Linux: enable building with a local version of libssl.

net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslcon.c

+/* 
+ * SSL v2 handshake functions, and functions common to SSL2 and SSL3.
+ *
+ * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
+ * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
+ * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
+ *
+ * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
+ * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
+ *
+ * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
+ * Netscape Communications Corporation.
+ * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
+ * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Contributor(s):
+ *   Dr Vipul Gupta <vipul.gupta@sun.com>, Sun Microsystems Laboratories
+ *
+ * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
+ * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
+ * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
+ * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
+ * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
+ * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
+ * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
+ * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
+ * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
+ * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
+ * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
+ *
+ * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
+/* $Id: sslcon.c,v 1.37 2009/10/16 17:45:35 wtc%google.com Exp $ */
+
+#include "nssrenam.h"
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "sechash.h"
+#include "cryptohi.h"           /* for SGN_ funcs */
+#include "keyhi.h"              /* for SECKEY_ high level functions. */
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "ssl3prot.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "prinit.h"
+#include "prtime.h"     /* for PR_Now() */
+
+#define XXX
+static PRBool policyWasSet;
+
+/* This ordered list is indexed by (SSL_CK_xx * 3)   */
+/* Second and third bytes are MSB and LSB of master key length. */
+static const PRUint8 allCipherSuites[] = {
+    0,                                          0,    0,
+    SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5,                    0x00, 0x80,
+    SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,           0x00, 0x80,
+    SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,                0x00, 0x80,
+    SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,       0x00, 0x80,
+    SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,               0x00, 0x80,
+    SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5,                 0x00, 0x40,
+    SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5,           0x00, 0xC0,
+    0,                                          0,    0
+};
+
+#define ssl2_NUM_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED 6
+
+/* This list is sent back to the client when the client-hello message 
+ * contains no overlapping ciphers, so the client can report what ciphers
+ * are supported by the server.  Unlike allCipherSuites (above), this list
+ * is sorted by descending preference, not by cipherSuite number. 
+ */
+static const PRUint8 implementedCipherSuites[ssl2_NUM_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED * 3] = {
+    SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5,                    0x00, 0x80,
+    SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5,                0x00, 0x80,
+    SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5,           0x00, 0xC0,
+    SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5,                 0x00, 0x40,
+    SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,           0x00, 0x80,
+    SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5,       0x00, 0x80
+};
+
+typedef struct ssl2SpecsStr {
+    PRUint8           nkm; /* do this many hashes to generate key material. */
+    PRUint8           nkd; /* size of readKey and writeKey in bytes. */
+    PRUint8           blockSize;
+    PRUint8           blockShift;
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
+    PRUint8           keyLen;   /* cipher symkey size in bytes. */
+    PRUint8           pubLen;   /* publicly reveal this many bytes of key. */
+    PRUint8           ivLen;    /* length of IV data at *ca.    */
+} ssl2Specs;
+
+static const ssl2Specs ssl_Specs[] = {
+/* NONE                                 */ 
+                                {  0,  0, 0, 0, },
+/* SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5              */ 
+                                {  2, 16, 1, 0, CKM_RC4,       16,   0, 0, },
+/* SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5     */ 
+                                {  2, 16, 1, 0, CKM_RC4,       16,  11, 0, },
+/* SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5          */ 
+                                {  2, 16, 8, 3, CKM_RC2_CBC,   16,   0, 8, },
+/* SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */ 
+                                {  2, 16, 8, 3, CKM_RC2_CBC,   16,  11, 8, },
+/* SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5         */ 
+                                {  0,  0, 0, 0, },
+/* SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5           */ 
+                                {  1,  8, 8, 3, CKM_DES_CBC,    8,   0, 8, },
+/* SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5     */ 
+                                {  3, 24, 8, 3, CKM_DES3_CBC,  24,   0, 8, },
+};
+
+#define SET_ERROR_CODE    /* reminder */
+#define TEST_FOR_FAILURE  /* reminder */
+
+/*
+** Put a string tag in the library so that we can examine an executable
+** and see what kind of security it supports.
+*/
+const char *ssl_version = "SECURITY_VERSION:"
+                        " +us"
+                        " +export"
+#ifdef TRACE
+                        " +trace"
+#endif
+#ifdef DEBUG
+                        " +debug"
+#endif
+                        ;
+
+const char * const ssl_cipherName[] = {
+    "unknown",
+    "RC4",
+    "RC4-Export",
+    "RC2-CBC",
+    "RC2-CBC-Export",
+    "IDEA-CBC",
+    "DES-CBC",
+    "DES-EDE3-CBC",
+    "unknown",
+    "unknown", /* was fortezza, NO LONGER USED */
+};
+
+
+/* bit-masks, showing which SSLv2 suites are allowed.
+ * lsb corresponds to first cipher suite in allCipherSuites[].
+ */
+static PRUint16 allowedByPolicy;          /* all off by default */
+static PRUint16 maybeAllowedByPolicy;     /* all off by default */
+static PRUint16 chosenPreference = 0xff;  /* all on  by default */
+
+/* bit values for the above two bit masks */
+#define SSL_CB_RC4_128_WITH_MD5              (1 << SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5)
+#define SSL_CB_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5     (1 << SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5)
+#define SSL_CB_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5          (1 << SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5)
+#define SSL_CB_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 (1 << SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5)
+#define SSL_CB_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5         (1 << SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5)
+#define SSL_CB_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5           (1 << SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5)
+#define SSL_CB_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5     (1 << SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5)
+#define SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED \
+   (SSL_CB_RC4_128_WITH_MD5              | \
+    SSL_CB_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5     | \
+    SSL_CB_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5          | \
+    SSL_CB_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 | \
+    SSL_CB_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5           | \
+    SSL_CB_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5)
+
+
+/* Construct a socket's list of cipher specs from the global default values.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_ConstructCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) 
+{
+    PRUint8 *           cs              = NULL;
+    unsigned int        allowed;
+    unsigned int        count;
+    int                 ssl3_count      = 0;
+    int                 final_count;
+    int                 i;
+    SECStatus           rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    count = 0;
+    PORT_Assert(ss != 0);
+    allowed = !ss->opt.enableSSL2 ? 0 :
+        (ss->allowedByPolicy & ss->chosenPreference & SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED);
+    while (allowed) {
+        if (allowed & 1) 
+            ++count;
+        allowed >>= 1;
+    }
+
+    /* Call ssl3_config_match_init() once here, 
+     * instead of inside ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(),
+     * because the latter gets called twice below, 
+     * and then again in ssl2_BeginClientHandshake().
+     */
+    ssl3_config_match_init(ss);
+
+    /* ask SSL3 how many cipher suites it has. */
+    rv = ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(ss, NULL, &ssl3_count);
+    if (rv < 0) 
+        return rv;
+    count += ssl3_count;
+
+    /* Allocate memory to hold cipher specs */
+    if (count > 0)
+        cs = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(count * 3);
+    else
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+    if (cs == NULL)
+        return SECFailure;
+
+    if (ss->cipherSpecs != NULL) {
+        PORT_Free(ss->cipherSpecs);
+    }
+    ss->cipherSpecs     = cs;
+    ss->sizeCipherSpecs = count * 3;
+
+    /* fill in cipher specs for SSL2 cipher suites */
+    allowed = !ss->opt.enableSSL2 ? 0 :
+        (ss->allowedByPolicy & ss->chosenPreference & SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED);
+    for (i = 0; i < ssl2_NUM_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED * 3; i += 3) {
+        const PRUint8 * hs = implementedCipherSuites + i;
+        int             ok = allowed & (1U << hs[0]);
+        if (ok) {
+            cs[0] = hs[0];
+            cs[1] = hs[1];
+            cs[2] = hs[2];
+            cs += 3;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* now have SSL3 add its suites onto the end */
+    rv = ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(ss, cs, &final_count);
+    
+    /* adjust for any difference between first pass and second pass */
+    ss->sizeCipherSpecs -= (ssl3_count - final_count) * 3;
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* This function is called immediately after ssl2_ConstructCipherSpecs()
+** at the beginning of a handshake.  It detects cases where a protocol
+** (e.g. SSL2 or SSL3) is logically enabled, but all its cipher suites
+** for that protocol have been disabled.  If such cases, it clears the 
+** enable bit for the protocol.  If no protocols remain enabled, or
+** if no cipher suites are found, it sets the error code and returns
+** SECFailure, otherwise it returns SECSuccess.
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_CheckConfigSanity(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    unsigned int      allowed;
+    int               ssl3CipherCount = 0;
+    SECStatus         rv;
+
+    /* count the SSL2 and SSL3 enabled ciphers.
+     * if either is zero, clear the socket's enable for that protocol.
+     */
+    if (!ss->cipherSpecs)
+        goto disabled;
+
+    allowed = ss->allowedByPolicy & ss->chosenPreference;
+    if (! allowed)
+        ss->opt.enableSSL2 = PR_FALSE; /* not really enabled if no ciphers */
+
+    /* ssl3_config_match_init was called in ssl2_ConstructCipherSpecs(). */
+    /* Ask how many ssl3 CipherSuites were enabled. */
+    rv = ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(ss, NULL, &ssl3CipherCount);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess || ssl3CipherCount <= 0) {
+        ss->opt.enableSSL3 = PR_FALSE; /* not really enabled if no ciphers */
+        ss->opt.enableTLS  = PR_FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!ss->opt.enableSSL2 && !ss->opt.enableSSL3 && !ss->opt.enableTLS) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Can't handshake! both v2 and v3 disabled.",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+disabled:
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Since this is a global (not per-socket) setting, we cannot use the
+ * HandshakeLock to protect this.  Probably want a global lock.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl2_SetPolicy(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 policy)
+{
+    PRUint32  bitMask;
+    SECStatus rv       = SECSuccess;
+
+    which &= 0x000f;
+    bitMask = 1 << which;
+
+    if (!(bitMask & SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (policy == SSL_ALLOWED) {
+        allowedByPolicy         |= bitMask;
+        maybeAllowedByPolicy    |= bitMask;
+    } else if (policy == SSL_RESTRICTED) {
+        allowedByPolicy         &= ~bitMask;
+        maybeAllowedByPolicy    |= bitMask;
+    } else {
+        allowedByPolicy         &= ~bitMask;
+        maybeAllowedByPolicy    &= ~bitMask;
+    }
+    allowedByPolicy             &= SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED;
+    maybeAllowedByPolicy        &= SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED;
+
+    policyWasSet = PR_TRUE;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl2_GetPolicy(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 *oPolicy)
+{
+    PRUint32     bitMask;
+    PRInt32      policy;
+
+    which &= 0x000f;
+    bitMask = 1 << which;
+
+    /* Caller assures oPolicy is not null. */
+    if (!(bitMask & SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+        *oPolicy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (maybeAllowedByPolicy & bitMask) {
+        policy = (allowedByPolicy & bitMask) ? SSL_ALLOWED : SSL_RESTRICTED;
+    } else {
+        policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED;
+    }
+
+    *oPolicy = policy;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Since this is a global (not per-socket) setting, we cannot use the
+ * HandshakeLock to protect this.  Probably want a global lock.
+ * Called from SSL_CipherPrefSetDefault in sslsock.c
+ * These changes have no effect on any sslSockets already created. 
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl2_CipherPrefSetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRBool enabled)
+{
+    PRUint32     bitMask;
+    
+    which &= 0x000f;
+    bitMask = 1 << which;
+
+    if (!(bitMask & SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (enabled)
+        chosenPreference |= bitMask;
+    else
+        chosenPreference &= ~bitMask;
+    chosenPreference &= SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus 
+ssl2_CipherPrefGetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRBool *enabled)
+{
+    PRBool       rv       = PR_FALSE;
+    PRUint32     bitMask;
+
+    which &= 0x000f;
+    bitMask = 1 << which;
+
+    if (!(bitMask & SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+        *enabled = PR_FALSE;
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = (PRBool)((chosenPreference & bitMask) != 0);
+    *enabled = rv;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus 
+ssl2_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 which, PRBool enabled)
+{
+    PRUint32     bitMask;
+    
+    which &= 0x000f;
+    bitMask = 1 << which;
+
+    if (!(bitMask & SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (enabled)
+        ss->chosenPreference |= bitMask;
+    else
+        ss->chosenPreference &= ~bitMask;
+    ss->chosenPreference &= SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus 
+ssl2_CipherPrefGet(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 which, PRBool *enabled)
+{
+    PRBool       rv       = PR_FALSE;
+    PRUint32     bitMask;
+
+    which &= 0x000f;
+    bitMask = 1 << which;
+
+    if (!(bitMask & SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE);
+        *enabled = PR_FALSE;
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = (PRBool)((ss->chosenPreference & bitMask) != 0);
+    *enabled = rv;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+
+/* copy global default policy into socket. */
+void      
+ssl2_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    ss->allowedByPolicy         = allowedByPolicy;
+    ss->maybeAllowedByPolicy    = maybeAllowedByPolicy;
+    ss->chosenPreference        = chosenPreference;
+}
+
+
+/************************************************************************/
+
+/* Called from ssl2_CreateSessionCypher(), which already holds handshake lock.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_CreateMAC(sslSecurityInfo *sec, SECItem *readKey, SECItem *writeKey, 
+          int cipherChoice)
+{
+    switch (cipherChoice) {
+
+      case SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5:
+      case SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5:
+      case SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5:
+      case SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5:
+      case SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5:
+      case SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5:
+        sec->hash = HASH_GetHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5);
+        SECITEM_CopyItem(0, &sec->sendSecret, writeKey);
+        SECITEM_CopyItem(0, &sec->rcvSecret, readKey);
+        break;
+
+      default:
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    sec->hashcx = (*sec->hash->create)();
+    if (sec->hashcx == NULL)
+        return SECFailure;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ * All the Send functions below must acquire and release the socket's 
+ * xmitBufLock.
