Baseline minijail with a commandline switch driven main.

src/platform/minijail/env.cc

Index: src/platform/minijail/env.cc
diff --git a/src/platform/minijail/env.cc b/src/platform/minijail/env.cc
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+++ b/src/platform/minijail/env.cc
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+// Copyright (c) 2009 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+// Some portions Copyright (c) 2009 The Chromium Authors.
+//
+// Default implementation of the Env interface.
+
+#include "minijail/env.h"
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <base/logging.h>
+
+// prctl constants that are still missing in the headers.
+#define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS    7
+#define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS    8
+#define PR_CAPBSET_READ   23
+#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP   24
+#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27
+#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28
+
+namespace chromeos {
+
+namespace minijail {
+
+bool Env::DisableTracing() const {
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Disabling DUMPABLE...";
+  if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to set PR_SET_KEEPCAPS";
+  }
+  if (prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
+    LOG(FATAL) << "PR_SET_DUMPABLE could not be set";
+  }
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Success";
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool Env::KeepRootCapabilities() const {
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Enabling KEEPCAPS...";
+  if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1) < 0) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to set PR_SET_KEEPCAPS";
+   }
+  if (prctl(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS, 0) != 1) {
+    LOG(FATAL) << "PR_GET_KEEPCAPS could not be set";
+  }
+
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Success.";
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool Env::DisableDefaultRootPrivileges() const {
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Enabling SECURE_ALL...";
+  // From: kernel/include/linux/securebits.h:
+  // http://git.chromium.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=kernel.git;a=blob;f=include/linux/securebits.h
+  const int kSecureBitsAllLocked = 0x3f;
+  if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, kSecureBitsAllLocked)) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to set PR_SET_SECUREBITS";
+  }
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Success.";
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool Env::ChangeUser(uid_t uid, gid_t gid) const {
+  // TODO(wad) support supplemental groups
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Dropping root...";
+  if (setgroups(0, NULL)) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to drop supplementary groups";
+  }
+  if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid)) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to change to gid " << gid;
+  }
+  if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid)) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to change to uid " << uid;
+  }
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Success.";
+  return true;
+}
+
+// At present, the total number of capabilities is less than 32. We
+// will just pack them into a bitmask to save on effort.
+bool Env::SanitizeBoundingSet(uint64 cap_mask) const {
+  unsigned int cap;
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Cleaning the bounding set...";
+  // XXX: we read until prctl complains but that may not
+  // match CAP_LAST_CAP.  We'll just drop the excess if it turns up.
+  // We mustn´t drop CAP_SETPCAP on the way though.
+  static const uint32 kBitsInAByte = 8;
+  static const uint32 kMaxCaps = sizeof(cap_mask) * kBitsInAByte;
+  for (cap = 0; cap < kMaxCaps && prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, cap) >= 0; ++cap) {
+    if (cap == CAP_SETPCAP) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (cap_mask & (1ULL << (cap))) {
+      DLOG(INFO) << "Leaving cap " << cap << " in bounding set";
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, cap)) {
+      PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to clean the bounding set of cap " << cap;
+    }
+  }
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Success.";
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool Env::SanitizeCapabilities(uint64 effective_capmask) const {
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Dropping capabilities...";
+  unsigned int cap;
+  cap_t caps = cap_get_proc();
+  cap_value_t raise_flag[1];
+  if (!caps) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "cap_get_proc failed";
+  }
+  if (cap_clear_flag(caps, CAP_INHERITABLE)) {
+     PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to clear all inheritable caps";
+  }
+  if (cap_clear_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE)) {
+     PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to clear all effective caps";
+  }
+  if (cap_clear_flag(caps, CAP_PERMITTED)) {
+     PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to clear all permitted caps";
+  }
+  for (cap = 0; cap < sizeof(effective_capmask)*8; ++cap) {
+    // In a secure_noroot jail, cap_setpcap is safe.
+    if (cap == CAP_SETPCAP ||
+        effective_capmask & (1 << cap)) {
+      raise_flag[0] = cap;
+      DLOG(INFO) << "Adding cap " << cap << "=eip";
+      if (cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, raise_flag, CAP_SET)) {
+        PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to add cap " << cap << " to the effective set";
+      }
+      if (cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, raise_flag, CAP_SET)) {
+        PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to add cap " << cap << " to the permitted set";
+      }
+      if (cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, raise_flag, CAP_SET)) {
+        PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to add cap " << cap << " to the inherite set";
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if (cap_set_proc(caps)) {
+     PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to apply cleaned capset";
+  }
+  cap_free(caps);
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Success.";
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool Env::FilterSyscallsBySource() const {
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Calling seccomp(2)";
+  if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2)) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to enabled seccomp(2)";
+  }
+  DLOG(INFO) << "System calls now filtered by source";
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool Env::FilterSyscallsBenchmarkOnly() const {
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Calling seccomp(3)";
+  if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 3)) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to enabled seccomp(3)";
+  }
+  DLOG(INFO) << "System calls now nop filtered";
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool Env::EnterNamespace(int namespaces) const {
+  if (namespaces == 0) {
+    DLOG(INFO) << "No namespacing to be done.";
+    return true;
+  }
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Entering namespaces " << namespaces;
+  // TODO(wad) support namespace args
+  const pid_t pid = syscall(
+      __NR_clone, namespaces | CLONE_VFORK | SIGCHLD, 0, 0, 0);
+  if (pid == -1) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Could not use PID namespacing";
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (pid) {
+    // Kill the original process without atexit handlers.
+    DLOG(INFO) << "original process death:" << pid;
+    _exit(0);
+  }
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Success: " << getpid();
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool Env::Mount() const {
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Attempting to mount /proc RO.";
+  if (mount("proc",
+            "/proc",
+            "proc",
+            MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID|MS_RDONLY,
+            "")) {
+    PLOG(FATAL) << "Failed to mount a local /proc";
+  }
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Success.";
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool Env::Run(const char *path, char * const *argv, char * const *envp) const {
+  // TODO(wad) log-pid option
+  DLOG(INFO) << "Executing: " << path << " with args: ";
+  for (char * const* arg = argv; *arg; ++arg) {
+    DLOG(INFO) << "-> " << *arg;
+  }
+  execve(path, argv, envp);
+  PLOG(FATAL) << "failed to execute " << path;
+  return false;
+}
+
+}  // namespace minijail
+}  // namespace chromeos