| Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
|
| diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
|
| new file mode 100644
|
| index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..23f52a23ca3ccb0e503b036c2f0177d27a7b7813
|
| --- /dev/null
|
| +++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
|
| @@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
|
| +/*
|
| + * Gather (Read) entire SSL2 records from socket into buffer.
|
| + *
|
| + * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
|
| + * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
|
| + *
|
| + * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
|
| + * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
|
| + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
|
| + * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
|
| + *
|
| + * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
|
| + * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
|
| + * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
|
| + * License.
|
| + *
|
| + * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
|
| + *
|
| + * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
|
| + * Netscape Communications Corporation.
|
| + * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
|
| + * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
|
| + *
|
| + * Contributor(s):
|
| + *
|
| + * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
|
| + * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
|
| + * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
|
| + * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
|
| + * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
|
| + * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
|
| + * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
|
| + * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
|
| + * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
|
| + * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
|
| + * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
|
| + *
|
| + * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
|
| +/* $Id: sslgathr.c,v 1.10 2009/10/16 17:45:35 wtc%google.com Exp $ */
|
| +#include "cert.h"
|
| +#include "ssl.h"
|
| +#include "sslimpl.h"
|
| +#include "sslproto.h"
|
| +
|
| +/* Forward static declarations */
|
| +static SECStatus ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss);
|
| +
|
| +/*
|
| +** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code
|
| +** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of
|
| +** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data
|
| +** for the record into gs->buf. This code handles non-blocking I/O
|
| +** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0.
|
| +** This function decrypts the gathered record in place, in gs_buf.
|
| + *
|
| + * Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
|
| + *
|
| + * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
|
| + * Returns 0 if it hits EOF.
|
| + * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error
|
| + * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) when it gathers an SSL v3 client hello header.
|
| +**
|
| +** The SSL2 Gather State machine has 4 states:
|
| +** GS_INIT - Done reading in previous record. Haven't begun to read in
|
| +** next record. When ssl2_GatherData is called with the machine
|
| +** in this state, the machine will attempt to read the first 3
|
| +** bytes of the SSL2 record header, and will advance the state
|
| +** to GS_HEADER.
|
| +**
|
| +** GS_HEADER - The machine is in this state while waiting for the completion
|
| +** of the first 3 bytes of the SSL2 record. When complete, the
|
| +** machine will compute the remaining unread length of this record
|
| +** and will initiate a read of that many bytes. The machine will
|
| +** advance to one of two states, depending on whether the record
|
| +** is encrypted (GS_MAC), or unencrypted (GS_DATA).
|
| +**
|
| +** GS_MAC - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder
|
| +** of the SSL2 record to be read in. When the read is completed,
|
| +** the machine checks the record for valid length, decrypts it,
|
| +** and checks and discards the MAC, then advances to GS_INIT.
|
| +**
|
| +** GS_DATA - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder
|
| +** of the unencrypted SSL2 record to be read in. Upon completion,
|
| +** the machine advances to the GS_INIT state and returns the data.
|
| +*/
|
| +int
|
| +ssl2_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags)
|
| +{
|
| + unsigned char * bp;
|
| + unsigned char * pBuf;
|
| + int nb, err, rv;
|
| +
|
| + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
|
| +
|
| + if (gs->state == GS_INIT) {
|
| + /* Initialize gathering engine */
|
| + gs->state = GS_HEADER;
|
| + gs->remainder = 3;
|
| + gs->count = 3;
|
| + gs->offset = 0;
|
| + gs->recordLen = 0;
|
| + gs->recordPadding = 0;
|
| + gs->hdr[2] = 0;
|
| +
|
| + gs->writeOffset = 0;
|
| + gs->readOffset = 0;
|
| + }
|
| + if (gs->encrypted) {
|
| + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.hash != 0);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + pBuf = gs->buf.buf;
|
| + for (;;) {
|
| + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)",
|
| + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder));
|
| + bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? pBuf : gs->hdr) + gs->offset;
|
| + nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags);
|
| + if (nb > 0) {
|
| + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb));
|
| + }
|
| + if (nb == 0) {
|
| + /* EOF */
|
| + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
|
| + rv = 0;
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| + if (nb < 0) {
|
| + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
|
| + PR_GetError()));
|
| + rv = SECFailure;
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + gs->offset += nb;
|
| + gs->remainder -= nb;
|
| +
|
| + if (gs->remainder > 0) {
|
| + continue;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Probably finished this piece */
|
| + switch (gs->state) {
|
| + case GS_HEADER:
|
| + if ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) {
|
| +
|
| + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
|
| +
|
| + /* If this looks like an SSL3 handshake record,
|
| + ** and we're expecting an SSL2 Hello message from our peer,
|
| + ** handle it here.
