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Unified Diff: net/third_party/nss/ssl/derive.c

Issue 394003: Linux: enable building with a local version of libssl. (Closed)
Patch Set: ... Created 11 years, 1 month ago
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Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/derive.c
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/derive.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/derive.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..84d7da0146533ed0ce5e3f9fef371dd6ebf2dc94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/derive.c
@@ -0,0 +1,853 @@
+/*
+ * Key Derivation that doesn't use PKCS11
+ *
+ * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
+ * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
+ * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
+ *
+ * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
+ * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
+ *
+ * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
+ * Netscape Communications Corporation.
+ * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2005
+ * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Contributor(s):
+ *
+ * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
+ * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
+ * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
+ * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
+ * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
+ * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
+ * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
+ * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
+ * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
+ * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
+ * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
+ *
+ * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
+/* $Id: derive.c,v 1.12 2008/06/06 01:16:31 wtc%google.com Exp $ */
+
+#include "ssl.h" /* prereq to sslimpl.h */
+#include "certt.h" /* prereq to sslimpl.h */
+#include "keythi.h" /* prereq to sslimpl.h */
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "blapi.h"
+
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "secmodt.h"
+
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+
+/* make this a macro! */
+#ifdef NOT_A_MACRO
+static void
+buildSSLKey(unsigned char * keyBlock, unsigned int keyLen, SECItem * result,
+ const char * label)
+{
+ result->type = siBuffer;
+ result->data = keyBlock;
+ result->len = keyLen;
+ PRINT_BUF(100, (NULL, label, keyBlock, keyLen));
+}
+#else
+#define buildSSLKey(keyBlock, keyLen, result, label) \
+{ \
+ (result)->type = siBuffer; \
+ (result)->data = keyBlock; \
+ (result)->len = keyLen; \
+ PRINT_BUF(100, (NULL, label, keyBlock, keyLen)); \
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * SSL Key generation given pre master secret
+ */
+#ifndef NUM_MIXERS
+#define NUM_MIXERS 9
+#endif
+static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = {
+ "A",
+ "BB",
+ "CCC",
+ "DDDD",
+ "EEEEE",
+ "FFFFFF",
+ "GGGGGGG",
+ "HHHHHHHH",
+ "IIIIIIIII"
+};
+
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_KeyAndMacDeriveBypass(
+ ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec,
+ const unsigned char * cr,
+ const unsigned char * sr,
+ PRBool isTLS,
+ PRBool isExport)
+{
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def;
+ unsigned char * key_block = pwSpec->key_block;
+ unsigned char * key_block2 = NULL;
+ unsigned int block_bytes = 0;
+ unsigned int block_needed = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int keySize; /* actual size of cipher keys */
+ unsigned int effKeySize; /* effective size of cipher keys */
+ unsigned int macSize; /* size of MAC secret */
+ unsigned int IVSize; /* size of IV */
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ SECStatus status = SECSuccess;
+ PRBool isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+
+ SECItem srcr;
+ SECItem crsr;
+
+ unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+ PRUint64 md5buf[22];
+ PRUint64 shabuf[40];
+
+#define md5Ctx ((MD5Context *)md5buf)
+#define shaCtx ((SHA1Context *)shabuf)
+
+ static const SECItem zed = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+ if (pwSpec->msItem.data == NULL ||
+ pwSpec->msItem.len != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(100, (NULL, "Master Secret", pwSpec->msItem.data,
+ pwSpec->msItem.len));
+
+ /* figure out how much is needed */
+ macSize = pwSpec->mac_size;
+ keySize = cipher_def->key_size;
+ effKeySize = cipher_def->secret_key_size;
+ IVSize = cipher_def->iv_size;
+ if (keySize == 0) {
+ effKeySize = IVSize = 0; /* only MACing */
+ }