+ */
+
+/* Called from all the Send* functions below. */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_GetSendBuffer(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int len)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+    if (len < 128) {
+        len = 128;
+    }
+    if (len > ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space) {
+        rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, len);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: ssl2_GetSendBuffer failed, tried to get %d bytes",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len));
+            rv = SECFailure;
+        }
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from:
+ * ssl2_ClientSetupSessionCypher() <- ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage()
+ * ssl2_HandleRequestCertificate()     <- ssl2_HandleMessage() <- 
+                                        ssl_Do1stHandshake()
+ * ssl2_HandleMessage()                <- ssl_Do1stHandshake()
+ * ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage() <- ssl_Do1stHandshake()
+                                     after ssl2_BeginClientHandshake()
+ * ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq() <- Called from certdlgs.c in nav.
+ * ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage() <- ssl_Do1stHandshake() 
+                                     after ssl2_BeginServerHandshake()
+ * 
+ * Acquires and releases the socket's xmitBufLock.
+ */     
+int
+ssl2_SendErrorMessage(sslSocket *ss, int error)
+{
+    int rv;
+    PRUint8 msg[SSL_HL_ERROR_HBYTES];
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    msg[0] = SSL_MT_ERROR;
+    msg[1] = MSB(error);
+    msg[2] = LSB(error);
+
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, error));
+
+    ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
+    rv = (*ss->sec.send)(ss, msg, sizeof(msg), 0);
+    if (rv >= 0) {
+        rv = SECSuccess;
+    }
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl2_TryToFinish().  
+ * Acquires and releases the socket's xmitBufLock.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_SendClientFinishedMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    SECStatus        rv    = SECSuccess;
+    int              sent;
+    PRUint8    msg[1 + SSL_CONNECTIONID_BYTES];
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+
+    if (ss->sec.ci.sentFinished == 0) {
+        ss->sec.ci.sentFinished = 1;
+
+        SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending client-finished",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+        msg[0] = SSL_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED;
+        PORT_Memcpy(msg+1, ss->sec.ci.connectionID, 
+                    sizeof(ss->sec.ci.connectionID));
+
+        DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, msg, 1 + sizeof(ss->sec.ci.connectionID)));
+        sent = (*ss->sec.send)(ss, msg, 1 + sizeof(ss->sec.ci.connectionID), 0);
+        rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent;
+    }
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from 
+ * ssl2_HandleClientSessionKeyMessage() <- ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage()
+ * ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage()  <- ssl_Do1stHandshake() 
+                                      after ssl2_BeginServerHandshake()
+ * Acquires and releases the socket's xmitBufLock.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_SendServerVerifyMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    PRUint8 *        msg;
+    int              sendLen;
+    int              sent;
+    SECStatus        rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+
+    sendLen = 1 + SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES;
+    rv = ssl2_GetSendBuffer(ss, sendLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    msg = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf;
+    msg[0] = SSL_MT_SERVER_VERIFY;
+    PORT_Memcpy(msg+1, ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge, SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
+
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, msg, sendLen));
+    sent = (*ss->sec.send)(ss, msg, sendLen, 0);
+
+    rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent;
+
+done:
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl2_TryToFinish(). 
+ * Acquires and releases the socket's xmitBufLock.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_SendServerFinishedMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    sslSessionID *   sid;
+    PRUint8 *        msg;
+    int              sendLen, sent;
+    SECStatus        rv    = SECSuccess;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+
+    if (ss->sec.ci.sentFinished == 0) {
+        ss->sec.ci.sentFinished = 1;
+        PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != 0);
+        sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+
+        SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending server-finished",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+        sendLen = 1 + sizeof(sid->u.ssl2.sessionID);
+        rv = ssl2_GetSendBuffer(ss, sendLen);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        msg = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf;
+        msg[0] = SSL_MT_SERVER_FINISHED;
+        PORT_Memcpy(msg+1, sid->u.ssl2.sessionID,
+                    sizeof(sid->u.ssl2.sessionID));
+
+        DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, msg, sendLen));
+        sent = (*ss->sec.send)(ss, msg, sendLen, 0);
+
+        if (sent < 0) {
+            /* If send failed, it is now a bogus  session-id */
+            (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid);
+            rv = (SECStatus)sent;
+        } else if (!ss->opt.noCache) {
+            /* Put the sid in session-id cache, (may already be there) */
+            (*ss->sec.cache)(sid);
+            rv = SECSuccess;
+        }
+        ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+        ss->sec.ci.sid = 0;
+    }
+done:
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl2_ClientSetupSessionCypher() <- 
+ *                                              ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage() 
+ *                                           after ssl2_BeginClientHandshake()
+ * Acquires and releases the socket's xmitBufLock.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_SendSessionKeyMessage(sslSocket *ss, int cipher, int keySize,
+                      PRUint8 *ca, int caLen,
+                      PRUint8 *ck, int ckLen,
+                      PRUint8 *ek, int ekLen)
+{
+    PRUint8 *        msg;
+    int              sendLen;
+    int              sent;
+    SECStatus        rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+
+    sendLen = SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES + ckLen + ekLen + caLen;
+    rv = ssl2_GetSendBuffer(ss, sendLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto done;
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending client-session-key",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    msg = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf;
+    msg[0] = SSL_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY;
+    msg[1] = cipher;
+    msg[2] = MSB(keySize);
+    msg[3] = LSB(keySize);
+    msg[4] = MSB(ckLen);
+    msg[5] = LSB(ckLen);
+    msg[6] = MSB(ekLen);
+    msg[7] = LSB(ekLen);
+    msg[8] = MSB(caLen);
+    msg[9] = LSB(caLen);
+    PORT_Memcpy(msg+SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES, ck, ckLen);
+    PORT_Memcpy(msg+SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES+ckLen, ek, ekLen);
+    PORT_Memcpy(msg+SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES+ckLen+ekLen, ca, caLen);
+
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, msg, sendLen));
+    sent = (*ss->sec.send)(ss, msg, sendLen, 0);
+    rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent;
+done:
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl2_TriggerNextMessage() <- ssl2_HandleMessage() 
+ * Acquires and releases the socket's xmitBufLock.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_SendCertificateRequestMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    PRUint8 *        msg;
+    int              sent;
+    int              sendLen;
+    SECStatus        rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+
+    sendLen = SSL_HL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES + SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES;
+    rv = ssl2_GetSendBuffer(ss, sendLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto done;
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending certificate request",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* Generate random challenge for client to encrypt */
+    PK11_GenerateRandom(ss->sec.ci.serverChallenge, SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
+
+    msg = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf;
+    msg[0] = SSL_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE;
+    msg[1] = SSL_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+    PORT_Memcpy(msg + SSL_HL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES, 
+                ss->sec.ci.serverChallenge, SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
+
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, msg, sendLen));
+    sent = (*ss->sec.send)(ss, msg, sendLen, 0);
+    rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent;
+done:
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl2_HandleRequestCertificate() <- ssl2_HandleMessage()
+ *             ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq() <- (application)
+ * Acquires and releases the socket's xmitBufLock.
+ */
+static int
+ssl2_SendCertificateResponseMessage(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *cert, 
+                                    SECItem *encCode)
+{
+    PRUint8 *msg;
+    int rv, sendLen;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+
+    sendLen = SSL_HL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES + encCode->len + cert->len;
+    rv = ssl2_GetSendBuffer(ss, sendLen);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto done;
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending certificate response",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    msg = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf;
+    msg[0] = SSL_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
+    msg[1] = SSL_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
+    msg[2] = MSB(cert->len);
+    msg[3] = LSB(cert->len);
+    msg[4] = MSB(encCode->len);
+    msg[5] = LSB(encCode->len);
+    PORT_Memcpy(msg + SSL_HL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES, cert->data, cert->len);
+    PORT_Memcpy(msg + SSL_HL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES + cert->len,
+              encCode->data, encCode->len);
+
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, msg, sendLen));
+    rv = (*ss->sec.send)(ss, msg, sendLen, 0);
+    if (rv >= 0) {
+        rv = SECSuccess;
+    }
+done:
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/********************************************************************
+**  Send functions above this line must aquire & release the socket's   
+**      xmitBufLock.  
+** All the ssl2_Send functions below this line are called vis ss->sec.send
+**      and require that the caller hold the xmitBufLock.
+*/
+
+/*
+** Called from ssl2_SendStream, ssl2_SendBlock, but not from ssl2_SendClear.
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_CalcMAC(PRUint8             * result, 
+             sslSecurityInfo     * sec,
+             const PRUint8       * data, 
+             unsigned int          dataLen,
+             unsigned int          paddingLen)
+{
+    const PRUint8 *      secret         = sec->sendSecret.data;
+    unsigned int         secretLen      = sec->sendSecret.len;
+    unsigned long        sequenceNumber = sec->sendSequence;
+    unsigned int         nout;
+    PRUint8              seq[4];
+    PRUint8              padding[32];/* XXX max blocksize? */
+
+    if (!sec->hash || !sec->hash->length)
+        return SECSuccess;
+    if (!sec->hashcx)
+        return SECFailure;
+
+    /* Reset hash function */
+    (*sec->hash->begin)(sec->hashcx);
+
+    /* Feed hash the data */
+    (*sec->hash->update)(sec->hashcx, secret, secretLen);
+    (*sec->hash->update)(sec->hashcx, data, dataLen);
+    PORT_Memset(padding, paddingLen, paddingLen);
+    (*sec->hash->update)(sec->hashcx, padding, paddingLen);
+
+    seq[0] = (PRUint8) (sequenceNumber >> 24);
+    seq[1] = (PRUint8) (sequenceNumber >> 16);
+    seq[2] = (PRUint8) (sequenceNumber >> 8);
+    seq[3] = (PRUint8) (sequenceNumber);
+
+    PRINT_BUF(60, (0, "calc-mac secret:", secret, secretLen));
+    PRINT_BUF(60, (0, "calc-mac data:", data, dataLen));
+    PRINT_BUF(60, (0, "calc-mac padding:", padding, paddingLen));
+    PRINT_BUF(60, (0, "calc-mac seq:", seq, 4));
+
+    (*sec->hash->update)(sec->hashcx, seq, 4);
+
+    /* Get result */
+    (*sec->hash->end)(sec->hashcx, result, &nout, sec->hash->length);
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+** Maximum transmission amounts. These are tiny bit smaller than they
+** need to be (they account for the MAC length plus some padding),
+** assuming the MAC is 16 bytes long and the padding is a max of 7 bytes
+** long. This gives an additional 9 bytes of slop to work within.
+*/
+#define MAX_STREAM_CYPHER_LEN   0x7fe0
+#define MAX_BLOCK_CYPHER_LEN    0x3fe0
+
+/*
+** Send some data in the clear. 
+** Package up data with the length header and send it.
+**
+** Return count of bytes successfully written, or negative number (failure).
+*/
+static PRInt32 
+ssl2_SendClear(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *in, PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+    PRUint8         * out;
+    int               rv;
+    int               amount;
+    int               count     = 0;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
+
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending %d bytes in the clear",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len));
+    PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "clear data:", (PRUint8*) in, len));
+
+    while (len) {
+        amount = PR_MIN( len, MAX_STREAM_CYPHER_LEN );
+        if (amount + 2 > ss->sec.writeBuf.space) {
+            rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.writeBuf, amount + 2);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                count = rv;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        out = ss->sec.writeBuf.buf;
+
+        /*
+        ** Construct message.
+        */
+        out[0] = 0x80 | MSB(amount);
+        out[1] = LSB(amount);
+        PORT_Memcpy(&out[2], in, amount);
+
+        /* Now send the data */
+        rv = ssl_DefSend(ss, out, amount + 2, flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK);
+        if (rv < 0) {
+            if (PORT_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+                rv = 0;
+            } else {
+                /* Return short write if some data already went out... */
+                if (count == 0)
+                    count = rv;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((unsigned)rv < (amount + 2)) {
+            /* Short write.  Save the data and return. */
+            if (ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, out + rv, amount + 2 - rv) 
+                == SECFailure) {
+                count = SECFailure;
+            } else {
+                count += amount;
+                ss->sec.sendSequence++;
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+
+        ss->sec.sendSequence++;
+        in    += amount;
+        count += amount;
+        len   -= amount;
+    }
+
+    return count;
+}
+
+/*
+** Send some data, when using a stream cipher. Stream ciphers have a
+** block size of 1. Package up the data with the length header
+** and send it.
