Return the constructed certificate chain in X509Certificate::Verify()

net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc

Index: net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc
diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc
index 26926b4d81ffe395324fa73805bc28edcc83e9c3..c25d6aa64b5dd9e7cea714eff73e3a7d95a4f5d6 100644
--- a/net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc
+++ b/net/base/x509_certificate_win.cc
@@ -295,16 +295,28 @@ bool CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) {
 // this function.
 void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context,
                       CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
+  if (chain_context->cChain < 1)
+    return;

[wtc, 2011/07/26 00:16:35]

Why don't you test chain_context->cChain == 0 here?
Can cChain be negative?

[Ryan Sleevi, 2011/07/26 00:44:15]

No, it's a DWORD, so it's unsigned. Updated to be explicit about the check for
== 0. And it's a check for pathologically bad/broken crypto providers, rather
than potentially dereferencing an invalid address.

+
   PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0];
   int num_elements = first_chain->cElement;
   PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement;
 
+  PCCERT_CONTEXT verified_cert = NULL;
+  std::vector<PCCERT_CONTEXT> verified_chain;
+
   // Each chain starts with the end entity certificate (i = 0) and ends with
   // the root CA certificate (i = num_elements - 1).  Do not inspect the
   // signature algorithm of the root CA certificate because the signature on
   // the trust anchor is not important.
   for (int i = 0; i < num_elements - 1; ++i) {
     PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext;
+    if (i == 0) {
+      verified_cert = cert;
+    } else {
+      verified_chain.push_back(cert);
+    }
+
     const char* algorithm = cert->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId;
     if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD5RSA) == 0) {
       // md5WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4
@@ -321,6 +333,14 @@ void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context,
       verify_result->has_md4 = true;
     }
   }
+
+  if (verified_cert) {
+    // Add the root certificate, if present, as it was not added above.
+    if (num_elements > 1)
+      verified_chain.push_back(element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext);
+    verify_result->verified_cert =
+          X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain);
+  }
 }
 
 // Decodes the cert's certificatePolicies extension into a CERT_POLICIES_INFO
@@ -674,8 +694,8 @@ int X509Certificate::Verify(const std::string& hostname,
                             int flags,
                             CertVerifyResult* verify_result) const {
   verify_result->Reset();
-  if (!cert_handle_)
-    return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+  verify_result->verified_cert =
+      CreateFromHandle(cert_handle_, GetIntermediateCertificates());
 
   if (IsBlacklisted()) {
     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;