+ block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize + ((!isExport) * IVSize));
+
+ /*
+ * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure
+ */
+ pwSpec->client.write_key_item = zed;
+ pwSpec->client.write_mac_key_item = zed;
+ pwSpec->server.write_key_item = zed;
+ pwSpec->server.write_mac_key_item = zed;
+
+ /* initialize the server random, client random block */
+ srcr.type = siBuffer;
+ srcr.data = srcrdata;
+ srcr.len = sizeof srcrdata;
+ PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata, sr, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, cr, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+ /* initialize the client random, server random block */
+ crsr.type = siBuffer;
+ crsr.data = crsrdata;
+ crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata;
+ PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, cr, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, sr, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PRINT_BUF(100, (NULL, "Key & MAC CRSR", crsr.data, crsr.len));
+
+ /*
+ * generate the key material:
+ */
+ if (isTLS) {
+ SECItem keyblk;
+
+ keyblk.type = siBuffer;
+ keyblk.data = key_block;
+ keyblk.len = block_needed;
+
+ status = TLS_PRF(&pwSpec->msItem, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk,
+ isFIPS);
+ if (status != SECSuccess) {
+ goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+ }
+ block_bytes = keyblk.len;
+ } else {
+ /* key_block =
+ * MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret +
+ * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+ * MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret +
+ * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+ * MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret +
+ * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
+ * [...];
+ */
+ unsigned int made = 0;
+ for (i = 0; made < block_needed && i < NUM_MIXERS; ++i) {
+ unsigned int outLen;
+ unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH];
+
+ SHA1_Begin(shaCtx);
+ SHA1_Update(shaCtx, (unsigned char*)(mixers[i]), i+1);
+ SHA1_Update(shaCtx, pwSpec->msItem.data, pwSpec->msItem.len);
+ SHA1_Update(shaCtx, srcr.data, srcr.len);
+ SHA1_End(shaCtx, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
+
+ MD5_Begin(md5Ctx);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, pwSpec->msItem.data, pwSpec->msItem.len);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, sha_out, outLen);
+ MD5_End(md5Ctx, key_block + made, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
+ made += MD5_LENGTH;
+ }
+ block_bytes = made;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(block_bytes >= block_needed);
+ PORT_Assert(block_bytes <= sizeof pwSpec->key_block);
+ PRINT_BUF(100, (NULL, "key block", key_block, block_bytes));
+
+ /*
+ * Put the key material where it goes.
+ */
+ key_block2 = key_block + block_bytes;
+ i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */
+
+ /*
+ * The key_block is partitioned as follows:
+ * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
+ */
+ buildSSLKey(&key_block[i],macSize, &pwSpec->client.write_mac_key_item, \
+ "Client Write MAC Secret");
+ i += macSize;
+
+ /*
+ * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
+ */
+ buildSSLKey(&key_block[i],macSize, &pwSpec->server.write_mac_key_item, \
+ "Server Write MAC Secret");
+ i += macSize;
+
+ if (!keySize) {
+ /* only MACing */
+ buildSSLKey(NULL, 0, &pwSpec->client.write_key_item, \
+ "Client Write Key (MAC only)");
+ buildSSLKey(NULL, 0, &pwSpec->server.write_key_item, \
+ "Server Write Key (MAC only)");
+ buildSSLKey(NULL, 0, &pwSpec->client.write_iv_item, \
+ "Client Write IV (MAC only)");
+ buildSSLKey(NULL, 0, &pwSpec->server.write_iv_item, \
+ "Server Write IV (MAC only)");
+ } else if (!isExport) {
+ /*
+ ** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs.
+ ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+ */
+ buildSSLKey(&key_block[i], keySize, &pwSpec->client.write_key_item, \
+ "Domestic Client Write Key");
+ i += keySize;
+
+ /*
+ ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+ */
+ buildSSLKey(&key_block[i], keySize, &pwSpec->server.write_key_item, \
+ "Domestic Server Write Key");
+ i += keySize;
+
+ if (IVSize > 0) {
+ /*
+ ** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
+ */
+ buildSSLKey(&key_block[i], IVSize, &pwSpec->client.write_iv_item, \
+ "Domestic Client Write IV");
+ i += IVSize;
+
+ /*
+ ** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
+ */
+ buildSSLKey(&key_block[i], IVSize, &pwSpec->server.write_iv_item, \
+ "Domestic Server Write IV");
+ i += IVSize;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(i <= block_bytes);
+
+ } else if (!isTLS) {
+ /*
+ ** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs.