+*/
+static PRInt32 
+ssl2_SendStream(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *in, PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+    PRUint8       *  out;
+    int              rv;
+    int              count      = 0;
+
+    int              amount;
+    PRUint8          macLen;
+    int              nout;
+    int              buflen;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
+
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending %d bytes using stream cipher",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len));
+    PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "clear data:", (PRUint8*) in, len));
+
+    while (len) {
+        ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);  /*************************************/
+
+        macLen = ss->sec.hash->length;
+        amount = PR_MIN( len, MAX_STREAM_CYPHER_LEN );
+        buflen = amount + 2 + macLen;
+        if (buflen > ss->sec.writeBuf.space) {
+            rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.writeBuf, buflen);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+        }
+        out    = ss->sec.writeBuf.buf;
+        nout   = amount + macLen;
+        out[0] = 0x80 | MSB(nout);
+        out[1] = LSB(nout);
+
+        /* Calculate MAC */
+        rv = ssl2_CalcMAC(out+2,                /* put MAC here */
+                          &ss->sec, 
+                          in, amount,           /* input addr & length */
+                          0);                   /* no padding */
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+            goto loser;
+
+        /* Encrypt MAC */
+        rv = (*ss->sec.enc)(ss->sec.writecx, out+2, &nout, macLen, out+2, macLen);
+        if (rv) goto loser;
+
+        /* Encrypt data from caller */
+        rv = (*ss->sec.enc)(ss->sec.writecx, out+2+macLen, &nout, amount, in, amount);
+        if (rv) goto loser;
+
+        ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);  /*************************************/
+
+        PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "encrypted data:", out, buflen));
+
+        rv = ssl_DefSend(ss, out, buflen, flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK);
+        if (rv < 0) {
+            if (PORT_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+                SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: SSL[%d]: send stream would block, "
+                             "saving data", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+                rv = 0;
+            } else {
+                SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: send stream error %d",
+                             SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError()));
+                /* Return short write if some data already went out... */
+                if (count == 0)
+                    count = rv;
+                goto done;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ((unsigned)rv < buflen) {
+            /* Short write.  Save the data and return. */
+            if (ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, out + rv, buflen - rv) == SECFailure) {
+                count = SECFailure;
+            } else {
+                count += amount;
+                ss->sec.sendSequence++;
+            }
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        ss->sec.sendSequence++;
+        in    += amount;
+        count += amount;
+        len   -= amount;
+    }
+
+done:
+    return count;
+
+loser:
+    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+** Send some data, when using a block cipher. Package up the data with
+** the length header and send it.
+*/
+/* XXX assumes blocksize is > 7 */
+static PRInt32
+ssl2_SendBlock(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *in, PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags)
+{
+    PRUint8       *  out;                   /* begining of output buffer.    */
+    PRUint8       *  op;                    /* next output byte goes here.   */
+    int              rv;                    /* value from funcs we called.   */
+    int              count      = 0;        /* this function's return value. */
+
+    unsigned int     hlen;                  /* output record hdr len, 2 or 3 */
+    unsigned int     macLen;                /* MAC is this many bytes long.  */
+    int              amount;                /* of plaintext to go in record. */
+    unsigned int     padding;               /* add this many padding byte.   */
+    int              nout;                  /* ciphertext size after header. */
+    int              buflen;                /* size of generated record.     */
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
+
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending %d bytes using block cipher",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len));
+    PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "clear data:", in, len));
+
+    while (len) {
+        ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);  /*************************************/
+
+        macLen = ss->sec.hash->length;
+        /* Figure out how much to send, including mac and padding */
+        amount  = PR_MIN( len, MAX_BLOCK_CYPHER_LEN );
+        nout    = amount + macLen;
+        padding = nout & (ss->sec.blockSize - 1);
+        if (padding) {
+            hlen    = 3;
+            padding = ss->sec.blockSize - padding;
+            nout   += padding;
+        } else {
+            hlen = 2;
+        }
+        buflen = hlen + nout;
+        if (buflen > ss->sec.writeBuf.space) {
+            rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.writeBuf, buflen);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+        }
+        out = ss->sec.writeBuf.buf;
+
+        /* Construct header */
+        op = out;
+        if (padding) {
+            *op++ = MSB(nout);
+            *op++ = LSB(nout);
+            *op++ = padding;
+        } else {
+            *op++ = 0x80 | MSB(nout);
+            *op++ = LSB(nout);
+        }
+
+        /* Calculate MAC */
+        rv = ssl2_CalcMAC(op,           /* MAC goes here. */
+                          &ss->sec, 
+                          in, amount,   /* intput addr, len */
+                          padding);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+            goto loser;
+        op += macLen;
+
+        /* Copy in the input data */
+        /* XXX could eliminate the copy by folding it into the encryption */
+        PORT_Memcpy(op, in, amount);
+        op += amount;
+        if (padding) {
+            PORT_Memset(op, padding, padding);
+            op += padding;
+        }
+
+        /* Encrypt result */
+        rv = (*ss->sec.enc)(ss->sec.writecx, out+hlen, &nout, buflen-hlen,
+                         out+hlen, op - (out + hlen));
+        if (rv) 
+            goto loser;
+
+        ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);  /*************************************/
+
+        PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "final xmit data:", out, op - out));
+
+        rv = ssl_DefSend(ss, out, op - out, flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK);
+        if (rv < 0) {
+            if (PORT_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) {
+                rv = 0;
+            } else {
+                SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: send block error %d",
+                             SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError()));
+                /* Return short write if some data already went out... */
+                if (count == 0)
+                    count = rv;
+                goto done;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (rv < (op - out)) {
+            /* Short write.  Save the data and return. */
+            if (ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, out + rv, op - out - rv) == SECFailure) {
+                count = SECFailure;
+            } else {
+                count += amount;
+                ss->sec.sendSequence++;
+            }
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        ss->sec.sendSequence++;
+        in    += amount;
+        count += amount;
+        len   -= amount;
+    }
+
+done:
+    return count;
+
+loser:
+    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+** Called from: ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage,
+**              ssl2_HandleClientSessionKeyMessage,
+**              ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert,
+**              ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage,
+**              
+*/
+static void
+ssl2_UseEncryptedSendFunc(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+    PORT_Assert(ss->sec.hashcx != 0);
+
+    ss->gs.encrypted = 1;
+    ss->sec.send = (ss->sec.blockSize > 1) ? ssl2_SendBlock : ssl2_SendStream;
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+}
+
+/* Called while initializing socket in ssl_CreateSecurityInfo().
+** This function allows us to keep the name of ssl2_SendClear static.
+*/
+void
+ssl2_UseClearSendFunc(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    ss->sec.send = ssl2_SendClear;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+**                      END of Send functions.                          * 
+*************************************************************************/
+
+/***********************************************************************
+ * For SSL3, this gathers in and handles records/messages until either 
+ *      the handshake is complete or application data is available.
+ *
+ * For SSL2, this gathers in only the next SSLV2 record.
+ *
+ * Called from ssl_Do1stHandshake() via function pointer ss->handshake.
+ * Caller must hold handshake lock.
+ * This function acquires and releases the RecvBufLock.
+ *
+ * returns SECSuccess for success.
+ * returns SECWouldBlock when that value is returned by ssl2_GatherRecord() or
+ *      ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake().
+ * returns SECFailure on all other errors.
+ *
+ * The gather functions called by ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake are expected 
+ *      to return values interpreted as follows:
+ *  1 : the function completed without error.
+ *  0 : the function read EOF.
+ * -1 : read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error.
+ * -2 : the function wants ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to be called again 
+ *      immediately, by ssl_Do1stHandshake.
+ *
+ * This code is similar to, and easily confused with, DoRecv() in sslsecur.c
+ *
+ * This function is called from ssl_Do1stHandshake().  
+ * The following functions put ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake into ss->handshake:
+ *      ssl2_HandleMessage
+ *      ssl2_HandleVerifyMessage
+ *      ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage
+ *      ssl2_BeginClientHandshake       
+ *      ssl2_HandleClientSessionKeyMessage
+ *      ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq 
+ *      ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq 
+ *      ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert 
+ *      ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert 
+ *      ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage
+ *      ssl2_BeginServerHandshake
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    int rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+        /* Wait for handshake to complete, or application data to arrive.  */
+        rv = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, 0);
+    } else {
+        /* See if we have a complete record */
+        rv = ssl2_GatherRecord(ss, 0);
+    }
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake gathering, rv=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rv));
+
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    if (rv <= 0) {
+        if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
+            /* Progress is blocked waiting for callback completion.  */
+            SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake blocked (need %d)",
+                         SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->gs.remainder));
+            return SECWouldBlock;
+        }
+        if (rv == 0) {
+            /* EOF. Loser  */
+            PORT_SetError(PR_END_OF_FILE_ERROR);
+        }
+        return SECFailure;      /* rv is < 0 here. */
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got handshake record of %d bytes",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->gs.recordLen));
+
+    ss->handshake = 0;  /* makes ssl_Do1stHandshake call ss->nextHandshake.*/
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************/
+
+/* Called from ssl2_ServerSetupSessionCypher()
+ *             ssl2_ClientSetupSessionCypher()
+ */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_FillInSID(sslSessionID * sid, 
+          int            cipher,
+          PRUint8       *keyData, 
+          int            keyLen,
+          PRUint8       *ca, 
+          int            caLen,
+          int            keyBits, 
+          int            secretKeyBits,
+          SSLSignType    authAlgorithm,
+          PRUint32       authKeyBits,
+          SSLKEAType     keaType,
+          PRUint32       keaKeyBits)
+{
+    PORT_Assert(sid->references == 1);
+    PORT_Assert(sid->cached == never_cached);
+    PORT_Assert(sid->u.ssl2.masterKey.data == 0);
+    PORT_Assert(sid->u.ssl2.cipherArg.data == 0);
+
+    sid->version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2;
+
+    sid->u.ssl2.cipherType = cipher;
+    sid->u.ssl2.masterKey.data = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(keyLen);
+    if (!sid->u.ssl2.masterKey.data) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl2.masterKey.data, keyData, keyLen);
+    sid->u.ssl2.masterKey.len = keyLen;
+    sid->u.ssl2.keyBits       = keyBits;
+    sid->u.ssl2.secretKeyBits = secretKeyBits;
+    sid->authAlgorithm        = authAlgorithm;
+    sid->authKeyBits          = authKeyBits;
+    sid->keaType              = keaType;
+    sid->keaKeyBits           = keaKeyBits;
+    sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time();
+    sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl_sid_timeout;
+
+    if (caLen) {
+        sid->u.ssl2.cipherArg.data = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(caLen);
+        if (!sid->u.ssl2.cipherArg.data) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        sid->u.ssl2.cipherArg.len = caLen;
+        PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl2.cipherArg.data, ca, caLen);
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+** Construct session keys given the masterKey (tied to the session-id),
+** the client's challenge and the server's nonce.
+**
+** Called from ssl2_CreateSessionCypher() <-
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_ProduceKeys(sslSocket *    ss, 
+            SECItem *      readKey, 
+            SECItem *      writeKey,
+            SECItem *      masterKey, 
+            PRUint8 *      challenge,
+            PRUint8 *      nonce, 
+            int            cipherType)
+{
+    PK11Context * cx        = 0;
+    unsigned      nkm       = 0; /* number of hashes to generate key mat. */
+    unsigned      nkd       = 0; /* size of readKey and writeKey. */
+    unsigned      part;
+    unsigned      i;
+    unsigned      off;
+    SECStatus     rv;
+    PRUint8       countChar;
+    PRUint8       km[3*16];     /* buffer for key material. */
+
+    readKey->data = 0;
+    writeKey->data = 0;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+    cx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5);
+    if (cx == NULL) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    nkm = ssl_Specs[cipherType].nkm;
+    nkd = ssl_Specs[cipherType].nkd;
+
+    readKey->data = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(nkd);
+    if (!readKey->data) 
+        goto loser;
+    readKey->len = nkd;
+
+    writeKey->data = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(nkd);
+    if (!writeKey->data) 
+        goto loser;
+    writeKey->len = nkd;
+
+    /* Produce key material */
+    countChar = '0';
+    for (i = 0, off = 0; i < nkm; i++, off += 16) {
+        rv  = PK11_DigestBegin(cx);
+        rv |= PK11_DigestOp(cx, masterKey->data, masterKey->len);
+        rv |= PK11_DigestOp(cx, &countChar,      1);
+        rv |= PK11_DigestOp(cx, challenge,       SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
+        rv |= PK11_DigestOp(cx, nonce,           SSL_CONNECTIONID_BYTES);
+        rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(cx, km+off, &part, MD5_LENGTH);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        countChar++;
+    }
+
+    /* Produce keys */
+    PORT_Memcpy(readKey->data,  km,       nkd);
+    PORT_Memcpy(writeKey->data, km + nkd, nkd);
+
+loser:
+    PK11_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl2_ServerSetupSessionCypher() 
+**                  <- ssl2_HandleClientSessionKeyMessage()
+**                          <- ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage()
+** and from    ssl2_ClientSetupSessionCypher() 
+**                  <- ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage()
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_CreateSessionCypher(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PRBool isClient)
+{
+    SECItem         * rk = NULL;
+    SECItem         * wk = NULL;
+    SECItem *         param;
+    SECStatus         rv;
+    int               cipherType  = sid->u.ssl2.cipherType;
+    PK11SlotInfo *    slot        = NULL;
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
+    SECItem           readKey;
+    SECItem           writeKey;
+
+    void *readcx = 0;
+    void *writecx = 0;
+    readKey.data = 0;
+    writeKey.data = 0;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+    if((ss->sec.ci.sid == 0))
+        goto sec_loser; /* don't crash if asserts are off */
+
+    /* Trying to cut down on all these switch statements that should be tables.
+     * So, test cipherType once, here, and then use tables below. 
