Move chain building/verification out of X509Certificate

net/base/x509_certificate_mac.cc

Index: net/base/x509_certificate_mac.cc
diff --git a/net/base/x509_certificate_mac.cc b/net/base/x509_certificate_mac.cc
index 2dbdb753c14767d0e05da3a2fbbf4be476dc9f4f..da7813f1780fb58013f60a43bb1d36c214154a19 100644
--- a/net/base/x509_certificate_mac.cc
+++ b/net/base/x509_certificate_mac.cc
@@ -12,163 +12,12 @@
 #include "base/pickle.h"
 #include "base/scoped_cftyperef.h"
 #include "base/sys_string_conversions.h"
-#include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h"
-#include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h"
-#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
 
 using base::Time;
 
 namespace net {
 
-class MacTrustedCertificates {
- public:
-  // Sets the trusted root certificate used by tests. Call with |cert| set
-  // to NULL to clear the test certificate.
-  void SetTestCertificate(X509Certificate* cert) {
-    AutoLock lock(lock_);
-    test_certificate_ = cert;
-  }
-
-  // Returns an array containing the trusted certificates for use with
-  // SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates(). Returns NULL if the system-supplied
-  // list of trust anchors is acceptable (that is, there is not test
-  // certificate available). Ownership follows the Create Rule (caller
-  // is responsible for calling CFRelease on the non-NULL result).
-  CFArrayRef CopyTrustedCertificateArray() {
-    AutoLock lock(lock_);
-
-    if (!test_certificate_)
-      return NULL;
-
-    // Failure to copy the anchor certificates or add the test certificate
-    // is non-fatal; SecTrustEvaluate() will use the system anchors instead.
-    CFArrayRef anchor_array;
-    OSStatus status = SecTrustCopyAnchorCertificates(&anchor_array);
-    if (status)
-      return NULL;
-    scoped_cftyperef<CFArrayRef> scoped_anchor_array(anchor_array);
-    CFMutableArrayRef merged_array = CFArrayCreateMutableCopy(
-        kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, anchor_array);
-    if (!merged_array)
-      return NULL;
-    CFArrayAppendValue(merged_array, test_certificate_->os_cert_handle());
-
-    return merged_array;
-  }
- private:
-  friend struct DefaultSingletonTraits<MacTrustedCertificates>;
-
-  // Obtain an instance of MacTrustedCertificates via the singleton
-  // interface.
-  MacTrustedCertificates() : test_certificate_(NULL) { }
-
-  // An X509Certificate object that may be appended to the list of
-  // system trusted anchors.
-  scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> test_certificate_;
-
-  // The trusted cache may be accessed from multiple threads.
-  mutable Lock lock_;
-
-  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(MacTrustedCertificates);
-};
-
-void SetMacTestCertificate(X509Certificate* cert) {
-  Singleton<MacTrustedCertificates>::get()->SetTestCertificate(cert);
-}
-
 namespace {
-
-typedef OSStatus (*SecTrustCopyExtendedResultFuncPtr)(SecTrustRef,
-                                                      CFDictionaryRef*);
-
-int NetErrorFromOSStatus(OSStatus status) {
-  switch (status) {
-    case noErr:
-      return OK;
-    case errSecNotAvailable:
-    case errSecNoCertificateModule:
-    case errSecNoPolicyModule:
-      return ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
-    case errSecAuthFailed:
-      return ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
-    default:
-      LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown error " << status << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED";
-      return ERR_FAILED;
-  }
-}
-
-int CertStatusFromOSStatus(OSStatus status) {
-  switch (status) {
-    case noErr:
-      return 0;
-
-    case CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT:
-    case CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED:
-    case CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY:
-      return CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
-
-    case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED:
-    case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET:
-      // "Expired" and "not yet valid" collapse into a single status.
-      return CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
-
-    case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_REVOKED:
-    case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_SUSPENDED:
-      return CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
-
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
-      return CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
-
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_NOT_FOUND:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_INCOMPLETE_REVOCATION_CHECK:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_UNAVAILABLE:
-      return CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
-
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_NOT_TRUSTED:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_SERVER_DOWN:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_NOT_VALID_YET:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_NETWORK_FAILURE:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_BAD_RESPONSE:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_NO_SIGNER:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_UNAUTHORIZED:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_SIG_REQUIRED:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_MALFORMED_REQ:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_INTERNAL_ERR:
-    case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_TRY_LATER:
-      // We asked for a revocation check, but didn't get it.
-      return CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
-
-    default:
-      // Failure was due to something Chromium doesn't define a
-      // specific status for (such as basic constraints violation, or
-      // unknown critical extension)
-      return CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
-  }
-}
-
-bool OverrideHostnameMismatch(const std::string& hostname,
-                              std::vector<std::string>* dns_names) {
-  // SecTrustEvaluate() does not check dotted IP addresses. If
-  // hostname is provided as, say, 127.0.0.1, then the error
-  // CSSMERR_APPLETP_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH will always be returned,
-  // even if the certificate contains 127.0.0.1 as one of its names.
-  // We, however, want to allow that behavior. SecTrustEvaluate()
-  // only checks for digits and dots when considering whether a
-  // hostname is an IP address, so IPv6 and hex addresses go through
-  // its normal comparison.
-  bool is_dotted_ip = true;
-  bool override_hostname_mismatch = false;
-  for (std::string::const_iterator c = hostname.begin();
-       c != hostname.end() && is_dotted_ip; ++c)
-    is_dotted_ip = (*c >= '0' && *c <= '9') || *c == '.';
-  if (is_dotted_ip) {
-    for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator name = dns_names->begin();
-         name != dns_names->end() && !override_hostname_mismatch; ++name)
-      override_hostname_mismatch = (*name == hostname);
-  }
-  return override_hostname_mismatch;
-}
-
 struct CSSMFields {
   CSSMFields() : cl_handle(NULL), num_of_fields(0), fields(NULL) {}
   ~CSSMFields() {
@@ -295,6 +144,31 @@ void GetCertDateForOID(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle,
   }
 }
 