+ */
+ unsigned int outLen;
+
+ /*
+ ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+ ** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key +
+ ** ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
+ */
+ MD5_Begin(md5Ctx);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, crsr.data, crsr.len);
+ MD5_End(md5Ctx, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+ i += effKeySize;
+ buildSSLKey(key_block2, keySize, &pwSpec->client.write_key_item, \
+ "SSL3 Export Client Write Key");
+ key_block2 += keySize;
+
+ /*
+ ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+ ** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key +
+ ** ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
+ */
+ MD5_Begin(md5Ctx);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, srcr.data, srcr.len);
+ MD5_End(md5Ctx, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+ i += effKeySize;
+ buildSSLKey(key_block2, keySize, &pwSpec->server.write_key_item, \
+ "SSL3 Export Server Write Key");
+ key_block2 += keySize;
+ PORT_Assert(i <= block_bytes);
+
+ if (IVSize) {
+ /*
+ ** client_write_IV =
+ ** MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
+ */
+ MD5_Begin(md5Ctx);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, crsr.data, crsr.len);
+ MD5_End(md5Ctx, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+ buildSSLKey(key_block2, IVSize, &pwSpec->client.write_iv_item, \
+ "SSL3 Export Client Write IV");
+ key_block2 += IVSize;
+
+ /*
+ ** server_write_IV =
+ ** MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
+ */
+ MD5_Begin(md5Ctx);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, srcr.data, srcr.len);
+ MD5_End(md5Ctx, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+ buildSSLKey(key_block2, IVSize, &pwSpec->server.write_iv_item, \
+ "SSL3 Export Server Write IV");
+ key_block2 += IVSize;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(key_block2 - key_block <= sizeof pwSpec->key_block);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ ** Generate TLS Export write keys and IVs.
+ */
+ SECItem secret ;
+ SECItem keyblk ;
+
+ secret.type = siBuffer;
+ keyblk.type = siBuffer;
+ /*
+ ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+ ** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key,
+ ** "client write key",
+ ** client_random + server_random);
+ */
+ secret.data = &key_block[i];
+ secret.len = effKeySize;
+ i += effKeySize;
+ keyblk.data = key_block2;
+ keyblk.len = keySize;
+ status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk, isFIPS);
+ if (status != SECSuccess) {
+ goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+ }
+ buildSSLKey(key_block2, keySize, &pwSpec->client.write_key_item, \
+ "TLS Export Client Write Key");
+ key_block2 += keySize;
+
+ /*
+ ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
+ ** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key,
+ ** "server write key",
+ ** client_random + server_random);
+ */
+ secret.data = &key_block[i];
+ secret.len = effKeySize;
+ i += effKeySize;
+ keyblk.data = key_block2;
+ keyblk.len = keySize;
+ status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk, isFIPS);
+ if (status != SECSuccess) {
+ goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+ }
+ buildSSLKey(key_block2, keySize, &pwSpec->server.write_key_item, \
+ "TLS Export Server Write Key");
+ key_block2 += keySize;
+
+ /*
+ ** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block", client_random + server_random);
+ ** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
+ ** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
+ */
+ if (IVSize) {
+ secret.data = NULL;
+ secret.len = 0;
+ keyblk.data = key_block2;
+ keyblk.len = 2 * IVSize;
+ status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk, isFIPS);
+ if (status != SECSuccess) {
+ goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
+ }
+ buildSSLKey(key_block2, IVSize, \
+ &pwSpec->client.write_iv_item, \
+ "TLS Export Client Write IV");
+ buildSSLKey(key_block2 + IVSize, IVSize, \
+ &pwSpec->server.write_iv_item, \
+ "TLS Export Server Write IV");
+ key_block2 += 2 * IVSize;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(key_block2 - key_block <= sizeof pwSpec->key_block);
+ }
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+key_and_mac_derive_fail:
+
+ MD5_DestroyContext(md5Ctx, PR_FALSE);
+ SHA1_DestroyContext(shaCtx, PR_FALSE);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+
+/* derive the Master Secret from the PMS */
+/* Presently, this is only done wtih RSA PMS, and only on the server side,
+ * so isRSA is always true.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl3_MasterKeyDeriveBypass(
+ ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec,
+ const unsigned char * cr,
+ const unsigned char * sr,
+ const SECItem * pms,
+ PRBool isTLS,
+ PRBool isRSA)
+{
+ unsigned char * key_block = pwSpec->key_block;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PRBool isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+
+ SECItem crsr;
+
+ unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
+ PRUint64 md5buf[22];
+ PRUint64 shabuf[40];
+
+#define md5Ctx ((MD5Context *)md5buf)
+#define shaCtx ((SHA1Context *)shabuf)
+
+ /* first do the consistancy checks */
+ if (isRSA) {
+ PORT_Assert(pms->len == SSL3_RSA_PMS_LENGTH);
+ if (pms->len != SSL3_RSA_PMS_LENGTH) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* caller must test PMS version for rollback */
+ }
+
+ /* initialize the client random, server random block */
+ crsr.type = siBuffer;
+ crsr.data = crsrdata;
+ crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata;
+ PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, cr, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, sr, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+ PRINT_BUF(100, (NULL, "Master Secret CRSR", crsr.data, crsr.len));
+
+ /* finally do the key gen */
+ if (isTLS) {
+ SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+ master.data = key_block;
+ master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
+
+ rv = TLS_PRF(pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ }
+ } else {
+ int i;
+ unsigned int made = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ unsigned int outLen;
+ unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH];
+
+ SHA1_Begin(shaCtx);
+ SHA1_Update(shaCtx, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], i+1);
+ SHA1_Update(shaCtx, pms->data, pms->len);
+ SHA1_Update(shaCtx, crsr.data, crsr.len);
+ SHA1_End(shaCtx, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
+
+ MD5_Begin(md5Ctx);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, pms->data, pms->len);
+ MD5_Update(md5Ctx, sha_out, outLen);
+ MD5_End(md5Ctx, key_block + made, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
+ PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
+ made += outLen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* store the results */
+ PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->raw_master_secret, key_block,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
+ pwSpec->msItem.data = pwSpec->raw_master_secret;
+ pwSpec->msItem.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
+ PRINT_BUF(100, (NULL, "Master Secret", pwSpec->msItem.data,
+ pwSpec->msItem.len));
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl_canExtractMS(PK11SymKey *pms, PRBool isTLS, PRBool isDH, PRBool *pcbp)
+{ SECStatus rv;
+ PK11SymKey * ms = NULL;
+ SECItem params = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params;
+ unsigned char rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH];
+ CK_VERSION pms_version;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive;
+ CK_FLAGS keyFlags;
+
+ if (pms == NULL)
+ return(SECFailure);
+
+ PORT_Memset(rand, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
+
+ if (isTLS) {
+ if(isDH) master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+ } else {
+ if (isDH) master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ else master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
+ keyFlags = 0;
+ }
+
+ master_params.pVersion = &pms_version;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = rand;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = rand;
+ master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
+
+ params.data = (unsigned char *) &master_params;
+ params.len = sizeof master_params;
+
+ ms = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(pms, master_derive, &params, key_derive,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags);
+ if (ms == NULL)
+ return(SECFailure);
+
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ms);
+ *pcbp = (rv == SECSuccess);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ms);
+
+ return(rv);
+
+}
+
+/* Check the key exchange algorithm for each cipher in the list to see if
+ * a master secret key can be extracted. If the KEA will use keys from the
+ * specified cert make sure the extract operation is attempted from the slot
+ * where the private key resides.
+ * If MS can be extracted for all ciphers, (*pcanbypass) is set to TRUE and
+ * SECSuccess is returned. In all other cases but one (*pcanbypass) is
+ * set to FALSE and SECFailure is returned.