+     */
+    switch (cipherType) {
+    case SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5:
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: ssl2_CreateSessionCypher: unknown cipher=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cipherType));
+        PORT_SetError(isClient ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER : SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+        goto sec_loser;
+    }
+ 
+    rk = isClient ? &readKey  : &writeKey;
+    wk = isClient ? &writeKey : &readKey;
+
+    /* Produce the keys for this session */
+    rv = ssl2_ProduceKeys(ss, &readKey, &writeKey, &sid->u.ssl2.masterKey,
+                     ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge, ss->sec.ci.connectionID,
+                     cipherType);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto loser;
+    PRINT_BUF(7, (ss, "Session read-key: ", rk->data, rk->len));
+    PRINT_BUF(7, (ss, "Session write-key: ", wk->data, wk->len));
+
+    PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.readKey, readKey.data, readKey.len);
+    PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.writeKey, writeKey.data, writeKey.len);
+    ss->sec.ci.keySize = readKey.len;
+
+    /* Setup the MAC */
+    rv = ssl2_CreateMAC(&ss->sec, rk, wk, cipherType);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    /* First create the session key object */
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: using %s", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+            ssl_cipherName[cipherType]));
+
+
+    mechanism  = ssl_Specs[cipherType].mechanism;
+
+    /* set destructer before we call loser... */
+    ss->sec.destroy = (void (*)(void*, PRBool)) PK11_DestroyContext;
+    slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(mechanism, ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+    if (slot == NULL)
+        goto loser;
+
+    param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &sid->u.ssl2.cipherArg);
+    if (param == NULL)
+        goto loser;
+    readcx = PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(slot, mechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+                                        CKA_DECRYPT, rk, param,
+                                        ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+    if (readcx == NULL)
+        goto loser;
+
+    /* build the client context */
+    param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &sid->u.ssl2.cipherArg);
+    if (param == NULL)
+        goto loser;
+    writecx = PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(slot, mechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+                                         CKA_ENCRYPT, wk, param,
+                                         ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(param,PR_TRUE);
+    if (writecx == NULL)
+        goto loser;
+    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+    ss->sec.enc           = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp;
+    ss->sec.dec           = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp;
+    ss->sec.readcx        = (void *) readcx;
+    ss->sec.writecx       = (void *) writecx;
+    ss->sec.blockSize     = ssl_Specs[cipherType].blockSize;
+    ss->sec.blockShift    = ssl_Specs[cipherType].blockShift;
+    ss->sec.cipherType    = sid->u.ssl2.cipherType;
+    ss->sec.keyBits       = sid->u.ssl2.keyBits;
+    ss->sec.secretKeyBits = sid->u.ssl2.secretKeyBits;
+    goto done;
+
+  loser:
+    if (ss->sec.destroy) {
+        if (readcx)  (*ss->sec.destroy)(readcx, PR_TRUE);
+        if (writecx) (*ss->sec.destroy)(writecx, PR_TRUE);
+    }
+    ss->sec.destroy = NULL;
+    if (slot) PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+  sec_loser:
+    rv = SECFailure;
+
+  done:
+    if (rk) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(rk, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+    if (wk) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(wk, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+** Setup the server ciphers given information from a CLIENT-MASTER-KEY
+** message.
+**      "ss"      pointer to the ssl-socket object
+**      "cipher"  the cipher type to use
+**      "keyBits" the size of the final cipher key
+**      "ck"      the clear-key data
+**      "ckLen"   the number of bytes of clear-key data
+**      "ek"      the encrypted-key data
+**      "ekLen"   the number of bytes of encrypted-key data
+**      "ca"      the cipher-arg data
+**      "caLen"   the number of bytes of cipher-arg data
+**
+** The MASTER-KEY is constructed by first decrypting the encrypted-key
+** data. This produces the SECRET-KEY-DATA. The MASTER-KEY is composed by
+** concatenating the clear-key data with the SECRET-KEY-DATA. This code
+** checks to make sure that the client didn't send us an improper amount
+** of SECRET-KEY-DATA (it restricts the length of that data to match the
+** spec).
+**
+** Called from ssl2_HandleClientSessionKeyMessage().
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_ServerSetupSessionCypher(sslSocket *ss, int cipher, unsigned int keyBits,
+                         PRUint8 *ck, unsigned int ckLen,
+                         PRUint8 *ek, unsigned int ekLen,
+                         PRUint8 *ca, unsigned int caLen)
+{
+    PRUint8      *    dk   = NULL; /* decrypted master key */
+    sslSessionID *    sid;
+    sslServerCerts *  sc   = ss->serverCerts + kt_rsa;
+    PRUint8       *   kbuf = 0; /* buffer for RSA decrypted data. */
+    unsigned int      ddLen;    /* length of RSA decrypted data in kbuf */
+    unsigned int      keySize;
+    unsigned int      dkLen;    /* decrypted key length in bytes */
+    int               modulusLen;
+    SECStatus         rv;
+    PRUint16          allowed;  /* cipher kinds enabled and allowed by policy */
+    PRUint8           mkbuf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_BYTES];
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)   );
+    PORT_Assert((sc->SERVERKEY != 0));
+    PORT_Assert((ss->sec.ci.sid != 0));
+    sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+
+    /* Trying to cut down on all these switch statements that should be tables.
+     * So, test cipherType once, here, and then use tables below. 
+     */
+    switch (cipher) {
+    case SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5:
+    case SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5:
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: ssl2_ServerSetupSessionCypher: unknown cipher=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cipher));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    allowed = ss->allowedByPolicy & ss->chosenPreference & SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED;
+    if (!(allowed & (1 << cipher))) {
+        /* client chose a kind we don't allow! */
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: disallowed cipher=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cipher));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    keySize = ssl_Specs[cipher].keyLen;
+    if (keyBits != keySize * BPB) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid master secret key length=%d (bits)!",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, keyBits));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    if (ckLen != ssl_Specs[cipher].pubLen) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid clear key length, ckLen=%d (bytes)!",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ckLen));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    if (caLen != ssl_Specs[cipher].ivLen) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid key args length, caLen=%d (bytes)!",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, caLen));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    modulusLen = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(sc->SERVERKEY);
+    if (modulusLen == -1) {
+        /* XXX If the key is bad, then PK11_PubDecryptRaw will fail below. */
+        modulusLen = ekLen;
+    }
+    if (ekLen > modulusLen || ekLen + ckLen < keySize) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid encrypted key length, ekLen=%d (bytes)!",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ekLen));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* allocate the buffer to hold the decrypted portion of the key. */
+    kbuf = (PRUint8*)PORT_Alloc(modulusLen);
+    if (!kbuf) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    dkLen = keySize - ckLen;
+    dk    = kbuf + modulusLen - dkLen;
+
+    /* Decrypt encrypted half of the key. 
+    ** NOTE: PK11_PubDecryptRaw will barf on a non-RSA key. This is
+    ** desired behavior here.
+    */
+    rv = PK11_PubDecryptRaw(sc->SERVERKEY, kbuf, &ddLen, modulusLen, ek, ekLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto hide_loser;
+
+    /* Is the length of the decrypted data (ddLen) the expected value? */
+    if (modulusLen != ddLen) 
+        goto hide_loser;
+
+    /* Cheaply verify that PKCS#1 was used to format the encryption block */
+    if ((kbuf[0] != 0x00) || (kbuf[1] != 0x02) || (dk[-1] != 0x00)) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: strange encryption block",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+        goto hide_loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Make sure we're not subject to a version rollback attack. */
+    if (ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) {
+        static const PRUint8 threes[8] = { 0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03,
+                                           0x03, 0x03, 0x03, 0x03 };
+        
+        if (PORT_Memcmp(dk - 8 - 1, threes, 8) == 0) {
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+            goto hide_loser;
+        }
+    }
+    if (0) {
+hide_loser:
+        /* Defense against the Bleichenbacher attack.
+         * Provide the client with NO CLUES that the decrypted master key
+         * was erroneous.  Don't send any error messages.
+         * Instead, Generate a completely bogus master key .
+         */
+        PK11_GenerateRandom(dk, dkLen);
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Construct master key out of the pieces.
+    */
+    if (ckLen) {
+        PORT_Memcpy(mkbuf, ck, ckLen);
+    }
+    PORT_Memcpy(mkbuf + ckLen, dk, dkLen);
+
+    /* Fill in session-id */
+    rv = ssl2_FillInSID(sid, cipher, mkbuf, keySize, ca, caLen,
+                   keyBits, keyBits - (ckLen<<3),
+                   ss->sec.authAlgorithm, ss->sec.authKeyBits,
+                   ss->sec.keaType,       ss->sec.keaKeyBits);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Create session ciphers */
+    rv = ssl2_CreateSessionCypher(ss, sid, PR_FALSE);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(1, ("%d: SSL[%d]: server, using %s cipher, clear=%d total=%d",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl_cipherName[cipher],
+                ckLen<<3, keySize<<3));
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+    goto done;
+
+  loser:
+    rv = SECFailure;
+
+  done:
+    PORT_Free(kbuf);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+** Rewrite the incoming cipher specs, comparing to list of specs we support,
+** (ss->cipherSpecs) and eliminating anything we don't support
+**
+*  Note: Our list may contain SSL v3 ciphers.  
+*  We MUST NOT match on any of those.  
+*  Fortunately, this is easy to detect because SSLv3 ciphers have zero
+*  in the first byte, and none of the SSLv2 ciphers do.
+*
+*  Called from ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage().
+*  Returns the number of bytes of "qualified cipher specs", 
+*  which is typically a multiple of 3, but will be zero if there are none.
+*/
+static int
+ssl2_QualifyCypherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, 
+                        PRUint8 *  cs, /* cipher specs in client hello msg. */
+                        int        csLen)
+{
+    PRUint8 *    ms;
+    PRUint8 *    hs;
+    PRUint8 *    qs;
+    int          mc;
+    int          hc;
+    PRUint8      qualifiedSpecs[ssl2_NUM_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED * 3];
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)   );
+
+    if (!ss->cipherSpecs) {
+        SECStatus rv = ssl2_ConstructCipherSpecs(ss);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess || !ss->cipherSpecs) 
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    PRINT_BUF(10, (ss, "specs from client:", cs, csLen));
+    qs = qualifiedSpecs;
+    ms = ss->cipherSpecs;
+    for (mc = ss->sizeCipherSpecs; mc > 0; mc -= 3, ms += 3) {
+        if (ms[0] == 0)
+            continue;
+        for (hs = cs, hc = csLen; hc > 0; hs += 3, hc -= 3) {
+            if ((hs[0] == ms[0]) &&
+                (hs[1] == ms[1]) &&
+                (hs[2] == ms[2])) {
+                /* Copy this cipher spec into the "keep" section */
+                qs[0] = hs[0];
+                qs[1] = hs[1];
+                qs[2] = hs[2];
+                qs   += 3;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    hc = qs - qualifiedSpecs;
+    PRINT_BUF(10, (ss, "qualified specs from client:", qualifiedSpecs, hc));
+    PORT_Memcpy(cs, qualifiedSpecs, hc);
+    return hc;
+}
+
+/*
+** Pick the best cipher we can find, given the array of server cipher
+** specs.  Returns cipher number (e.g. SSL_CK_*), or -1 for no overlap.
+** If successful, stores the master key size (bytes) in *pKeyLen.
+**
+** This is correct only for the client side, but presently
+** this function is only called from 
+**      ssl2_ClientSetupSessionCypher() <- ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage()
+**
+** Note that most servers only return a single cipher suite in their 
+** ServerHello messages.  So, the code below for finding the "best" cipher
+** suite usually has only one choice.  The client and server should send 
+** their cipher suite lists sorted in descending order by preference.
+*/
+static int
+ssl2_ChooseSessionCypher(sslSocket *ss, 
+                         int        hc,    /* number of cs's in hs. */
+                         PRUint8 *  hs,    /* server hello's cipher suites. */
+                         int *      pKeyLen) /* out: sym key size in bytes. */
+{
+    PRUint8 *       ms;
+    unsigned int    i;
+    int             bestKeySize;
+    int             bestRealKeySize;
+    int             bestCypher;
+    int             keySize;
+    int             realKeySize;
+    PRUint8 *       ohs               = hs;
+    const PRUint8 * preferred;
+    static const PRUint8 noneSuch[3] = { 0, 0, 0 };
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)   );
+
+    if (!ss->cipherSpecs) {
+        SECStatus rv = ssl2_ConstructCipherSpecs(ss);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess || !ss->cipherSpecs) 
+            goto loser;
+    }
+
+    if (!ss->preferredCipher) {
+        unsigned int allowed = ss->allowedByPolicy & ss->chosenPreference &
+                               SSL_CB_IMPLEMENTED;
+        if (allowed) {
+            preferred = implementedCipherSuites;
+            for (i = ssl2_NUM_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i > 0; --i) {
+                if (0 != (allowed & (1U << preferred[0]))) {
+                    ss->preferredCipher = preferred;
+                    break;
+                }
+                preferred += 3;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    preferred = ss->preferredCipher ? ss->preferredCipher : noneSuch;
+    /*
+    ** Scan list of ciphers recieved from peer and look for a match in
+    ** our list.  
+    *  Note: Our list may contain SSL v3 ciphers.  
+    *  We MUST NOT match on any of those.  
+    *  Fortunately, this is easy to detect because SSLv3 ciphers have zero
+    *  in the first byte, and none of the SSLv2 ciphers do.
+    */
+    bestKeySize = bestRealKeySize = 0;
+    bestCypher = -1;
+    while (--hc >= 0) {
+        for (i = 0, ms = ss->cipherSpecs; i < ss->sizeCipherSpecs; i += 3, ms += 3) {
+            if ((hs[0] == preferred[0]) &&
+                (hs[1] == preferred[1]) &&
+                (hs[2] == preferred[2]) &&
+                 hs[0] != 0) {
+                /* Pick this cipher immediately! */
+                *pKeyLen = (((hs[1] << 8) | hs[2]) + 7) >> 3;
+                return hs[0];
+            }
+            if ((hs[0] == ms[0]) && (hs[1] == ms[1]) && (hs[2] == ms[2]) &&
+                 hs[0] != 0) {
+                /* Found a match */
+
+                /* Use secret keySize to determine which cipher is best */
+                realKeySize = (hs[1] << 8) | hs[2];
+                switch (hs[0]) {
+                  case SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5:
+                  case SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5:
+                    keySize = 40;
+                    break;
+                  default:
+                    keySize = realKeySize;
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (keySize > bestKeySize) {
+                    bestCypher = hs[0];
+                    bestKeySize = keySize;
+                    bestRealKeySize = realKeySize;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        hs += 3;
+    }
+    if (bestCypher < 0) {
+        /*
+        ** No overlap between server and client. Re-examine server list
+        ** to see what kind of ciphers it does support so that we can set
+        ** the error code appropriately.