+// Serializes the |cert_handle| into |pickle|, such that it may be unserialized
+// by ReadCertHandleFromPickle(). Returns FALSE on failure.
+bool WriteCertHandleToPickle(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle,
+                             Pickle* pickle) {
+  CSSM_DATA cert_data;
+  OSStatus status = SecCertificateGetData(cert_handle, &cert_data);
+  if (status) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return pickle->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<char*>(cert_data.Data),
+                           cert_data.Length);
+}
+
+// Reads a previously serialized OSCertHandle from the specified |pickle|. If
+// an error is encountered, returns NULL.
+SecCertificateRef ReadCertHandleFromPickle(const Pickle& pickle,
+                                           void** pickle_iter) {
+  const char* data;
+  int length;
+  if (!pickle.ReadData(pickle_iter, &data, &length))
+    return NULL;
+
+  return X509Certificate::CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes(data, length);
+}
+
 // Creates a SecPolicyRef for the given OID, with optional value.
 OSStatus CreatePolicy(const CSSM_OID* policy_OID,
                       void* option_data,
@@ -486,233 +360,6 @@ X509Certificate::CreateOSCertListHandle() const {
   return cert_list;
 }
 
-int X509Certificate::Verify(const std::string& hostname, int flags,
-                            CertVerifyResult* verify_result) const {
-  verify_result->Reset();
-
-  // Create an SSL SecPolicyRef, and configure it to perform hostname
-  // validation. The hostname check does 99% of what we want, with the
-  // exception of dotted IPv4 addreses, which we handle ourselves below.
-  CSSM_APPLE_TP_SSL_OPTIONS tp_ssl_options = {
-    CSSM_APPLE_TP_SSL_OPTS_VERSION,
-    hostname.size(),
-    hostname.data(),
-    0
-  };
-  SecPolicyRef ssl_policy;
-  OSStatus status = CreatePolicy(&CSSMOID_APPLE_TP_SSL,
-                                 &tp_ssl_options,
-                                 sizeof(tp_ssl_options),
-                                 &ssl_policy);
-  if (status)
-    return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
-  scoped_cftyperef<SecPolicyRef> scoped_ssl_policy(ssl_policy);
-
-  // Create and configure a SecTrustRef, which takes our certificate(s)
-  // and our SSL SecPolicyRef. SecTrustCreateWithCertificates() takes an
-  // array of certificates, the first of which is the certificate we're
-  // verifying, and the subsequent (optional) certificates are used for
-  // chain building.
-  scoped_cftyperef<CFArrayRef> cert_list(CreateOSCertListHandle());
-
-  // From here on, only one thread can be active at a time. We have had a number
-  // of sporadic crashes in the SecTrustEvaluate call below, way down inside
-  // Apple's cert code, which we suspect are caused by a thread-safety issue.
-  // So as a speculative fix allow only one thread to use SecTrust on this cert.
-  AutoLock lock(verification_lock_);
-
-  SecTrustRef trust_ref = NULL;
-  status = SecTrustCreateWithCertificates(cert_list, ssl_policy, &trust_ref);
-  if (status)
-    return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
-  scoped_cftyperef<SecTrustRef> scoped_trust_ref(trust_ref);
-
-  // Set the trusted anchor certificates for the SecTrustRef by merging the
-  // system trust anchors and the test root certificate.
-  CFArrayRef anchor_array =
-      Singleton<MacTrustedCertificates>::get()->CopyTrustedCertificateArray();
-  scoped_cftyperef<CFArrayRef> scoped_anchor_array(anchor_array);
-  if (anchor_array) {
-    status = SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates(trust_ref, anchor_array);
-    if (status)
-      return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
-  }
-
-  if (flags & VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) {
-    // When called with VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED, we ask SecTrustEvaluate()
-    // to apply OCSP and CRL checking, but we're still subject to the global
-    // settings, which are configured in the Keychain Access application (in