|
| + */
|
| + if (gs->hdr[0] == content_handshake) {
|
| + if ((ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage) ||
|
| + (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage)) {
|
| + rv = ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(ss);
|
| + if (rv == SECFailure) {
|
| + return SECFailure;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + /* XXX_1 The call stack to here is:
|
| + * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake ->
|
| + * ssl2_GatherRecord -> here.
|
| + * We want to return all the way out to ssl_Do1stHandshake,
|
| + * and have it call ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake again.
|
| + * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will call
|
| + * ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake when it is called again.
|
| + *
|
| + * Returning SECWouldBlock here causes
|
| + * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to return without clearing
|
| + * ss->handshake, ensuring that ssl_Do1stHandshake will
|
| + * call it again immediately.
|
| + *
|
| + * If we return 1 here, ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will
|
| + * clear ss->handshake before returning, and thus will not
|
| + * be called again by ssl_Do1stHandshake.
|
| + */
|
| + return SECWouldBlock;
|
| + } else if (gs->hdr[0] == content_alert) {
|
| + if (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage) {
|
| + /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any failure
|
| + * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match
|
| + * XXX ciphers.
|
| + */
|
| + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
|
| + return SECFailure;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + } /* ((ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) && !ss->firstHsDone) */
|
| +
|
| + /* we've got the first 3 bytes. The header may be two or three. */
|
| + if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
|
| + /* This record has a 2-byte header, and no padding */
|
| + gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
|
| + gs->recordPadding = 0;
|
| + } else {
|
| + /* This record has a 3-byte header that is all read in now. */
|
| + gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x3f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
|
| + /* is_escape = (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) != 0; */
|
| + gs->recordPadding = gs->hdr[2];
|
| + }
|
| + if (!gs->count) {
|
| + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto cleanup;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (gs->count > gs->buf.space) {
|
| + err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, gs->count);
|
| + if (err) {
|
| + return err;
|
| + }
|
| + pBuf = gs->buf.buf;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
|
| + /* we've already read in the first byte of the body.
|
| + ** Put it into the buffer.
|
| + */
|
| + pBuf[0] = gs->hdr[2];
|
| + gs->offset = 1;
|
| + gs->remainder = gs->count - 1;
|
| + } else {
|
| + gs->offset = 0;
|
| + gs->remainder = gs->count;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (gs->encrypted) {
|
| + gs->state = GS_MAC;
|
| + gs->recordLen = gs->count - gs->recordPadding
|
| + - ss->sec.hash->length;
|
| + } else {
|
| + gs->state = GS_DATA;
|
| + gs->recordLen = gs->count;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + case GS_MAC:
|
| + /* Have read in entire rest of the ciphertext.
|
| + ** Check for valid length.
|
| + ** Decrypt it.
|
| + ** Check the MAC.
|
| + */
|
| + PORT_Assert(gs->encrypted);
|
| +
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned int macLen;
|
| + int nout;
|
| + unsigned char mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_BYTES];
|
| +
|
| + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /**********************************/
|
| +
|
| + /* If this is a stream cipher, blockSize will be 1,
|
| + * and this test will always be false.
|
| + * If this is a block cipher, this will detect records
|
| + * that are not a multiple of the blocksize in length.
|
| + */
|
| + if (gs->count & (ss->sec.blockSize - 1)) {
|
| + /* This is an error. Sender is misbehaving */
|
| + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: sender, count=%d blockSize=%d",
|
| + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->count,
|
| + ss->sec.blockSize));
|
| + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
|
| + rv = SECFailure;
|
| + goto spec_locked_done;
|
| + }
|
| + PORT_Assert(gs->count == gs->offset);
|
| +
|
| + if (gs->offset == 0) {
|
| + rv = 0; /* means EOF. */
|
| + goto spec_locked_done;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Decrypt the portion of data that we just recieved.
|
| + ** Decrypt it in place.
