Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c |
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c |
new file mode 100644 |
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..23f52a23ca3ccb0e503b036c2f0177d27a7b7813 |
--- /dev/null |
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c |
@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@ |
+/* |
+ * Gather (Read) entire SSL2 records from socket into buffer. |
+ * |
+ * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK ***** |
+ * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1 |
+ * |
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version |
+ * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with |
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at |
+ * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ |
+ * |
+ * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, |
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License |
+ * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the |
+ * License. |
+ * |
+ * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries. |
+ * |
+ * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is |
+ * Netscape Communications Corporation. |
+ * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000 |
+ * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved. |
+ * |
+ * Contributor(s): |
+ * |
+ * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of |
+ * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or |
+ * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"), |
+ * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead |
+ * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only |
+ * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to |
+ * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your |
+ * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice |
+ * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete |
+ * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under |
+ * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL. |
+ * |
+ * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */ |
+/* $Id: sslgathr.c,v 1.10 2009/10/16 17:45:35 wtc%google.com Exp $ */ |
+#include "cert.h" |
+#include "ssl.h" |
+#include "sslimpl.h" |
+#include "sslproto.h" |
+ |
+/* Forward static declarations */ |
+static SECStatus ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss); |
+ |
+/* |
+** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code |
+** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of |
+** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data |
+** for the record into gs->buf. This code handles non-blocking I/O |
+** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0. |
+** This function decrypts the gathered record in place, in gs_buf. |
+ * |
+ * Caller must hold RecvBufLock. |
+ * |
+ * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record. |
+ * Returns 0 if it hits EOF. |
+ * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error |
+ * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) when it gathers an SSL v3 client hello header. |
+** |
+** The SSL2 Gather State machine has 4 states: |
+** GS_INIT - Done reading in previous record. Haven't begun to read in |
+** next record. When ssl2_GatherData is called with the machine |
+** in this state, the machine will attempt to read the first 3 |
+** bytes of the SSL2 record header, and will advance the state |
+** to GS_HEADER. |
+** |
+** GS_HEADER - The machine is in this state while waiting for the completion |
+** of the first 3 bytes of the SSL2 record. When complete, the |
+** machine will compute the remaining unread length of this record |
+** and will initiate a read of that many bytes. The machine will |
+** advance to one of two states, depending on whether the record |
+** is encrypted (GS_MAC), or unencrypted (GS_DATA). |
+** |
+** GS_MAC - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder |
+** of the SSL2 record to be read in. When the read is completed, |
+** the machine checks the record for valid length, decrypts it, |
+** and checks and discards the MAC, then advances to GS_INIT. |
+** |
+** GS_DATA - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder |
+** of the unencrypted SSL2 record to be read in. Upon completion, |
+** the machine advances to the GS_INIT state and returns the data. |
+*/ |
+int |
+ssl2_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags) |
+{ |
+ unsigned char * bp; |
+ unsigned char * pBuf; |
+ int nb, err, rv; |
+ |
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); |
+ |
+ if (gs->state == GS_INIT) { |
+ /* Initialize gathering engine */ |
+ gs->state = GS_HEADER; |
+ gs->remainder = 3; |
+ gs->count = 3; |
+ gs->offset = 0; |
+ gs->recordLen = 0; |
+ gs->recordPadding = 0; |
+ gs->hdr[2] = 0; |
+ |
+ gs->writeOffset = 0; |
+ gs->readOffset = 0; |
+ } |
+ if (gs->encrypted) { |
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.hash != 0); |
+ } |
+ |
+ pBuf = gs->buf.buf; |
+ for (;;) { |
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)", |
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder)); |
+ bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? pBuf : gs->hdr) + gs->offset; |
+ nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags); |
+ if (nb > 0) { |
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb)); |
+ } |
+ if (nb == 0) { |
+ /* EOF */ |
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); |
+ rv = 0; |
+ break; |
+ } |
+ if (nb < 0) { |
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, |
+ PR_GetError())); |
+ rv = SECFailure; |
+ break; |
+ } |
+ |
+ gs->offset += nb; |
+ gs->remainder -= nb; |
+ |
+ if (gs->remainder > 0) { |
+ continue; |
+ } |
+ |