-    // the Certificates tab of the Preferences dialog). If the user has
-    // revocation disabled (which is the default), then we will get
-    // kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure back from SecTrustEvaluate()
-    // with one of a number of sub error codes indicating that revocation
-    // checking did not occur. In that case, we'll set our own result to include
-    // CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION.
-    //
-    // NOTE: This does not apply to EV certificates, which always get
-    // revocation checks regardless of the global settings.
-    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
-    CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_DATA tp_action_data = { CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_VERSION };
-    tp_action_data.ActionFlags = CSSM_TP_ACTION_REQUIRE_REV_PER_CERT;
-    CFDataRef action_data_ref =
-        CFDataCreate(NULL, reinterpret_cast<UInt8*>(&tp_action_data),
-                     sizeof(tp_action_data));
-    if (!action_data_ref)
-      return ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-    scoped_cftyperef<CFDataRef> scoped_action_data_ref(action_data_ref);
-    status = SecTrustSetParameters(trust_ref, CSSM_TP_ACTION_DEFAULT,
-                                   action_data_ref);
-    if (status)
-      return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
-  }
-
-  // Verify the certificate. A non-zero result from SecTrustGetResult()
-  // indicates that some fatal error occurred and the chain couldn't be
-  // processed, not that the chain contains no errors. We need to examine the
-  // output of SecTrustGetResult() to determine that.
-  SecTrustResultType trust_result;
-  status = SecTrustEvaluate(trust_ref, &trust_result);
-  if (status)
-    return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
-  CFArrayRef completed_chain = NULL;
-  CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO* chain_info;
-  status = SecTrustGetResult(trust_ref, &trust_result, &completed_chain,
-                             &chain_info);
-  if (status)
-    return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
-  scoped_cftyperef<CFArrayRef> scoped_completed_chain(completed_chain);
-
-  // Evaluate the results
-  OSStatus cssm_result;
-  bool got_certificate_error = false;
-  switch (trust_result) {
-    case kSecTrustResultUnspecified:
-    case kSecTrustResultProceed:
-      // Certificate chain is valid and trusted ("unspecified" indicates that
-      // the user has not explicitly set a trust setting)
-      break;
-
-    case kSecTrustResultDeny:
-    case kSecTrustResultConfirm:
-      // Certificate chain is explicitly untrusted. For kSecTrustResultConfirm,
-      // we're following what Secure Transport does and treating it as
-      // "deny".
-      verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
-      break;
-
-    case kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure:
-      // Certificate chain has a failure that can be overridden by the user.
-      status = SecTrustGetCssmResultCode(trust_ref, &cssm_result);
-      if (status)
-        return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
-      switch (cssm_result) {
-        case CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED:
-        case CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT:
-          verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
-          break;
-        case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED:
-        case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET:
-          verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
-          break;
-        case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_REVOKED:
-        case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_SUSPENDED:
-          verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
-          break;
-        default:
-          // Look for specific per-certificate errors below.
-          break;
-      }
-      // Walk the chain of error codes in the CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO
-      // structure which can catch multiple errors from each certificate.
-      for (CFIndex index = 0, chain_count = CFArrayGetCount(completed_chain);
-           index < chain_count; ++index) {
-        if (chain_info[index].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_EXPIRED ||
-            chain_info[index].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_NOT_VALID_YET)
-          verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
-        for (uint32 status_code_index = 0;
-             status_code_index < chain_info[index].NumStatusCodes;
-             ++status_code_index) {
-          got_certificate_error = true;
-          int cert_status = CertStatusFromOSStatus(
-              chain_info[index].StatusCodes[status_code_index]);
-          if (cert_status == CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID) {
-            std::vector<std::string> names;
-            GetDNSNames(&names);
-            if (OverrideHostnameMismatch(hostname, &names)) {
-              cert_status = 0;
-            }
-          }
-          verify_result->cert_status |= cert_status;
-        }
-      }
-      // Be paranoid and ensure that we recorded at least one certificate
-      // status on receiving kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure. The
-      // call to SecTrustGetCssmResultCode() should pick up when the chain
-      // is not trusted and the loop through CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO
-      // should pick up everything else, but let's be safe.
-      if (!verify_result->cert_status && !got_certificate_error) {
-        verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
-        NOTREACHED();
-      }
-      break;
-
-    default:
-      status = SecTrustGetCssmResultCode(trust_ref, &cssm_result);
-      if (status)
-        return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status);
-      verify_result->cert_status |= CertStatusFromOSStatus(cssm_result);
-      if (!verify_result->cert_status) {
-        verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
-      }
-      break;
-  }
-
-  // TODO(wtc): Suppress CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM for now to be
-  // compatible with Windows, which in turn implements this behavior to be
-  // compatible with WinHTTP, which doesn't report this error (bug 3004).
-  verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
-
-  if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
-    return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
-
-  if (flags & VERIFY_EV_CERT) {
-    // Determine the certificate's EV status using SecTrustCopyExtendedResult(),
-    // which we need to look up because the function wasn't added until
-    // Mac OS X 10.5.7.
-    CFBundleRef bundle =
-        CFBundleGetBundleWithIdentifier(CFSTR("com.apple.security"));
-    if (bundle) {
-      SecTrustCopyExtendedResultFuncPtr copy_extended_result =
-          reinterpret_cast<SecTrustCopyExtendedResultFuncPtr>(
-              CFBundleGetFunctionPointerForName(bundle,
-                  CFSTR("SecTrustCopyExtendedResult")));
-      if (copy_extended_result) {
-        CFDictionaryRef ev_dict = NULL;
-        status = copy_extended_result(trust_ref, &ev_dict);
-        if (!status && ev_dict) {
-          // The returned dictionary contains the EV organization name from the
-          // server certificate, which we don't need at this point (and we
-          // have other ways to access, anyway). All we care is that
-          // SecTrustCopyExtendedResult() returned noErr and a non-NULL
-          // dictionary.
-          CFRelease(ev_dict);
-          verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return OK;
-}
-
-bool X509Certificate::VerifyEV() const {
-  // We don't call this private method, but we do need to implement it because
-  // it's defined in x509_certificate.h. We perform EV checking in the
-  // Verify() above.
-  NOTREACHED();
-  return false;
-}
-
 // static
 bool X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle a,
                                    X509Certificate::OSCertHandle b) {