if (type == ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS &&
|
| + !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) &&
|
| + content::GetContentClient()->browser()->SandboxPlugin(cmd_line, policy)) {
|
| + in_sandbox = true;
|
| + AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| if (!in_sandbox) {
|
| + policy->Release();
|
| base::LaunchApp(*cmd_line, false, false, &process);
|
| return process;
|
| }
|
|
|
| - sandbox::ResultCode result;
|
| - PROCESS_INFORMATION target = {0};
|
| - sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
|
| -
|
| - if (type == ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS) {
|
| - if (!AddPolicyForPlugin(cmd_line, policy))
|
| - return 0;
|
| - } else if (type == ChildProcessInfo::GPU_PROCESS) {
|
| + if (type == ChildProcessInfo::GPU_PROCESS) {
|
| if (!AddPolicyForGPU(cmd_line, policy))
|
| return 0;
|
| } else if (type == ChildProcessInfo::PPAPI_PLUGIN_PROCESS) {
|
|
|