+ /* Probably finished this piece */ |
+ switch (gs->state) { |
+ case GS_HEADER: |
+ if ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) { |
+ |
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) ); |
+ |
+ /* If this looks like an SSL3 handshake record, |
+ ** and we're expecting an SSL2 Hello message from our peer, |
+ ** handle it here. |
+ */ |
+ if (gs->hdr[0] == content_handshake) { |
+ if ((ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage) || |
+ (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage)) { |
+ rv = ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(ss); |
+ if (rv == SECFailure) { |
+ return SECFailure; |
+ } |
+ } |
+ /* XXX_1 The call stack to here is: |
+ * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake -> |
+ * ssl2_GatherRecord -> here. |
+ * We want to return all the way out to ssl_Do1stHandshake, |
+ * and have it call ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake again. |
+ * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will call |
+ * ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake when it is called again. |
+ * |
+ * Returning SECWouldBlock here causes |
+ * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to return without clearing |
+ * ss->handshake, ensuring that ssl_Do1stHandshake will |
+ * call it again immediately. |
+ * |
+ * If we return 1 here, ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will |
+ * clear ss->handshake before returning, and thus will not |
+ * be called again by ssl_Do1stHandshake. |
+ */ |
+ return SECWouldBlock; |
+ } else if (gs->hdr[0] == content_alert) { |
+ if (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage) { |
+ /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any failure |
+ * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match |
+ * XXX ciphers. |
+ */ |
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); |
+ return SECFailure; |
+ } |
+ } |
+ } /* ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) */ |
+ |
+ /* we've got the first 3 bytes. The header may be two or three. */ |
+ if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) { |
+ /* This record has a 2-byte header, and no padding */ |
+ gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1]; |
+ gs->recordPadding = 0; |
+ } else { |
+ /* This record has a 3-byte header that is all read in now. */ |
+ gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x3f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1]; |
+ /* is_escape = (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) != 0; */ |
+ gs->recordPadding = gs->hdr[2]; |
+ } |
+ if (!gs->count) { |
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); |
+ goto cleanup; |
+ } |
+ |
+ if (gs->count > gs->buf.space) { |
+ err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, gs->count); |
+ if (err) { |
+ return err; |
+ } |
+ pBuf = gs->buf.buf; |
+ } |
+ |
+ |
+ if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) { |
+ /* we've already read in the first byte of the body. |
+ ** Put it into the buffer. |
+ */ |
+ pBuf[0] = gs->hdr[2]; |
+ gs->offset = 1; |
+ gs->remainder = gs->count - 1; |
+ } else { |
+ gs->offset = 0; |
+ gs->remainder = gs->count; |
+ } |
+ |
+ if (gs->encrypted) { |
+ gs->state = GS_MAC; |
+ gs->recordLen = gs->count - gs->recordPadding |
+ - ss->sec.hash->length; |
+ } else { |
+ gs->state = GS_DATA; |
+ gs->recordLen = gs->count; |
+ } |
+ |
+ break; |
+ |
+ |
+ case GS_MAC: |
+ /* Have read in entire rest of the ciphertext. |
+ ** Check for valid length. |
+ ** Decrypt it. |
+ ** Check the MAC. |
+ */ |
+ PORT_Assert(gs->encrypted); |
+ |
+ { |
+ unsigned int macLen; |
+ int nout; |
+ unsigned char mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_BYTES]; |
+ |
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /**********************************/ |
+ |
+ /* If this is a stream cipher, blockSize will be 1, |
+ * and this test will always be false. |
+ * If this is a block cipher, this will detect records |
+ * that are not a multiple of the blocksize in length. |
+ */ |
+ if (gs->count & (ss->sec.blockSize - 1)) { |
+ /* This is an error. Sender is misbehaving */ |
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: sender, count=%d blockSize=%d", |
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->count, |
+ ss->sec.blockSize)); |
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING); |
+ rv = SECFailure; |
+ goto spec_locked_done; |
+ } |
+ PORT_Assert(gs->count == gs->offset); |
+ |
+ if (gs->offset == 0) { |
+ rv = 0; /* means EOF. */ |
+ goto spec_locked_done; |
+ } |
+ |
+ /* Decrypt the portion of data that we just recieved. |
+ ** Decrypt it in place. |
+ */ |
+ rv = (*ss->sec.dec)(ss->sec.readcx, pBuf, &nout, gs->offset, |
+ pBuf, gs->offset); |
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
+ goto spec_locked_done; |
+ } |
+ |
+ |
+ /* Have read in all the MAC portion of record |
+ ** |
+ ** Prepare MAC by resetting it and feeding it the shared secret |
+ */ |
+ macLen = ss->sec.hash->length; |
+ if (gs->offset >= macLen) { |
+ PRUint32 sequenceNumber = ss->sec.rcvSequence++; |
+ unsigned char seq[4]; |
+ |
+ seq[0] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 24); |
+ seq[1] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 16); |
+ seq[2] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 8); |
+ seq[3] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber); |
+ |
+ (*ss->sec.hash->begin)(ss->sec.hashcx); |
+ (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, ss->sec.rcvSecret.data, |
+ ss->sec.rcvSecret.len); |
+ (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, pBuf + macLen, |
+ gs->offset - macLen); |
+ (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, seq, 4); |