+ * In that last case Derive() has been called successfully but the MS is null,
+ * CanBypass sets (*pcanbypass) to FALSE and returns SECSuccess indicating the
+ * arguments were all valid but the slot cannot be bypassed.
+ */
+
+SECStatus
+SSL_CanBypass(CERTCertificate *cert, SECKEYPrivateKey *srvPrivkey,
+ PRUint32 protocolmask, PRUint16 *ciphersuites, int nsuites,
+ PRBool *pcanbypass, void *pwArg)
+{ SECStatus rv;
+ int i;
+ PRUint16 suite;
+ PK11SymKey * pms = NULL;
+ SECKEYPublicKey * srvPubkey = NULL;
+ KeyType privKeytype;
+ PK11SlotInfo * slot = NULL;
+ SECItem param;
+ CK_VERSION version;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[2];
+ SECItem enc_pms = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
+ PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+ SSLCipherSuiteInfo csdef;
+ PRBool testrsa = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool testrsa_export = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool testecdh = PR_FALSE;
+ PRBool testecdhe = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (!cert || !srvPrivkey || !ciphersuites || !pcanbypass) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ srvPubkey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+ if (!srvPubkey)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ *pcanbypass = PR_TRUE;
+ rv = SECFailure;
+
+ /* determine which KEAs to test */
+ /* 0 (SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) is used as a list terminator because
+ * SSL3 and TLS specs forbid negotiating that cipher suite number.
+ */
+ for (i=0; i < nsuites && (suite = *ciphersuites++) != 0; i++) {
+ /* skip SSL2 cipher suites and ones NSS doesn't support */
+ if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(suite, &csdef, sizeof(csdef)) != SECSuccess
+ || SSL_IS_SSL2_CIPHER(suite) )
+ continue;
+ switch (csdef.keaType) {
+ case ssl_kea_rsa:
+ switch (csdef.cipherSuite) {
+ case TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA:
+ case TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA:
+ case SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5:
+ case SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5:
+ testrsa_export = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if (!testrsa_export)
+ testrsa = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ if (strcmp(csdef.keaTypeName, "ECDHE") == 0) /* ephemeral? */
+ testecdhe = PR_TRUE;
+ else
+ testecdh = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ case ssl_kea_dh:
+ /* this is actually DHE */
+ default:
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* For each protocol try to derive and extract an MS.
+ * Failure of function any function except MS extract means
+ * continue with the next cipher test. Stop testing when the list is
+ * exhausted or when the first MS extract--not derive--fails.
+ */
+ privKeytype = SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(srvPrivkey);
+ protocolmask &= SSL_CBP_SSL3|SSL_CBP_TLS1_0;
+ while (protocolmask) {
+ if (protocolmask & SSL_CBP_SSL3) {
+ isTLS = PR_FALSE;
+ protocolmask ^= SSL_CBP_SSL3;
+ } else {
+ isTLS = PR_TRUE;
+ protocolmask ^= SSL_CBP_TLS1_0;
+ }
+
+ if (privKeytype == rsaKey && testrsa_export) {
+ if (PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(srvPrivkey) > EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ *pcanbypass = PR_FALSE;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ break;
+ } else
+ testrsa = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ for (; privKeytype == rsaKey && testrsa; ) {
+ /* TLS_RSA */
+ unsigned char rsaPmsBuf[SSL3_RSA_PMS_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int outLen = 0;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target;
+ SECStatus irv;
+
+ mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN;
+ mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the pre-master secret ... (client side) */
+ version.major = 3 /*MSB(clientHelloVersion)*/;
+ version.minor = 0 /*LSB(clientHelloVersion)*/;
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&version;
+ param.len = sizeof version;
+ pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, &param, 0, pwArg);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ if (!pms)
+ break;
+ /* now wrap it */
+ enc_pms.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(srvPubkey);
+ enc_pms.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len);
+ irv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, srvPubkey, pms, &enc_pms);
+ if (irv != SECSuccess)
+ break;
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ /* now do the server side--check the triple bypass first */
+ rv = PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1(srvPrivkey, rsaPmsBuf, &outLen,
+ sizeof rsaPmsBuf,
+ (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data,