|
| + */
|
| + rv = (*ss->sec.dec)(ss->sec.readcx, pBuf, &nout, gs->offset,
|
| + pBuf, gs->offset);
|
| + if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| + goto spec_locked_done;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + /* Have read in all the MAC portion of record
|
| + **
|
| + ** Prepare MAC by resetting it and feeding it the shared secret
|
| + */
|
| + macLen = ss->sec.hash->length;
|
| + if (gs->offset >= macLen) {
|
| + PRUint32 sequenceNumber = ss->sec.rcvSequence++;
|
| + unsigned char seq[4];
|
| +
|
| + seq[0] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 24);
|
| + seq[1] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 16);
|
| + seq[2] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 8);
|
| + seq[3] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber);
|
| +
|
| + (*ss->sec.hash->begin)(ss->sec.hashcx);
|
| + (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, ss->sec.rcvSecret.data,
|
| + ss->sec.rcvSecret.len);
|
| + (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, pBuf + macLen,
|
| + gs->offset - macLen);
|
| + (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, seq, 4);
|
| + (*ss->sec.hash->end)(ss->sec.hashcx, mac, &macLen, macLen);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + PORT_Assert(macLen == ss->sec.hash->length);
|
| +
|
| + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************/
|
| +
|
| + if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(mac, pBuf, macLen) != 0) {
|
| + /* MAC's didn't match... */
|
| + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: mac check failed, seq=%d",
|
| + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.rcvSequence));
|
| + PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "computed mac:", mac, macLen));
|
| + PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "received mac:", pBuf, macLen));
|
| + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
|
| + rv = SECFailure;
|
| + goto cleanup;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + PORT_Assert(gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset);
|
| + if (gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset) {
|
| + gs->recordOffset = macLen;
|
| + gs->readOffset = macLen;
|
| + gs->writeOffset = gs->offset - gs->recordPadding;
|
| + rv = 1;
|
| + } else {
|
| + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
|
| +cleanup:
|
| + /* nothing in the buffer any more. */
|
| + gs->recordOffset = 0;
|
| + gs->readOffset = 0;
|
| + gs->writeOffset = 0;
|
| + rv = SECFailure;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + gs->recordLen = gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset;
|
| + gs->recordPadding = 0; /* forget we did any padding. */
|
| + gs->state = GS_INIT;
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + if (rv > 0) {
|
| + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:",
|
| + pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
|
| + }
|
| + return rv;
|
| +
|
| +spec_locked_done:
|
| + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
|
| + return rv;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + case GS_DATA:
|
| + /* Have read in all the DATA portion of record */
|
| +
|
| + gs->recordOffset = 0;
|
| + gs->readOffset = 0;
|
| + gs->writeOffset = gs->offset;
|
| + PORT_Assert(gs->recordLen == gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset);
|
| + gs->recordLen = gs->offset;
|
| + gs->recordPadding = 0;
|
| + gs->state = GS_INIT;
|
| +
|
| + ++ss->sec.rcvSequence;
|
| +
|
| + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:",
|
| + pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
|
| + return 1;
|
| +
|
| + } /* end switch gs->state */
|
| + } /* end gather loop. */
|
| + return rv;
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +/*
|
| +** Gather a single record of data from the receiving stream. This code
|
| +** first gathers the header (2 or 3 bytes long depending on the value of
|
| +** the most significant bit in the first byte) then gathers up the data
|
| +** for the record into the readBuf. This code handles non-blocking I/O
|
| +** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0.
|
| + *
|
| + * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
|
| + * Returns 0 if it hits EOF.
|
| + * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error
|
| + * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock)
|
| + *
|
| + * Called by ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c,
|
| + * and by DoRecv in sslsecur.c
|
| + * Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
|
| + */
|
| +int
|
| +ssl2_GatherRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
|
| +{
|
| + return ssl2_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags);
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +/*
|
| + * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
|
| + * Returns 0 if it hits EOF.
|
| + * Returns -1 (SECFailure) on any error
|
| + * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock)
|
| + *
|
| + * Called from SocksStartGather in sslsocks.c
|
| + * Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
|
| + */
|
| +int
|
| +ssl2_StartGatherBytes(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, unsigned int count)
|
| +{
|
| + int rv;
|
| +
|
| + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
|
| + gs->state = GS_DATA;
|
| + gs->remainder = count;
|
| + gs->count = count;
|
| + gs->offset = 0;
|
| + if (count > gs->buf.space) {
|
| + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, count);
|
| + if (rv) {
|
| + return rv;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + return ssl2_GatherData(ss, gs, 0);
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +/* Caller should hold RecvBufLock. */
|
| +SECStatus
|
| +ssl_InitGather(sslGather *gs)
|
| +{
|
| + SECStatus status;
|
| +
|
| + gs->state = GS_INIT;
|
| + gs->writeOffset = 0;
|
| + gs->readOffset = 0;
|
| + status = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, 4096);
|
| + return status;
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
|
| +void
|
| +ssl_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs)
|
| +{
|
| + if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */
|
| + PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space);
|
| + PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf);
|
| + }
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
|
| +static SECStatus
|
| +ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss)
|
| +{
|
| + SECStatus rv;
|
| + SSL3ProtocolVersion version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2];
|
| +
|
| + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
|
| + PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
|
| +
|
| + /* We've read in 3 bytes, there are 2 more to go in an ssl3 header. */
|
| + ss->gs.remainder = 2;
|
| + ss->gs.count = 0;
|
| +
|
| + /* Clearing these handshake pointers ensures that
|
| + * ssl_Do1stHandshake won't call ssl2_HandleMessage when we return.
|
| + */
|
| + ss->nextHandshake = 0;
|
| + ss->securityHandshake = 0;
|
| +
|
| + /* Setting ss->version to an SSL 3.x value will cause
|
| + ** ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to invoke ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake()
|
| + ** the next time it is called.
|
| + **/
|
| + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version);
|
| + if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| + return rv;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
|
| +
|
| + return SECSuccess;
|
| +}
|
|
|