+ (*ss->sec.hash->end)(ss->sec.hashcx, mac, &macLen, macLen); |
+ } |
+ |
+ PORT_Assert(macLen == ss->sec.hash->length); |
+ |
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************/ |
+ |
+ if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(mac, pBuf, macLen) != 0) { |
+ /* MAC's didn't match... */ |
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: mac check failed, seq=%d", |
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.rcvSequence)); |
+ PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "computed mac:", mac, macLen)); |
+ PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "received mac:", pBuf, macLen)); |
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); |
+ rv = SECFailure; |
+ goto cleanup; |
+ } |
+ |
+ |
+ PORT_Assert(gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset); |
+ if (gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset) { |
+ gs->recordOffset = macLen; |
+ gs->readOffset = macLen; |
+ gs->writeOffset = gs->offset - gs->recordPadding; |
+ rv = 1; |
+ } else { |
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING); |
+cleanup: |
+ /* nothing in the buffer any more. */ |
+ gs->recordOffset = 0; |
+ gs->readOffset = 0; |
+ gs->writeOffset = 0; |
+ rv = SECFailure; |
+ } |
+ |
+ gs->recordLen = gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset; |
+ gs->recordPadding = 0; /* forget we did any padding. */ |
+ gs->state = GS_INIT; |
+ |
+ |
+ if (rv > 0) { |
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:", |
+ pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen)); |
+ } |
+ return rv; |
+ |
+spec_locked_done: |
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); |
+ return rv; |
+ } |
+ |
+ case GS_DATA: |
+ /* Have read in all the DATA portion of record */ |
+ |
+ gs->recordOffset = 0; |
+ gs->readOffset = 0; |
+ gs->writeOffset = gs->offset; |
+ PORT_Assert(gs->recordLen == gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset); |
+ gs->recordLen = gs->offset; |
+ gs->recordPadding = 0; |
+ gs->state = GS_INIT; |
+ |
+ ++ss->sec.rcvSequence; |
+ |
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:", |
+ pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen)); |
+ return 1; |
+ |
+ } /* end switch gs->state */ |
+ } /* end gather loop. */ |
+ return rv; |
+} |
+ |
+/* |
+** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code |
+** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of |
+** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data |
+** for the record into the readBuf. This code handles non-blocking I/O |
+** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0. |
+ * |
+ * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record. |
+ * Returns 0 if it hits EOF. |
+ * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error |
+ * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) |
+ * |
+ * Called by ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c, |
+ * and by DoRecv in sslsecur.c |
+ * Caller must hold RecvBufLock. |
+ */ |
+int |
+ssl2_GatherRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags) |
+{ |
+ return ssl2_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags); |
+} |
+ |
+/* |
+ * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record. |
+ * Returns 0 if it hits EOF. |
+ * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error |
+ * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) |
+ * |
+ * Called from SocksStartGather in sslsocks.c |
+ * Caller must hold RecvBufLock. |
+ */ |
+int |
+ssl2_StartGatherBytes(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, unsigned int count) |
+{ |
+ int rv; |
+ |
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); |
+ gs->state = GS_DATA; |
+ gs->remainder = count; |
+ gs->count = count; |
+ gs->offset = 0; |
+ if (count > gs->buf.space) { |
+ rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, count); |
+ if (rv) { |
+ return rv; |
+ } |
+ } |
+ return ssl2_GatherData(ss, gs, 0); |
+} |
+ |
+/* Caller should hold RecvBufLock. */ |
+SECStatus |
+ssl_InitGather(sslGather *gs) |
+{ |
+ SECStatus status; |
+ |
+ gs->state = GS_INIT; |
+ gs->writeOffset = 0; |
+ gs->readOffset = 0; |
+ status = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, 4096); |
+ return status; |
+} |
+ |
+/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */ |
+void |
+ssl_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs) |
+{ |
+ if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */ |
+ PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space); |
+ PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf); |
+ } |
+} |
+ |
+/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */ |
+static SECStatus |
+ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss) |
+{ |
+ SECStatus rv; |
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2]; |
+ |
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); |
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) ); |
+ |
+ /* We've read in 3 bytes, there are 2 more to go in an ssl3 header. */ |
+ ss->gs.remainder = 2; |
+ ss->gs.count = 0; |
+ |
+ /* Clearing these handshake pointers ensures that |
+ * ssl_Do1stHandshake won't call ssl2_HandleMessage when we return. |
+ */ |
+ ss->nextHandshake = 0; |
+ ss->securityHandshake = 0; |
+ |
+ /* Setting ss->version to an SSL 3.x value will cause |
+ ** ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to invoke ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake() |
+ ** the next time it is called. |
+ **/ |
+ rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version); |
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
+ return rv; |
+ } |
+ |
+ ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; |
+ |
+ return SECSuccess; |
+} |