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Unified Diff: net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c

Issue 394003: Linux: enable building with a local version of libssl. (Closed)
Patch Set: ... Created 11 years, 1 month ago
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Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..23f52a23ca3ccb0e503b036c2f0177d27a7b7813
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
+/*
+ * Gather (Read) entire SSL2 records from socket into buffer.
+ *
+ * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
+ * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
+ * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
+ *
+ * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
+ * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
+ *
+ * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
+ * Netscape Communications Corporation.
+ * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
+ * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Contributor(s):
+ *
+ * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
+ * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
+ * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
+ * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
+ * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
+ * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
+ * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
+ * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
+ * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
+ * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
+ * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
+ *
+ * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
+/* $Id: sslgathr.c,v 1.10 2009/10/16 17:45:35 wtc%google.com Exp $ */
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+
+/* Forward static declarations */
+static SECStatus ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss);
+
+/*
+** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code
+** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of
+** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data
+** for the record into gs->buf. This code handles non-blocking I/O
+** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0.
+** This function decrypts the gathered record in place, in gs_buf.
+ *
+ * Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
+ *
+ * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
+ * Returns 0 if it hits EOF.
+ * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error
+ * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) when it gathers an SSL v3 client hello header.
+**
+** The SSL2 Gather State machine has 4 states:
+** GS_INIT - Done reading in previous record. Haven't begun to read in
+** next record. When ssl2_GatherData is called with the machine
+** in this state, the machine will attempt to read the first 3
+** bytes of the SSL2 record header, and will advance the state
+** to GS_HEADER.
+**
+** GS_HEADER - The machine is in this state while waiting for the completion
+** of the first 3 bytes of the SSL2 record. When complete, the
+** machine will compute the remaining unread length of this record
+** and will initiate a read of that many bytes. The machine will
+** advance to one of two states, depending on whether the record
+** is encrypted (GS_MAC), or unencrypted (GS_DATA).
+**
+** GS_MAC - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder
+** of the SSL2 record to be read in. When the read is completed,
+** the machine checks the record for valid length, decrypts it,
+** and checks and discards the MAC, then advances to GS_INIT.
+**
+** GS_DATA - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder
+** of the unencrypted SSL2 record to be read in. Upon completion,
+** the machine advances to the GS_INIT state and returns the data.
+*/
+int
+ssl2_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags)
+{
+ unsigned char * bp;
+ unsigned char * pBuf;
+ int nb, err, rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
+
+ if (gs->state == GS_INIT) {
+ /* Initialize gathering engine */
+ gs->state = GS_HEADER;
+ gs->remainder = 3;
+ gs->count = 3;
+ gs->offset = 0;
+ gs->recordLen = 0;
+ gs->recordPadding = 0;
+ gs->hdr[2] = 0;
+
+ gs->writeOffset = 0;
+ gs->readOffset = 0;
+ }
+ if (gs->encrypted) {
+ PORT_Assert(ss->sec.hash != 0);
+ }
+
+ pBuf = gs->buf.buf;
+ for (;;) {
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder));
+ bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? pBuf : gs->hdr) + gs->offset;
+ nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags);
+ if (nb > 0) {
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb));
+ }
+ if (nb == 0) {
+ /* EOF */
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ rv = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (nb < 0) {
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+ PR_GetError()));
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ gs->offset += nb;
+ gs->remainder -= nb;
+
+ if (gs->remainder > 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Probably finished this piece */
+ switch (gs->state) {
+ case GS_HEADER:
+ if ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) {
+
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+ /* If this looks like an SSL3 handshake record,
+ ** and we're expecting an SSL2 Hello message from our peer,
+ ** handle it here.
+ */
+ if (gs->hdr[0] == content_handshake) {
+ if ((ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage) ||
+ (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage)) {
+ rv = ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(ss);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ /* XXX_1 The call stack to here is:
+ * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake ->
+ * ssl2_GatherRecord -> here.
+ * We want to return all the way out to ssl_Do1stHandshake,
+ * and have it call ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake again.
+ * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will call
+ * ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake when it is called again.
+ *
+ * Returning SECWouldBlock here causes
+ * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to return without clearing
+ * ss->handshake, ensuring that ssl_Do1stHandshake will
+ * call it again immediately.
+ *
+ * If we return 1 here, ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will
+ * clear ss->handshake before returning, and thus will not
+ * be called again by ssl_Do1stHandshake.
+ */
+ return SECWouldBlock;
+ } else if (gs->hdr[0] == content_alert) {
+ if (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage) {
+ /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any failure
+ * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match
+ * XXX ciphers.
+ */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ } /* ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) */
+
+ /* we've got the first 3 bytes. The header may be two or three. */
+ if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
+ /* This record has a 2-byte header, and no padding */
+ gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
+ gs->recordPadding = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* This record has a 3-byte header that is all read in now. */
+ gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x3f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
+ /* is_escape = (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) != 0; */
+ gs->recordPadding = gs->hdr[2];
+ }
+ if (!gs->count) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (gs->count > gs->buf.space) {
+ err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, gs->count);
+ if (err) {
+ return err;
+ }
+ pBuf = gs->buf.buf;
+ }
+
+
+ if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
+ /* we've already read in the first byte of the body.
+ ** Put it into the buffer.
+ */
+ pBuf[0] = gs->hdr[2];
+ gs->offset = 1;
+ gs->remainder = gs->count - 1;
+ } else {
+ gs->offset = 0;
+ gs->remainder = gs->count;
+ }
+
+ if (gs->encrypted) {
+ gs->state = GS_MAC;
+ gs->recordLen = gs->count - gs->recordPadding
+ - ss->sec.hash->length;
+ } else {
+ gs->state = GS_DATA;
+ gs->recordLen = gs->count;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+
+ case GS_MAC:
+ /* Have read in entire rest of the ciphertext.