+        */
+        if ((ohs[0] == SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5) ||
+            (ohs[0] == SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5)) {
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_US_ONLY_SERVER);
+        } else if ((ohs[0] == SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5) ||
+                   (ohs[0] == SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5)) {
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_ONLY_SERVER);
+        } else {
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+        }
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: no cipher overlap", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    *pKeyLen = (bestRealKeySize + 7) >> 3;
+    return bestCypher;
+
+  loser:
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_ClientHandleServerCert(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *certData, int certLen)
+{
+    CERTCertificate *cert      = NULL;
+    SECItem          certItem;
+
+    certItem.data = certData;
+    certItem.len  = certLen;
+
+    /* decode the certificate */
+    cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
+                                   PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+    
+    if (cert == NULL) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: decode of server certificate fails",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+#ifdef TRACE
+    {
+        if (ssl_trace >= 1) {
+            char *issuer;
+            char *subject;
+            issuer = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer);
+            subject = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject);
+            SSL_TRC(1,("%d: server certificate issuer: '%s'",
+                       SSL_GETPID(), issuer ? issuer : "OOPS"));
+            SSL_TRC(1,("%d: server name: '%s'",
+                       SSL_GETPID(), subject ? subject : "OOPS"));
+            PORT_Free(issuer);
+            PORT_Free(subject);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    ss->sec.peerCert = cert;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Format one block of data for public/private key encryption using
+ * the rules defined in PKCS #1. SSL2 does this itself to handle the
+ * rollback detection.
+ */
+#define RSA_BLOCK_MIN_PAD_LEN           8
+#define RSA_BLOCK_FIRST_OCTET           0x00
+#define RSA_BLOCK_AFTER_PAD_OCTET       0x00
+#define RSA_BLOCK_PUBLIC_OCTET          0x02
+unsigned char *
+ssl_FormatSSL2Block(unsigned modulusLen, SECItem *data)
+{
+    unsigned char *block;
+    unsigned char *bp;
+    int padLen;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    int i;
+
+    if (modulusLen < data->len + (3 + RSA_BLOCK_MIN_PAD_LEN)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    block = (unsigned char *) PORT_Alloc(modulusLen);
+    if (block == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    bp = block;
+
+    /*
+     * All RSA blocks start with two octets:
+     *  0x00 || BlockType
+     */
+    *bp++ = RSA_BLOCK_FIRST_OCTET;
+    *bp++ = RSA_BLOCK_PUBLIC_OCTET;
+
+    /*
+     * 0x00 || BT || Pad || 0x00 || ActualData
+     *   1      1   padLen    1      data->len
+     * Pad is all non-zero random bytes.
+     */
+    padLen = modulusLen - data->len - 3;
+    PORT_Assert (padLen >= RSA_BLOCK_MIN_PAD_LEN);
+    rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(bp, padLen);
+    if (rv == SECFailure) goto loser;
+    /* replace all the 'zero' bytes */
+    for (i = 0; i < padLen; i++) {
+        while (bp[i] == RSA_BLOCK_AFTER_PAD_OCTET) {
+            rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(bp+i, 1);
+            if (rv == SECFailure) goto loser;
+        }
+    }
+    bp += padLen;
+    *bp++ = RSA_BLOCK_AFTER_PAD_OCTET;
+    PORT_Memcpy (bp, data->data, data->len);
+
+    return block;
+loser:
+    if (block) PORT_Free(block);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+** Given the server's public key and cipher specs, generate a session key
+** that is ready to use for encrypting/decrypting the byte stream. At
+** the same time, generate the SSL_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY message and
+** send it to the server.
+**
+** Called from ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage()
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_ClientSetupSessionCypher(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *cs, int csLen)
+{
+    sslSessionID *    sid;
+    PRUint8 *         ca;       /* points to iv data, or NULL if none. */
+    PRUint8 *         ekbuf             = 0;
+    CERTCertificate * cert              = 0;
+    SECKEYPublicKey * serverKey         = 0;
+    unsigned          modulusLen        = 0;
+    SECStatus         rv;
+    int               cipher;
+    int               keyLen;   /* cipher symkey size in bytes. */
+    int               ckLen;    /* publicly reveal this many bytes of key. */
+    int               caLen;    /* length of IV data at *ca.    */
+    int               nc;
+
+    unsigned char *eblock;      /* holds unencrypted PKCS#1 formatted key. */
+    SECItem           rek;      /* holds portion of symkey to be encrypted. */
+
+    PRUint8           keyData[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_BYTES];
+    PRUint8           iv     [8];
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    eblock = NULL;
+
+    sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+    PORT_Assert(sid != 0);
+
+    cert = ss->sec.peerCert;
+    
+    serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+    if (!serverKey) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: extract public key failed: error=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError()));
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser2;
+    }
+
+    ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ssl_sign_rsa;
+    ss->sec.keaType       = ssl_kea_rsa;
+    ss->sec.keaKeyBits    = \
+    ss->sec.authKeyBits   = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey);
+
+    /* Choose a compatible cipher with the server */
+    nc = csLen / 3;
+    cipher = ssl2_ChooseSessionCypher(ss, nc, cs, &keyLen);
+    if (cipher < 0) {
+        /* ssl2_ChooseSessionCypher has set error code. */
+        ssl2_SendErrorMessage(ss, SSL_PE_NO_CYPHERS);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Generate the random keys */
+    PK11_GenerateRandom(keyData, sizeof(keyData));
+
+    /*
+    ** Next, carve up the keys into clear and encrypted portions. The
+    ** clear data is taken from the start of keyData and the encrypted
+    ** portion from the remainder. Note that each of these portions is
+    ** carved in half, one half for the read-key and one for the
+    ** write-key.
+    */
+    ca = 0;
+
+    /* We know that cipher is a legit value here, because 
+     * ssl2_ChooseSessionCypher doesn't return bogus values.
+     */
+    ckLen = ssl_Specs[cipher].pubLen;   /* cleartext key length. */
+    caLen = ssl_Specs[cipher].ivLen;    /* IV length.           */
+    if (caLen) {
+        PORT_Assert(sizeof iv >= caLen);
+        PK11_GenerateRandom(iv, caLen);
+        ca = iv;
+    }
+
+    /* Fill in session-id */
+    rv = ssl2_FillInSID(sid, cipher, keyData, keyLen,
+                   ca, caLen, keyLen << 3, (keyLen - ckLen) << 3,
+                   ss->sec.authAlgorithm, ss->sec.authKeyBits,
+                   ss->sec.keaType,       ss->sec.keaKeyBits);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(1, ("%d: SSL[%d]: client, using %s cipher, clear=%d total=%d",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl_cipherName[cipher],
+                ckLen<<3, keyLen<<3));
+
+    /* Now setup read and write ciphers */
+    rv = ssl2_CreateSessionCypher(ss, sid, PR_TRUE);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /*
+    ** Fill in the encryption buffer with some random bytes. Then 
+    ** copy in the portion of the session key we are encrypting.
+    */
+    modulusLen = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(serverKey);
+    rek.data   = keyData + ckLen;
+    rek.len    = keyLen  - ckLen;
+    eblock = ssl_FormatSSL2Block(modulusLen, &rek);
+    if (eblock == NULL) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    /* Set up the padding for version 2 rollback detection. */
+    /* XXX We should really use defines here */
+    if (ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS) {
+        PORT_Assert((modulusLen - rek.len) > 12);
+        PORT_Memset(eblock + modulusLen - rek.len - 8 - 1, 0x03, 8);
+    }
+    ekbuf = (PRUint8*) PORT_Alloc(modulusLen);
+    if (!ekbuf) 
+        goto loser;
+    PRINT_BUF(10, (ss, "master key encryption block:",
+                   eblock, modulusLen));
+
+    /* Encrypt ekitem */
+    rv = PK11_PubEncryptRaw(serverKey, ekbuf, eblock, modulusLen,
+                                                ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    /*  Now we have everything ready to send */
+    rv = ssl2_SendSessionKeyMessage(ss, cipher, keyLen << 3, ca, caLen,
+                               keyData, ckLen, ekbuf, modulusLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+    goto done;
+
+  loser:
+    rv = SECFailure;
+
+  loser2:
+  done:
+    PORT_Memset(keyData, 0, sizeof(keyData));
+    PORT_ZFree(ekbuf, modulusLen);
+    PORT_ZFree(eblock, modulusLen);
+    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************/
+
+/* 
+ * Called from ssl2_HandleMessage in response to SSL_MT_SERVER_FINISHED message.
+ * Caller holds recvBufLock and handshakeLock
+ */
+static void
+ssl2_ClientRegSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *s)
+{
+    sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+
+    /* Record entry in nonce cache */
+    if (sid->peerCert == NULL) {
+        PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl2.sessionID, s, sizeof(sid->u.ssl2.sessionID));
+        sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert);
+
+    }
+    if (!ss->opt.noCache)
+        (*ss->sec.cache)(sid);
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl2_HandleMessage() */
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_TriggerNextMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    SECStatus        rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    if ((ss->sec.ci.requiredElements & CIS_HAVE_CERTIFICATE) &&
+        !(ss->sec.ci.sentElements & CIS_HAVE_CERTIFICATE)) {
+        ss->sec.ci.sentElements |= CIS_HAVE_CERTIFICATE;
+        rv = ssl2_SendCertificateRequestMessage(ss);
+        return rv;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* See if it's time to send our finished message, or if the handshakes are
+** complete.  Send finished message if appropriate.
+** Returns SECSuccess unless anything goes wrong.
+**
+** Called from ssl2_HandleMessage,
+**             ssl2_HandleVerifyMessage 
+**             ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage
+**             ssl2_HandleClientSessionKeyMessage
+**             ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq
+**             ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_TryToFinish(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    SECStatus        rv;
+    char             e, ef;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    e = ss->sec.ci.elements;
+    ef = e | CIS_HAVE_FINISHED;
+    if ((ef & ss->sec.ci.requiredElements) == ss->sec.ci.requiredElements) {
+        if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+            /* Send server finished message if we already didn't */
+            rv = ssl2_SendServerFinishedMessage(ss);
+        } else {
+            /* Send client finished message if we already didn't */
+            rv = ssl2_SendClientFinishedMessage(ss);
+        }
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return rv;
+        }
+        if ((e & ss->sec.ci.requiredElements) == ss->sec.ci.requiredElements) {
+            /* Totally finished */
+            ss->handshake = 0;
+            return SECSuccess;
+        }
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+** Called from ssl2_HandleRequestCertificate
+**             ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_SignResponse(sslSocket *ss,
+             SECKEYPrivateKey *key,
+             SECItem *response)
+{
+    SGNContext *     sgn = NULL;
+    PRUint8 *        challenge;
+    unsigned int     len;
+    SECStatus        rv         = SECFailure;
+    
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    challenge = ss->sec.ci.serverChallenge;
+    len = ss->sec.ci.serverChallengeLen;
+    
+    /* Sign the expected data... */
+    sgn = SGN_NewContext(SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION,key);
+    if (!sgn) 
+        goto done;
+    rv = SGN_Begin(sgn);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto done;
+    rv = SGN_Update(sgn, ss->sec.ci.readKey, ss->sec.ci.keySize);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto done;
+    rv = SGN_Update(sgn, ss->sec.ci.writeKey, ss->sec.ci.keySize);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto done;
+    rv = SGN_Update(sgn, challenge, len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto done;
+    rv = SGN_Update(sgn, ss->sec.peerCert->derCert.data, 
+                         ss->sec.peerCert->derCert.len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto done;
+    rv = SGN_End(sgn, response);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto done;
+
+done:
+    SGN_DestroyContext(sgn, PR_TRUE);
+    return rv == SECSuccess ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+** Try to handle a request-certificate message. Get client's certificate
+** and private key and sign a message for the server to see.
+** Caller must hold handshakeLock 
+**
+** Called from ssl2_HandleMessage().
+*/
+static int
+ssl2_HandleRequestCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    CERTCertificate * cert      = NULL; /* app-selected client cert. */
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *key       = NULL; /* priv key for cert. */
+    SECStatus         rv;
+    SECItem           response;
+    int               ret       = 0;
+    PRUint8           authType;
+
+
+    /*
+     * These things all need to be initialized before we can "goto loser".