+ enc_pms.len);
+ /* if decrypt worked we're done with the RSA test */
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ *pcanbypass = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* check for fallback to double bypass */
+ target = isTLS ? CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
+ : CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE;
+ pms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(srvPrivkey, &enc_pms,
+ target, CKA_DERIVE, 0);
+ rv = ssl_canExtractMS(pms, isTLS, PR_FALSE, pcanbypass);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && *pcanbypass == PR_FALSE)
+ goto done;
+ break;
+ }
+#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
+ for (; (privKeytype == ecKey && ( testecdh || testecdhe)) ||
+ (privKeytype == rsaKey && testecdhe); ) {
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *keapub = NULL;
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *keapriv;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *cpub = NULL; /* client's ephemeral ECDH keys */
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *cpriv = NULL;
+ SECKEYECParams ecParams = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 },
+ *pecParams;
+
+ if (privKeytype == ecKey && testecdhe) {
+ /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA */
+ pecParams = &srvPubkey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams;
+ } else if (privKeytype == rsaKey && testecdhe) {
+ /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA */
+ ECName ec_curve;
+ int serverKeyStrengthInBits;
+ int signatureKeyStrength;
+ int requiredECCbits;
+
+ /* find a curve of equivalent strength to the RSA key's */
+ requiredECCbits = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(srvPrivkey);
+ if (requiredECCbits < 0)
+ break;
+ requiredECCbits *= BPB;
+ serverKeyStrengthInBits = srvPubkey->u.rsa.modulus.len;
+ if (srvPubkey->u.rsa.modulus.data[0] == 0) {
+ serverKeyStrengthInBits--;
+ }
+ /* convert to strength in bits */
+ serverKeyStrengthInBits *= BPB;
+
+ signatureKeyStrength =
+ SSL_RSASTRENGTH_TO_ECSTRENGTH(serverKeyStrengthInBits);
+
+ if ( requiredECCbits > signatureKeyStrength )
+ requiredECCbits = signatureKeyStrength;
+
+ ec_curve =
+ ssl3_GetCurveWithECKeyStrength(SSL3_SUPPORTED_CURVES_MASK,
+ requiredECCbits);
+ rv = ssl3_ECName2Params(NULL, ec_curve, &ecParams);
+ if (rv == SECFailure) {
+ break;
+ }
+ pecParams = &ecParams;
+ }
+
+ if (testecdhe) {
+ /* generate server's ephemeral keys */
+ keapriv = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(pecParams, &keapub, NULL);
+ if (!keapriv || !keapub) {
+ if (keapriv)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(keapriv);
+ if (keapub)
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(keapub);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA */
+ keapub = srvPubkey;
+ keapriv = srvPrivkey;
+ pecParams = &srvPubkey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams;
+ }
+
+ /* perform client side ops */
+ /* generate a pair of ephemeral keys using server's parms */
+ cpriv = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(pecParams, &cpub, NULL);
+ if (!cpriv || !cpub) {
+ if (testecdhe) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(keapriv);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(keapub);
+ }
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* now do the server side */
+ /* determine the PMS using client's public value */
+ target = isTLS ? CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
+ : CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH;
+ pms = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(keapriv, cpub, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL,
+ CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE,
+ target,
+ CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ rv = ssl_canExtractMS(pms, isTLS, PR_TRUE, pcanbypass);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(cpriv);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(cpub);
+ if (testecdhe) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(keapriv);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(keapub);
+ if (privKeytype == rsaKey)
+ PORT_Free(ecParams.data);
+ }
+ if (rv == SECSuccess && *pcanbypass == PR_FALSE)
+ goto done;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
+ if (pms)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+ }
+
+ /* *pcanbypass has been set */
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+
+ done:
+ if (pms)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(&enc_pms, PR_FALSE);
+
+ if (srvPubkey) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(srvPubkey);
+ srvPubkey = NULL;
+ }
+
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
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