+ ** Check for valid length.
+ ** Decrypt it.
+ ** Check the MAC.
+ */
+ PORT_Assert(gs->encrypted);
+
+ {
+ unsigned int macLen;
+ int nout;
+ unsigned char mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_BYTES];
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /**********************************/
+
+ /* If this is a stream cipher, blockSize will be 1,
+ * and this test will always be false.
+ * If this is a block cipher, this will detect records
+ * that are not a multiple of the blocksize in length.
+ */
+ if (gs->count & (ss->sec.blockSize - 1)) {
+ /* This is an error. Sender is misbehaving */
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: sender, count=%d blockSize=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->count,
+ ss->sec.blockSize));
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto spec_locked_done;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(gs->count == gs->offset);
+
+ if (gs->offset == 0) {
+ rv = 0; /* means EOF. */
+ goto spec_locked_done;
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt the portion of data that we just recieved.
+ ** Decrypt it in place.
+ */
+ rv = (*ss->sec.dec)(ss->sec.readcx, pBuf, &nout, gs->offset,
+ pBuf, gs->offset);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto spec_locked_done;
+ }
+
+
+ /* Have read in all the MAC portion of record
+ **
+ ** Prepare MAC by resetting it and feeding it the shared secret
+ */
+ macLen = ss->sec.hash->length;
+ if (gs->offset >= macLen) {
+ PRUint32 sequenceNumber = ss->sec.rcvSequence++;
+ unsigned char seq[4];
+
+ seq[0] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 24);
+ seq[1] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 16);
+ seq[2] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 8);
+ seq[3] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber);
+
+ (*ss->sec.hash->begin)(ss->sec.hashcx);
+ (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, ss->sec.rcvSecret.data,
+ ss->sec.rcvSecret.len);
+ (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, pBuf + macLen,
+ gs->offset - macLen);
+ (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, seq, 4);
+ (*ss->sec.hash->end)(ss->sec.hashcx, mac, &macLen, macLen);
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(macLen == ss->sec.hash->length);
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************/
+
+ if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(mac, pBuf, macLen) != 0) {
+ /* MAC's didn't match... */
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: mac check failed, seq=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.rcvSequence));
+ PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "computed mac:", mac, macLen));
+ PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "received mac:", pBuf, macLen));
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+
+ PORT_Assert(gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset);
+ if (gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset) {
+ gs->recordOffset = macLen;
+ gs->readOffset = macLen;
+ gs->writeOffset = gs->offset - gs->recordPadding;
+ rv = 1;
+ } else {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
+cleanup:
+ /* nothing in the buffer any more. */
+ gs->recordOffset = 0;
+ gs->readOffset = 0;
+ gs->writeOffset = 0;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ gs->recordLen = gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset;
+ gs->recordPadding = 0; /* forget we did any padding. */
+ gs->state = GS_INIT;
+
+
+ if (rv > 0) {
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:",
+ pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
+ }
+ return rv;
+
+spec_locked_done:
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ case GS_DATA:
+ /* Have read in all the DATA portion of record */
+
+ gs->recordOffset = 0;
+ gs->readOffset = 0;
+ gs->writeOffset = gs->offset;
+ PORT_Assert(gs->recordLen == gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset);
+ gs->recordLen = gs->offset;
+ gs->recordPadding = 0;
+ gs->state = GS_INIT;
+
+ ++ss->sec.rcvSequence;
+
+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:",
+ pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
+ return 1;
+
+ } /* end switch gs->state */
+ } /* end gather loop. */
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code
+** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of
+** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data
+** for the record into the readBuf. This code handles non-blocking I/O
+** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0.
+ *
+ * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
+ * Returns 0 if it hits EOF.
+ * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error
+ * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock)
+ *
+ * Called by ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c,
+ * and by DoRecv in sslsecur.c
+ * Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
+ */
+int
+ssl2_GatherRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
+{
+ return ssl2_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
+ * Returns 0 if it hits EOF.
+ * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error
+ * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock)
+ *
+ * Called from SocksStartGather in sslsocks.c
+ * Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
+ */
+int
+ssl2_StartGatherBytes(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, unsigned int count)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
+ gs->state = GS_DATA;
+ gs->remainder = count;
+ gs->count = count;
+ gs->offset = 0;
+ if (count > gs->buf.space) {
+ rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, count);
+ if (rv) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ return ssl2_GatherData(ss, gs, 0);
+}
+
+/* Caller should hold RecvBufLock. */
+SECStatus
+ssl_InitGather(sslGather *gs)
+{
+ SECStatus status;
+
+ gs->state = GS_INIT;
+ gs->writeOffset = 0;
+ gs->readOffset = 0;
+ status = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, 4096);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
+void
+ssl_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs)
+{
+ if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */
+ PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space);
+ PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSL3ProtocolVersion version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2];
+
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+ /* We've read in 3 bytes, there are 2 more to go in an ssl3 header. */
+ ss->gs.remainder = 2;
+ ss->gs.count = 0;
+
+ /* Clearing these handshake pointers ensures that
+ * ssl_Do1stHandshake won't call ssl2_HandleMessage when we return.
+ */
+ ss->nextHandshake = 0;
+ ss->securityHandshake = 0;
+
+ /* Setting ss->version to an SSL 3.x value will cause
+ ** ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to invoke ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake()
+ ** the next time it is called.
+ **/
+ rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
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