+     */
+    response.data = NULL;
+
+    /* get challenge info from connectionInfo */
+    authType = ss->sec.ci.authType;
+
+    if (authType != SSL_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION) {
+        SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL[%d]: unsupported auth type 0x%x", SSL_GETPID(),
+                    ss->fd, authType));
+        goto no_cert_error;
+    }
+
+    /* Get certificate and private-key from client */
+    if (!ss->getClientAuthData) {
+        SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL[%d]: client doesn't support client-auth",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        goto no_cert_error;
+    }
+    ret = (*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg, ss->fd,
+                                   NULL, &cert, &key);
+    if ( ret == SECWouldBlock ) {
+        ssl_SetAlwaysBlock(ss);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (ret) {
+        goto no_cert_error;
+    }
+
+    /* check what the callback function returned */
+    if ((!cert) || (!key)) {
+        /* we are missing either the key or cert */
+        if (cert) {
+            /* got a cert, but no key - free it */
+            CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+            cert = NULL;
+        }
+        if (key) {
+            /* got a key, but no cert - free it */
+            SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
+            key = NULL;
+        }
+        goto no_cert_error;
+    }
+
+    rv = ssl2_SignResponse(ss, key, &response);
+    if ( rv != SECSuccess ) {
+        ret = -1;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Send response message */
+    ret = ssl2_SendCertificateResponseMessage(ss, &cert->derCert, &response);
+
+    /* Now, remember the cert we sent. But first, forget any previous one. */
+    if (ss->sec.localCert) {
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
+    }
+    ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+    PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.ci.sid->localCert);
+    if (ss->sec.ci.sid->localCert) {
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.ci.sid->localCert);
+    }
+    ss->sec.ci.sid->localCert = cert;
+    cert = NULL;
+
+    goto done;
+
+  no_cert_error:
+    SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no certificate (ret=%d)", SSL_GETPID(),
+                ss->fd, ret));
+    ret = ssl2_SendErrorMessage(ss, SSL_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+
+  loser:
+  done:
+    if ( cert ) {
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+    }
+    if ( key ) {
+        SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
+    }
+    if ( response.data ) {
+        PORT_Free(response.data);
+    }
+    
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+** Called from ssl2_HandleMessage for SSL_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE message.
+** Caller must hold HandshakeLock and RecvBufLock, since cd and response
+** are contained in the gathered input data.
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_HandleClientCertificate(sslSocket *    ss, 
+                             PRUint8        certType,   /* XXX unused */
+                             PRUint8 *      cd, 
+                             unsigned int   cdLen,
+                             PRUint8 *      response,
+                             unsigned int   responseLen)
+{
+    CERTCertificate *cert       = NULL;
+    SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey     = NULL;
+    VFYContext *     vfy        = NULL;
+    SECItem *        derCert;
+    SECStatus        rv         = SECFailure;
+    SECItem          certItem;
+    SECItem          rep;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)   );
+
+    /* Extract the certificate */
+    certItem.data = cd;
+    certItem.len  = cdLen;
+
+    cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL,
+                                   PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+    if (cert == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* save the certificate, since the auth routine will need it */
+    ss->sec.peerCert = cert;
+
+    /* Extract the public key */
+    pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+    if (!pubKey) 
+        goto loser;
+    
+    /* Verify the response data... */
+    rep.data = response;
+    rep.len = responseLen;
+    /* SSL 2.0 only supports RSA certs, so we don't have to worry about
+     * DSA here. */
+    vfy = VFY_CreateContext(pubKey, &rep, SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
+                            ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+    if (!vfy) 
+        goto loser;
+    rv = VFY_Begin(vfy);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    rv = VFY_Update(vfy, ss->sec.ci.readKey, ss->sec.ci.keySize);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto loser;
+    rv = VFY_Update(vfy, ss->sec.ci.writeKey, ss->sec.ci.keySize);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto loser;
+    rv = VFY_Update(vfy, ss->sec.ci.serverChallenge, SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    derCert = &ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].serverCert->derCert;
+    rv = VFY_Update(vfy, derCert->data, derCert->len);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto loser;
+    rv = VFY_End(vfy);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    /* Now ask the server application if it likes the certificate... */
+    rv = (SECStatus) (*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg,
+                                            ss->fd, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE);
+    /* Hey, it liked it. */
+    if (SECSuccess == rv) 
+        goto done;
+
+loser:
+    ss->sec.peerCert = NULL;
+    CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+done:
+    VFY_DestroyContext(vfy, PR_TRUE);
+    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+** Handle remaining messages between client/server. Process finished
+** messages from either side and any authentication requests.
+** This should only be called for SSLv2 handshake messages, 
+** not for application data records.
+** Caller must hold handshake lock.
+**
+** Called from ssl_Do1stHandshake().
+** 
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_HandleMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    PRUint8 *        data;
+    PRUint8 *        cid;
+    unsigned         len, certType, certLen, responseLen;
+    int              rv;
+    int              rv2;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    data = ss->gs.buf.buf + ss->gs.recordOffset;
+
+    if (ss->gs.recordLen < 1) {
+        goto bad_peer;
+    }
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: received %d message",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, data[0]));
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, data, ss->gs.recordLen));
+
+    switch (data[0]) {
+    case SSL_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+        if (ss->sec.ci.elements & CIS_HAVE_FINISHED) {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: dup client-finished message",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            goto bad_peer;
+        }
+
+        /* See if nonce matches */
+        len = ss->gs.recordLen - 1;
+        cid = data + 1;
+        if ((len != sizeof(ss->sec.ci.connectionID)) ||
+            (PORT_Memcmp(ss->sec.ci.connectionID, cid, len) != 0)) {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad connection-id", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            PRINT_BUF(5, (ss, "sent connection-id",
+                          ss->sec.ci.connectionID, 
+                          sizeof(ss->sec.ci.connectionID)));
+            PRINT_BUF(5, (ss, "rcvd connection-id", cid, len));
+            goto bad_peer;
+        }
+
+        SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got client finished, waiting for 0x%d",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, 
+                    ss->sec.ci.requiredElements ^ ss->sec.ci.elements));
+        ss->sec.ci.elements |= CIS_HAVE_FINISHED;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_MT_SERVER_FINISHED:
+        if (ss->sec.ci.elements & CIS_HAVE_FINISHED) {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: dup server-finished message",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            goto bad_peer;
+        }
+
+        if (ss->gs.recordLen - 1 != SSL2_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad server-finished message, len=%d",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->gs.recordLen));
+            goto bad_peer;
+        }
+        ssl2_ClientRegSessionID(ss, data+1);
+        SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got server finished, waiting for 0x%d",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, 
+                    ss->sec.ci.requiredElements ^ ss->sec.ci.elements));
+        ss->sec.ci.elements |= CIS_HAVE_FINISHED;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
+        len = ss->gs.recordLen - 2;
+        if ((len < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES) ||
+            (len > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES)) {
+            /* Bad challenge */
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad cert request message: code len=%d",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len));
+            goto bad_peer;
+        }
+        
+        /* save auth request info */
+        ss->sec.ci.authType           = data[1];
+        ss->sec.ci.serverChallengeLen = len;
+        PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.serverChallenge, data + 2, len);
+        
+        rv = ssl2_HandleRequestCertificate(ss);
+        if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
+            SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: async cert request",
+                        SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            /* someone is handling this asynchronously */
+            ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+            return SECWouldBlock;
+        }
+        if (rv) {
+            SET_ERROR_CODE
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+        if (!ss->authCertificate) {
+            /* Server asked for authentication and can't handle it */
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        if (ss->gs.recordLen < SSL_HL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES) {
+            SET_ERROR_CODE
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        certType    = data[1];
+        certLen     = (data[2] << 8) | data[3];
+        responseLen = (data[4] << 8) | data[5];
+        if (certType != SSL_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE) {
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        if (certLen + responseLen + SSL_HL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES 
+            > ss->gs.recordLen) {
+            /* prevent overflow crash. */
+            rv = SECFailure;
+        } else
+        rv = ssl2_HandleClientCertificate(ss, data[1],
+                data + SSL_HL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES,
+                certLen,
+                data + SSL_HL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES + certLen,
+                responseLen);
+        if (rv) {
+            rv2 = ssl2_SendErrorMessage(ss, SSL_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+            SET_ERROR_CODE
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        ss->sec.ci.elements |= CIS_HAVE_CERTIFICATE;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_MT_ERROR:
+        rv = (data[1] << 8) | data[2];
+        SSL_TRC(2, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got error message, error=0x%x",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rv));
+
+        /* Convert protocol error number into API error number */
+        switch (rv) {
+          case SSL_PE_NO_CYPHERS:
+            rv = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
+            break;
+          case SSL_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+            rv = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE;
+            break;
+          case SSL_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+            rv = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+            break;
+          case SSL_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE:
+            rv = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
+            break;
+          default:
+            goto bad_peer;
+        }
+        /* XXX make certificate-request optionally fail... */
+        PORT_SetError(rv);
+        goto loser;
+
+    default:
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: unknown message %d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, data[0]));
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handled %d message, required=0x%x got=0x%x",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, data[0],
+                ss->sec.ci.requiredElements, ss->sec.ci.elements));
+
+    rv = ssl2_TryToFinish(ss);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    if (ss->handshake == 0) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    ss->handshake     = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+    ss->nextHandshake = ssl2_HandleMessage;
+    return ssl2_TriggerNextMessage(ss);
+
+  bad_peer:
+    PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+    /* FALL THROUGH */
+
+  loser:
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************/
+
+/* Called from ssl_Do1stHandshake, after ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage or 
+** ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert.
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_HandleVerifyMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    PRUint8 *        data;
+    SECStatus        rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+    ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    data = ss->gs.buf.buf + ss->gs.recordOffset;
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, data, ss->gs.recordLen));
+    if ((ss->gs.recordLen != 1 + SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES) ||
+        (data[0] != SSL_MT_SERVER_VERIFY) ||
+        NSS_SecureMemcmp(data+1, ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge,
+                         SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES)) {
+        /* Bad server */
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    ss->sec.ci.elements |= CIS_HAVE_VERIFY;
+
+    SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got server-verify, required=0x%d got=0x%x",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.requiredElements,
+                ss->sec.ci.elements));
+
+    rv = ssl2_TryToFinish(ss);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    if (ss->handshake == 0) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+    ss->handshake         = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+    ss->nextHandshake     = ssl2_HandleMessage;
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+
+  loser:
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Not static because ssl2_GatherData() tests ss->nextHandshake for this value.
+ * ICK! 
+ * Called from ssl_Do1stHandshake after ssl2_BeginClientHandshake()
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    sslSessionID *   sid;
+    PRUint8 *        cert;
+    PRUint8 *        cs;
+    PRUint8 *        data;
+    SECStatus        rv; 
+    int              needed, sidHit, certLen, csLen, cidLen, certType, err;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    if (!ss->opt.enableSSL2) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL2_DISABLED);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != 0);
+    sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+
+    data = ss->gs.buf.buf + ss->gs.recordOffset;
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, data, ss->gs.recordLen));
+
+    /* Make sure first message has some data and is the server hello message */
+    if ((ss->gs.recordLen < SSL_HL_SERVER_HELLO_HBYTES)
+        || (data[0] != SSL_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) {
+        if ((data[0] == SSL_MT_ERROR) && (ss->gs.recordLen == 3)) {
+            err = (data[1] << 8) | data[2];
+            if (err == SSL_PE_NO_CYPHERS) {
+                PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+                goto loser;
+            }
+        }
+        goto bad_server;
+    }
+
+    sidHit      = data[1];
+    certType    = data[2];
+    ss->version = (data[3] << 8) | data[4];
+    certLen     = (data[5] << 8) | data[6];
+    csLen       = (data[7] << 8) | data[8];
+    cidLen      = (data[9] << 8) | data[10];
+    cert        = data + SSL_HL_SERVER_HELLO_HBYTES;
+    cs          = cert + certLen;
+
+    SSL_TRC(5,
+            ("%d: SSL[%d]: server-hello, hit=%d vers=%x certLen=%d csLen=%d cidLen=%d",
+             SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sidHit, ss->version, certLen,
+             csLen, cidLen));
+    if (ss->version != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2) {
+        if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2) {
+          SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: demoting self (%x) to server version (%x)",
+                      SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2,
+                      ss->version));
+        } else {
+          SSL_TRC(1, ("%d: SSL[%d]: server version is %x (we are %x)",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2));
+          /* server claims to be newer but does not follow protocol */
+          PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+          goto loser;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((SSL_HL_SERVER_HELLO_HBYTES + certLen + csLen + cidLen 
+                                                  > ss->gs.recordLen)
+        || (csLen % 3) != 0   
+        /* || cidLen < SSL_CONNECTIONID_BYTES || cidLen > 32  */
+        ) {
+        goto bad_server;
+    }
+
+    /* Save connection-id.
+    ** This code only saves the first 16 byte of the connectionID.
+    ** If the connectionID is shorter than 16 bytes, it is zero-padded.
+    */
+    if (cidLen < sizeof ss->sec.ci.connectionID)
+        memset(ss->sec.ci.connectionID, 0, sizeof ss->sec.ci.connectionID);
+    cidLen = PR_MIN(cidLen, sizeof ss->sec.ci.connectionID);
+    PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.connectionID, cs + csLen, cidLen);
+
+    /* See if session-id hit */
+    needed = CIS_HAVE_MASTER_KEY | CIS_HAVE_FINISHED | CIS_HAVE_VERIFY;
+    if (sidHit) {
+        if (certLen || csLen) {
+            /* Uh oh - bogus server */
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: client, huh? hit=%d certLen=%d csLen=%d",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sidHit, certLen, csLen));
+            goto bad_server;
+        }
+
+        /* Total winner. */
+        SSL_TRC(1, ("%d: SSL[%d]: client, using nonce for peer=0x%08x "
+                    "port=0x%04x",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port));
+        ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert);
+        ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm;
+        ss->sec.authKeyBits   = sid->authKeyBits;
+        ss->sec.keaType       = sid->keaType;
+        ss->sec.keaKeyBits    = sid->keaKeyBits;
+        rv = ssl2_CreateSessionCypher(ss, sid, PR_TRUE);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (certType != SSL_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE) {
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        if (csLen == 0) {
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: no cipher overlap",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        if (certLen == 0) {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: client, huh? certLen=%d csLen=%d",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, certLen, csLen));
+            goto bad_server;
+        }
+
+        if (sid->cached != never_cached) {
+            /* Forget our session-id - server didn't like it */
+            SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL[%d]: server forgot me, uncaching session-id",
+                        SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid);
+            ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+            ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = (sslSessionID*) PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(sslSessionID));
+            if (!sid) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            sid->references = 1;
+            sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer;
+            sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port;
+        }
+
+        /* decode the server's certificate */
+        rv = ssl2_ClientHandleServerCert(ss, cert, certLen);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            if (PORT_GetError() == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE) {
+                (void) ssl2_SendErrorMessage(ss, SSL_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+            }
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        /* Setup new session cipher */
+        rv = ssl2_ClientSetupSessionCypher(ss, cs, csLen);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            if (PORT_GetError() == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE) {
+                (void) ssl2_SendErrorMessage(ss, SSL_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+            }
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Build up final list of required elements */
+    ss->sec.ci.elements         = CIS_HAVE_MASTER_KEY;
+    ss->sec.ci.requiredElements = needed;
+
+  if (!sidHit) {
+    /* verify the server's certificate. if sidHit, don't check signatures */
+    rv = (* ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd, 
+                                 (PRBool)(!sidHit), PR_FALSE);
+    if (rv) {
+        if (ss->handleBadCert) {
+            rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd);
+            if ( rv ) {
+                if ( rv == SECWouldBlock ) {
+                    /* someone will handle this connection asynchronously*/
+
+                    SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: go to async cert handler",
+                             SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+                    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+                    ssl_SetAlwaysBlock(ss);
+                    return SECWouldBlock;
+                }
+                /* cert is bad */
+                SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: server certificate is no good: error=%d",
+                         SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError()));
+                goto loser;
+
+            }
+            /* cert is good */
+        } else {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: server certificate is no good: error=%d",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError()));
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    }
+  }
+    /*
+    ** At this point we have a completed session key and our session
+    ** cipher is setup and ready to go. Switch to encrypted write routine
+    ** as all future message data is to be encrypted.
+    */
+    ssl2_UseEncryptedSendFunc(ss);
+
+    rv = ssl2_TryToFinish(ss);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
+
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    if (ss->handshake == 0) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got server-hello, required=0x%d got=0x%x",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.requiredElements, 
+                ss->sec.ci.elements));
+    ss->handshake     = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+    ss->nextHandshake = ssl2_HandleVerifyMessage;
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+  bad_server:
+    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
+    /* FALL THROUGH */
+
+  loser:
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Sends out the initial client Hello message on the connection.
+ * Acquires and releases the socket's xmitBufLock.
+ */
+SECStatus
+ssl2_BeginClientHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    sslSessionID      *sid;
+    PRUint8           *msg;
+    PRUint8           *cp;
+    PRUint8           *localCipherSpecs = NULL;
+    unsigned int      localCipherSize;
+    unsigned int      i;
+    int               sendLen, sidLen = 0;
+    SECStatus         rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    ss->sec.isServer     = 0;
+    ss->sec.sendSequence = 0;
+    ss->sec.rcvSequence  = 0;
+    ssl_ChooseSessionIDProcs(&ss->sec);
+
+    if (!ss->cipherSpecs) {
+        rv = ssl2_ConstructCipherSpecs(ss);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess)
+            goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* count the SSL2 and SSL3 enabled ciphers.
+     * if either is zero, clear the socket's enable for that protocol.
+     */
+    rv = ssl2_CheckConfigSanity(ss);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+        goto loser;
+
+    /* Get peer name of server */
+    rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss);
+    if (rv < 0) {
+#ifdef HPUX11
+        /*
+         * On some HP-UX B.11.00 systems, getpeername() occasionally
+         * fails with ENOTCONN after a successful completion of
+         * non-blocking connect.  I found that if we do a write()
+         * and then retry getpeername(), it will work.
+         */
+        if (PR_GetError() == PR_NOT_CONNECTED_ERROR) {
+            char dummy;
+            (void) PR_Write(ss->fd->lower, &dummy, 0);
+            rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss);
+            if (rv < 0) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+        }
+#else
+        goto loser;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending client-hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* Try to find server in our session-id cache */
+    if (ss->opt.noCache) {
+        sid = NULL;
+    } else {
+        sid = ssl_LookupSID(&ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, 
+                            ss->url);
+    }
+    while (sid) {  /* this isn't really a loop */
+        /* if we're not doing this SID's protocol any more, drop it. */
+        if (((sid->version  < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) && !ss->opt.enableSSL2) ||
+            ((sid->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) && !ss->opt.enableSSL3) ||
+            ((sid->version >  SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) && !ss->opt.enableTLS)) {
+            ss->sec.uncache(sid);
+            ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+            sid = NULL;
+            break;
+        }
+        if (ss->opt.enableSSL2 && sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+            /* If the cipher in this sid is not enabled, drop it. */
+            for (i = 0; i < ss->sizeCipherSpecs; i += 3) {
+                if (ss->cipherSpecs[i] == sid->u.ssl2.cipherType)
+                    break;
+            }
+            if (i >= ss->sizeCipherSpecs) {
+                ss->sec.uncache(sid);
+                ssl_FreeSID(sid);
+                sid = NULL;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        sidLen = sizeof(sid->u.ssl2.sessionID);
+        PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl2.sessionID,
+                      sidLen));
+        ss->version = sid->version;
+        PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.localCert);
+        if (ss->sec.localCert) {
+            CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
+        }
+        ss->sec.localCert     = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->localCert);
+        break;  /* this isn't really a loop */
+    } 
+    if (!sid) {
+        sidLen = 0;
+        sid = (sslSessionID*) PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(sslSessionID));
+        if (!sid) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        sid->references = 1;
+        sid->cached     = never_cached;
+        sid->addr       = ss->sec.ci.peer;
+        sid->port       = ss->sec.ci.port;
+        if (ss->peerID != NULL) {
+            sid->peerID = PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID);
+        }
+        if (ss->url != NULL) {
+            sid->urlSvrName = PORT_Strdup(ss->url);
+        }
+    }
+    ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+
+    PORT_Assert(sid != NULL);
+
+    if ((sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 || !ss->opt.v2CompatibleHello) &&
+        (ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS)) {
+
+        ss->gs.state      = GS_INIT;
+        ss->handshake     = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+
+        /* ssl3_SendClientHello will override this if it succeeds. */
+        ss->version       = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0;
+
+        ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+        ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+        rv =  ssl3_SendClientHello(ss);
+        ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+        ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /***************************************/
+
+        return rv;
+    }
+#if defined(NSS_ENABLE_ECC) && !defined(NSS_ECC_MORE_THAN_SUITE_B)
+    /* ensure we don't neogtiate ECC cipher suites with SSL2 hello */
+    ssl3_DisableECCSuites(ss, NULL); /* disable all ECC suites */
+    if (ss->cipherSpecs != NULL) {
+        PORT_Free(ss->cipherSpecs);
+        ss->cipherSpecs     = NULL;
+        ss->sizeCipherSpecs = 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!ss->cipherSpecs) {
+        rv = ssl2_ConstructCipherSpecs(ss);
+        if (rv < 0) {
+            return rv;
+        }
+    }
+    localCipherSpecs = ss->cipherSpecs;
+    localCipherSize  = ss->sizeCipherSpecs;
+
+    sendLen = SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + localCipherSize + sidLen +
+        SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES;
+
+    /* Generate challenge bytes for server */
+    PK11_GenerateRandom(ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge, SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
+
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+
+    rv = ssl2_GetSendBuffer(ss, sendLen);
+    if (rv) 
+        goto unlock_loser;
+
+    /* Construct client-hello message */
+    cp = msg = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf;
+    msg[0] = SSL_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+    if ( ss->opt.enableTLS ) {
+        ss->clientHelloVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS;
+    } else if ( ss->opt.enableSSL3 ) {
+        ss->clientHelloVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0;
+    } else {
+        ss->clientHelloVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2;
+    }
+    
+    msg[1] = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+    msg[2] = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion);
+    msg[3] = MSB(localCipherSize);
+    msg[4] = LSB(localCipherSize);
+    msg[5] = MSB(sidLen);
+    msg[6] = LSB(sidLen);
+    msg[7] = MSB(SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
+    msg[8] = LSB(SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
+    cp += SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES;
+    PORT_Memcpy(cp, localCipherSpecs, localCipherSize);
+    cp += localCipherSize;
+    if (sidLen) {
+        PORT_Memcpy(cp, sid->u.ssl2.sessionID, sidLen);
+        cp += sidLen;
+    }
+    PORT_Memcpy(cp, ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge, SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES);
+
+    /* Send it to the server */
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, msg, sendLen));
+    ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
+    rv = (*ss->sec.send)(ss, msg, sendLen, 0);
+
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);    /***************************************/
+
+    if (rv < 0) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    rv = ssl3_StartHandshakeHash(ss, msg, sendLen);
+    if (rv < 0) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup to receive servers hello message */
+    ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+    ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    ss->handshake     = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+    ss->nextHandshake = ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage;
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+unlock_loser:
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+loser:
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************/
+
+/* Handle the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message. 
+** Acquires and releases RecvBufLock.
+** Called from ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage(). 
+*/
+static SECStatus
+ssl2_HandleClientSessionKeyMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    PRUint8 *        data;
+    unsigned int     caLen;
+    unsigned int     ckLen;
+    unsigned int     ekLen;
+    unsigned int     keyBits;
+    int              cipher;
+    SECStatus        rv;
+
+
+    ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    data = ss->gs.buf.buf + ss->gs.recordOffset;
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, data, ss->gs.recordLen));
+
+    if ((ss->gs.recordLen < SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES)
+        || (data[0] != SSL_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY)) {
+        goto bad_client;
+    }
+    cipher  = data[1];
+    keyBits = (data[2] << 8) | data[3];
+    ckLen   = (data[4] << 8) | data[5];
+    ekLen   = (data[6] << 8) | data[7];
+    caLen   = (data[8] << 8) | data[9];
+
+    SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: session-key, cipher=%d keyBits=%d ckLen=%d ekLen=%d caLen=%d",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cipher, keyBits, ckLen, ekLen, caLen));
+
+    if (ss->gs.recordLen < 
+            SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES + ckLen + ekLen + caLen) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: protocol size mismatch dataLen=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->gs.recordLen));
+        goto bad_client;
+    }
+
+    /* Use info from client to setup session key */
+    rv = ssl2_ServerSetupSessionCypher(ss, cipher, keyBits,
+                data + SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES,                 ckLen,
+                data + SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES + ckLen,         ekLen,
+                data + SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES + ckLen + ekLen, caLen);
+    ss->gs.recordLen = 0;       /* we're done with this record. */
+
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    ss->sec.ci.elements |= CIS_HAVE_MASTER_KEY;
+    ssl2_UseEncryptedSendFunc(ss);
+
+    /* Send server verify message now that keys are established */
+    rv = ssl2_SendServerVerifyMessage(ss);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto loser;
+
+    rv = ssl2_TryToFinish(ss);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+        goto loser;
+    if (ss->handshake == 0) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: server: waiting for elements=0x%d",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, 
+                ss->sec.ci.requiredElements ^ ss->sec.ci.elements));
+    ss->handshake         = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+    ss->nextHandshake     = ssl2_HandleMessage;
+
+    return ssl2_TriggerNextMessage(ss);
+
+bad_client:
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+    /* FALLTHROUGH */
+
+loser:
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * attempt to restart the handshake after asynchronously handling
+ * a request for the client's certificate.
+ *
+ * inputs:  
+ *      cert    Client cert chosen by application.
+ *      key     Private key associated with cert.  
+ *
+ * XXX: need to make ssl2 and ssl3 versions of this function agree on whether
+ *      they take the reference, or bump the ref count!
+ *
+ * Return value: XXX
+ *
+ * Caller holds 1stHandshakeLock.
+ */
+int
+ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq(sslSocket *          ss,
+                                  CERTCertificate *    cert, 
+                                  SECKEYPrivateKey *   key)
+{
+    int              ret;
+    SECStatus        rv          = SECSuccess;
+    SECItem          response;
+
+    if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) 
+        return SECFailure;
+
+    response.data = NULL;
+
+    /* generate error if no cert or key */
+    if ( ( cert == NULL ) || ( key == NULL ) ) {
+        goto no_cert;
+    }
+    
+    /* generate signed response to the challenge */
+    rv = ssl2_SignResponse(ss, key, &response);
+    if ( rv != SECSuccess ) {
+        goto no_cert;
+    }
+    
+    /* Send response message */
+    ret = ssl2_SendCertificateResponseMessage(ss, &cert->derCert, &response);
+    if (ret) {
+        goto no_cert;
+    }
+
+    /* try to finish the handshake */
+    ret = ssl2_TryToFinish(ss);
+    if (ret) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    
+    /* done with handshake */
+    if (ss->handshake == 0) {
+        ret = SECSuccess;
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* continue handshake */
+    ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+    ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+    ss->handshake     = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+    ss->nextHandshake = ssl2_HandleMessage;
+    ret = ssl2_TriggerNextMessage(ss);
+    goto done;
+    
+no_cert:
+    /* no cert - send error */
+    ret = ssl2_SendErrorMessage(ss, SSL_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+    goto done;
+    
+loser:
+    ret = SECFailure;
+done:
+    /* free allocated data */
+    if ( response.data ) {
+        PORT_Free(response.data);
+    }
+    
+    return ret;
+}
+
+
+/* restart an SSL connection that we stopped to run certificate dialogs 
+** XXX  Need to document here how an application marks a cert to show that
+**      the application has accepted it (overridden CERT_VerifyCert).
+ *
+ * Return value: XXX
+ *
+ * Caller holds 1stHandshakeLock.
+*/
+int
+ssl2_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    int rv      = SECSuccess;
+
+    if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) 
+        return SECFailure;
+
+    /* SSL 2
+    ** At this point we have a completed session key and our session
+    ** cipher is setup and ready to go. Switch to encrypted write routine
+    ** as all future message data is to be encrypted.
+    */
+    ssl2_UseEncryptedSendFunc(ss);
+
+    rv = ssl2_TryToFinish(ss);
+    if (rv == SECSuccess && ss->handshake != NULL) {    
+        /* handshake is not yet finished. */
+
+        SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got server-hello, required=0x%d got=0x%x",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.requiredElements,
+                ss->sec.ci.elements));
+
+        ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+        ss->gs.recordLen = 0;   /* mark it all used up. */
+        ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+        ss->handshake     = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+        ss->nextHandshake = ssl2_HandleVerifyMessage;
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+** Handle the initial hello message from the client
+**
+** not static because ssl2_GatherData() tests ss->nextHandshake for this value.
+*/
+SECStatus
+ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    sslSessionID    *sid;
+    sslServerCerts * sc;
+    CERTCertificate *serverCert;
+    PRUint8         *msg;
+    PRUint8         *data;
+    PRUint8         *cs;
+    PRUint8         *sd;
+    PRUint8         *cert = NULL;
+    PRUint8         *challenge;
+    unsigned int    challengeLen;
+    SECStatus       rv; 
+    int             csLen;
+    int             sendLen;
+    int             sdLen;
+    int             certLen;
+    int             pid;
+    int             sent;
+    int             gotXmitBufLock = 0;
+#if defined(SOLARIS) && defined(i386)
+    volatile PRUint8 hit;
+#else
+    int             hit;
+#endif
+    PRUint8         csImpl[sizeof implementedCipherSuites];
+
+    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+    sc = ss->serverCerts + kt_rsa;
+    serverCert = sc->serverCert;
+
+    ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+
+    data = ss->gs.buf.buf + ss->gs.recordOffset;
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, data, ss->gs.recordLen));
+
+    /* Make sure first message has some data and is the client hello message */
+    if ((ss->gs.recordLen < SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES)
+        || (data[0] != SSL_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+        goto bad_client;
+    }
+
+    /* Get peer name of client */
+    rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Examine version information */
+    /*
+     * See if this might be a V2 client hello asking to use the V3 protocol
+     */
+    if ((data[0] == SSL_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && 
+        (data[1] >= MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) && 
+        (ss->opt.enableSSL3 || ss->opt.enableTLS)) {
+        rv = ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(ss, data, ss->gs.recordLen);
+        if (rv != SECFailure) { /* Success */
+            ss->handshake             = NULL;
+            ss->nextHandshake         = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+            ss->securityHandshake     = NULL;
+            ss->gs.state              = GS_INIT;
+
+            /* ssl3_HandleV3ClientHello has set ss->version,
+            ** and has gotten us a brand new sid.  
+            */
+            ss->sec.ci.sid->version  = ss->version;
+        }
+        ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+        return rv;
+    }
+    /* Previously, there was a test here to see if SSL2 was enabled.
+    ** If not, an error code was set, and SECFailure was returned,
+    ** without sending any error code to the other end of the connection.
+    ** That test has been removed.  If SSL2 has been disabled, there
+    ** should be no SSL2 ciphers enabled, and consequently, the code
+    ** below should send the ssl2 error message SSL_PE_NO_CYPHERS.
+    ** We now believe this is the correct thing to do, even when SSL2
+    ** has been explicitly disabled by the application.
+    */
+
+    /* Extract info from message */
+    ss->version = (data[1] << 8) | data[2];
+
+    /* If some client thinks ssl v2 is 2.0 instead of 0.2, we'll allow it.  */
+    if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+        ss->version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2;
+    }
+    
+    csLen        = (data[3] << 8) | data[4];
+    sdLen        = (data[5] << 8) | data[6];
+    challengeLen = (data[7] << 8) | data[8];
+    cs           = data + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES;
+    sd           = cs + csLen;
+    challenge    = sd + sdLen;
+    PRINT_BUF(7, (ss, "server, client session-id value:", sd, sdLen));
+
+    if (!csLen || (csLen % 3) != 0 || 
+        (sdLen != 0 && sdLen != SSL2_SESSIONID_BYTES) ||
+        challengeLen < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES || 
+        challengeLen > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES ||
+        (unsigned)ss->gs.recordLen != 
+            SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + csLen + sdLen + challengeLen) {
+        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad client hello message, len=%d should=%d",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->gs.recordLen,
+                 SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES+csLen+sdLen+challengeLen));
+        goto bad_client;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: client version is %x",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->version));
+    if (ss->version != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2) {
+        if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2) {
+            /*
+            ** Newer client than us. Things are ok because new clients
+            ** are required to be backwards compatible with old servers.
+            ** Change version number to our version number so that client
+            ** knows whats up.
+            */
+            ss->version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2;
+        } else {
+            SSL_TRC(1, ("%d: SSL[%d]: client version is %x (we are %x)",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2));
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Qualify cipher specs before returning them to client */
+    csLen = ssl2_QualifyCypherSpecs(ss, cs, csLen);
+    if (csLen == 0) {
+        /* no overlap, send client our list of supported SSL v2 ciphers. */
+        cs    = csImpl;
+        csLen = sizeof implementedCipherSuites;
+        PORT_Memcpy(cs, implementedCipherSuites, csLen);
+        csLen = ssl2_QualifyCypherSpecs(ss, cs, csLen);
+        if (csLen == 0) {
+          /* We don't support any SSL v2 ciphers! */
+          ssl2_SendErrorMessage(ss, SSL_PE_NO_CYPHERS);
+          PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+          goto loser;
+        }
+        /* Since this handhsake is going to fail, don't cache it. */
+        ss->opt.noCache = 1; 
+    }
+
+    /* Squirrel away the challenge for later */
+    PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge, challenge, challengeLen);
+
+    /* Examine message and see if session-id is good */
+    ss->sec.ci.elements = 0;
+    if (sdLen > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) {
+        SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0],
+                    ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1], 
+                    ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2],
+                    ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3]));
+        sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(&ss->sec.ci.peer, sd, sdLen, ss->dbHandle);
+    } else {
+        sid = NULL;
+    }
+    if (sid) {
+        /* Got a good session-id. Short cut! */
+        SSL_TRC(1, ("%d: SSL[%d]: server, using session-id for 0x%08x (age=%d)",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer, 
+                    ssl_Time() - sid->creationTime));
+        PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "session-id value:", sd, sdLen));
+        ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+        ss->sec.ci.elements = CIS_HAVE_MASTER_KEY;
+        hit = 1;
+        certLen = 0;
+        csLen = 0;
+
+        ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm;
+        ss->sec.authKeyBits   = sid->authKeyBits;
+        ss->sec.keaType       = sid->keaType;
+        ss->sec.keaKeyBits    = sid->keaKeyBits;
+
+        rv = ssl2_CreateSessionCypher(ss, sid, PR_FALSE);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    } else {
+        SECItem * derCert   = &serverCert->derCert;
+
+        SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL[%d]: server, lookup nonce missed",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        if (!serverCert) {
+            SET_ERROR_CODE
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        hit = 0;
+        sid = (sslSessionID*) PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(sslSessionID));
+        if (!sid) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        sid->references = 1;
+        sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer;
+        sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port;
+
+        /* Invent a session-id */
+        ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
+        PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl2.sessionID+2, SSL2_SESSIONID_BYTES-2);
+
+        pid = SSL_GETPID();
+        sid->u.ssl2.sessionID[0] = MSB(pid);
+        sid->u.ssl2.sessionID[1] = LSB(pid);
+        cert    = derCert->data;
+        certLen = derCert->len;
+
+        /* pretend that server sids remember the local cert. */
+        PORT_Assert(!sid->localCert);
+        if (sid->localCert) {
+            CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->localCert);
+        }
+        sid->localCert     = CERT_DupCertificate(serverCert);
+
+        ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ssl_sign_rsa;
+        ss->sec.keaType       = ssl_kea_rsa;
+        ss->sec.keaKeyBits    = \
+        ss->sec.authKeyBits   = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].serverKeyBits;
+    }
+
+    /* server sids don't remember the local cert, so whether we found
+    ** a sid or not, just "remember" we used the rsa server cert.
+    */
+    if (ss->sec.localCert) {
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert);
+    }
+    ss->sec.localCert     = CERT_DupCertificate(serverCert);
+
+    /* Build up final list of required elements */
+    ss->sec.ci.requiredElements = CIS_HAVE_MASTER_KEY | CIS_HAVE_FINISHED;
+    if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) {
+        ss->sec.ci.requiredElements |= CIS_HAVE_CERTIFICATE;
+    }
+    ss->sec.ci.sentElements = 0;
+
+    /* Send hello message back to client */
+    sendLen = SSL_HL_SERVER_HELLO_HBYTES + certLen + csLen
+            + SSL_CONNECTIONID_BYTES;
+
+    ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); gotXmitBufLock = 1;
+    rv = ssl2_GetSendBuffer(ss, sendLen);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending server-hello (%d)",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sendLen));
+
+    msg = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf;
+    msg[0] = SSL_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
+    msg[1] = hit;
+    msg[2] = SSL_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE;
+    msg[3] = MSB(ss->version);
+    msg[4] = LSB(ss->version);
+    msg[5] = MSB(certLen);
+    msg[6] = LSB(certLen);
+    msg[7] = MSB(csLen);
+    msg[8] = LSB(csLen);
+    msg[9] = MSB(SSL_CONNECTIONID_BYTES);
+    msg[10] = LSB(SSL_CONNECTIONID_BYTES);
+    if (certLen) {
+        PORT_Memcpy(msg+SSL_HL_SERVER_HELLO_HBYTES, cert, certLen);
+    }
+    if (csLen) {
+        PORT_Memcpy(msg+SSL_HL_SERVER_HELLO_HBYTES+certLen, cs, csLen);
+    }
+    PORT_Memcpy(msg+SSL_HL_SERVER_HELLO_HBYTES+certLen+csLen, 
+                ss->sec.ci.connectionID, SSL_CONNECTIONID_BYTES);
+
+    DUMP_MSG(29, (ss, msg, sendLen));
+
+    ss->handshakeBegun = 1;
+    sent = (*ss->sec.send)(ss, msg, sendLen, 0);
+    if (sent < 0) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); gotXmitBufLock = 0;
+
+    ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
+    ss->handshake = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+    if (hit) {
+        /* Old SID Session key is good. Go encrypted */
+        ssl2_UseEncryptedSendFunc(ss);
+
+        /* Send server verify message now that keys are established */
+        rv = ssl2_SendServerVerifyMessage(ss);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) 
+            goto loser;
+
+        ss->nextHandshake = ssl2_HandleMessage;
+        ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+        rv = ssl2_TriggerNextMessage(ss);
+        return rv;
+    }
+    ss->nextHandshake = ssl2_HandleClientSessionKeyMessage;
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+  bad_client:
+    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT);
+    /* FALLTHROUGH */
+
+  loser:
+    if (gotXmitBufLock) {
+        ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); gotXmitBufLock = 0;
+    }
+    SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: server, wait for client-hello lossage",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+    ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl2_BeginServerHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+    SECStatus        rv;
+    sslServerCerts * rsaAuth = ss->serverCerts + kt_rsa;
+
+    ss->sec.isServer = 1;
+    ssl_ChooseSessionIDProcs(&ss->sec);
+    ss->sec.sendSequence = 0;
+    ss->sec.rcvSequence = 0;
+
+    /* don't turn on SSL2 if we don't have an RSA key and cert */
+    if (!rsaAuth->serverKeyPair || !rsaAuth->SERVERKEY || 
+        !rsaAuth->serverCert) {
+        ss->opt.enableSSL2 = PR_FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!ss->cipherSpecs) {
+        rv = ssl2_ConstructCipherSpecs(ss);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess)
+            goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* count the SSL2 and SSL3 enabled ciphers.
+     * if either is zero, clear the socket's enable for that protocol.
+     */
+    rv = ssl2_CheckConfigSanity(ss);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+        goto loser;
+
+    /*
+    ** Generate connection-id. Always do this, even if things fail
+    ** immediately. This way the random number generator is always
+    ** rolling around, every time we get a connection.
+    */
+    PK11_GenerateRandom(ss->sec.ci.connectionID, 
+                        sizeof(ss->sec.ci.connectionID));
+
+    ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
+    ss->handshake     = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake;
+    ss->nextHandshake = ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage;
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* This function doesn't really belong in this file.
+** It's here to keep AIX compilers from optimizing it away, 
+** and not including it in the DSO.
+*/
+
+#include "nss.h"
+extern const char __nss_ssl_rcsid[];
+extern const char __nss_ssl_sccsid[];
+
+PRBool
+NSSSSL_VersionCheck(const char *importedVersion)
+{
+    /*
+     * This is the secret handshake algorithm.
+     *
+     * This release has a simple version compatibility
+     * check algorithm.  This release is not backward
+     * compatible with previous major releases.  It is
+     * not compatible with future major, minor, or
+     * patch releases.
+     */
+    volatile char c; /* force a reference that won't get optimized away */
+
+    c = __nss_ssl_rcsid[0] + __nss_ssl_sccsid[0]; 
+    return NSS_VersionCheck(importedVersion);
+}