Move chain building/verification out of X509Certificate

net/base/x509_chain_nss.cc

+// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "net/base/x509_chain.h"
+
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h"
+#include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h"
+#include "net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.h"
+#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
+
+namespace net {
+
+namespace {
+
+class ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies {
+ public:
+  explicit ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies(CERTCertificatePolicies* policies)
+      : policies_(policies) {}
+
+  ~ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies() {
+    if (policies_)
+      CERT_DestroyCertificatePoliciesExtension(policies_);
+  }
+
+ private:
+  CERTCertificatePolicies* policies_;
+
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies);
+};
+
+// ScopedCERTValOutParam manages destruction of values in the CERTValOutParam
+// array that cvout points to.  cvout must be initialized as passed to
+// CERT_PKIXVerifyCert, so that the array must be terminated with
+// cert_po_end type.
+// When it goes out of scope, it destroys values of cert_po_trustAnchor
+// and cert_po_certList types, but doesn't release the array itself.
+class ScopedCERTValOutParam {
+ public:
+  explicit ScopedCERTValOutParam(CERTValOutParam* cvout)
+      : cvout_(cvout) {}
+
+  ~ScopedCERTValOutParam() {
+    if (cvout_ == NULL)
+      return;
+    for (CERTValOutParam *p = cvout_; p->type != cert_po_end; p++) {

[bulach, 2010/10/21 10:21:33]

nits:
s/CERTValOutParam */CERTValOutParam* /
s/p++/++p/

+      switch (p->type) {
+        case cert_po_trustAnchor:
+          if (p->value.pointer.cert) {
+            CERT_DestroyCertificate(p->value.pointer.cert);
+            p->value.pointer.cert = NULL;
+          }
+          break;
+        case cert_po_certList:
+          if (p->value.pointer.chain) {
+            CERT_DestroyCertList(p->value.pointer.chain);
+            p->value.pointer.chain = NULL;
+          }
+          break;
+        default:
+          break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+ private:
+  CERTValOutParam* cvout_;
+
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedCERTValOutParam);
+};
+
+// Map PORT_GetError() return values to our network error codes.
+int MapSecurityError(int err) {
+  switch (err) {
+    case PR_DIRECTORY_LOOKUP_ERROR:  // DNS lookup error.
+      return ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED;
+    case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
+      return ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+    case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN:
+      return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
+    case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+    case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+      return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID;
+    case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+    case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+    case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+    case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+      return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
+    case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE:
+      return ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+    case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER:
+    case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+    case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID:
+    // TODO(port): add an ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE error code.
+    case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+    case SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED:
+      return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
+    default:
+      LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED";
+      return ERR_FAILED;
+  }
+}
+
+// Map PORT_GetError() return values to our cert status flags.
+int MapCertErrorToCertStatus(int err) {
+  switch (err) {
+    case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN:
+      return CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
+    case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
+    case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
+      return CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
+    case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
+    case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+    case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
+    case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
+      return CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
+    // TODO(port): map CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM.
+    case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE:
+    case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR:
+      return CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
+    case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE:
+      return CERT_STATUS_REVOKED;
+    case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER:
+    case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
+    case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID:
+    // TODO(port): add a CERT_STATUS_WRONG_USAGE error code.
+    case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
+    case SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED:
+      return CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+// Saves some information about the certificate chain cert_list in
+// *verify_result.  The caller MUST initialize *verify_result before calling
+// this function.
+// Note that cert_list[0] is the end entity certificate and cert_list doesn't
+// contain the root CA certificate.
+void GetCertChainInfo(CERTCertList* cert_list,
+                      CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
+  // NOTE: Using a NSS library before 3.12.3.1 will crash below.  To see the
+  // NSS version currently in use:
+  // 1. use ldd on the chrome executable for NSS's location (ie. libnss3.so*)
+  // 2. use ident libnss3.so* for the library's version
+  DCHECK(cert_list);
+  int i = 0;
+  for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list);
+       !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list);
+       node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node), i++) {

[bulach, 2010/10/21 10:21:33]

nit: ++i

+    SECAlgorithmID& signature = node->cert->signature;
+    SECOidTag oid_tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&signature.algorithm);
+    switch (oid_tag) {
+      case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+        verify_result->has_md5 = true;
+        if (i != 0)
+          verify_result->has_md5_ca = true;
+        break;
+      case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+        verify_result->has_md2 = true;
+        if (i != 0)
+          verify_result->has_md2_ca = true;
+        break;
+      case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+        verify_result->has_md4 = true;
+        break;
+      default:
+        break;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Forward declarations.
+SECStatus RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds(
+    X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle, int num_policy_oids,
+    std::vector<CERTValInParam>* cvin, CERTValOutParam* cvout);
+SECOidTag GetFirstCertPolicy(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle);
+
+// Call CERT_PKIXVerifyCert for the cert_handle.
+// Verification results are stored in an array of CERTValOutParam.
+// If policy_oids is not NULL and num_policy_oids is positive, policies
+// are also checked.
+// Caller must initialize cvout before calling this function.
+SECStatus PKIXVerifyCert(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle,
+                         bool check_revocation,
+                         const SECOidTag* policy_oids,
+                         int num_policy_oids,
+                         CERTValOutParam* cvout) {
+  bool use_crl = check_revocation;
+  bool use_ocsp = check_revocation;
+
+  // These CAs have multiple keys, which trigger two bugs in NSS's CRL code.
+  // 1. NSS may use one key to verify a CRL signed with another key,
+  //    incorrectly concluding that the CRL's signature is invalid.
+  //    Hopefully this bug will be fixed in NSS 3.12.9.
+  // 2. NSS considers all certificates issued by the CA as revoked when it
+  //    receives a CRL with an invalid signature.  This overly strict policy
+  //    has been relaxed in NSS 3.12.7.  See
+  //    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=562542.
+  // So we have to turn off CRL checking for these CAs.  See
+  // http://crbug.com/55695.
+  static const char* const kMultipleKeyCA[] = {
+    "CN=Microsoft Secure Server Authority,"
+    "DC=redmond,DC=corp,DC=microsoft,DC=com",
+    "CN=Microsoft Secure Server Authority",
+  };
+
+  if (!NSS_VersionCheck("3.12.7")) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kMultipleKeyCA); ++i) {
+      if (strcmp(cert_handle->issuerName, kMultipleKeyCA[i]) == 0) {
+        use_crl = false;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  PRUint64 revocation_method_flags =
+      CERT_REV_M_DO_NOT_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD |
+      CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING |
+      CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE |
+      CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO |
+      CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO;
+  PRUint64 revocation_method_independent_flags =
+      CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST;
+  if (policy_oids && num_policy_oids > 0) {
+    // EV verification requires revocation checking.  Consider the certificate
+    // revoked if we don't have revocation info.
+    // TODO(wtc): Add a bool parameter to expressly specify we're doing EV
+    // verification or we want strict revocation flags.
+    revocation_method_flags |= CERT_REV_M_REQUIRE_INFO_ON_MISSING_SOURCE;
+    revocation_method_independent_flags |=
+        CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE;
+  } else {
+    revocation_method_flags |= CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE;
+    revocation_method_independent_flags |=
+        CERT_REV_MI_NO_OVERALL_INFO_REQUIREMENT;
+  }
+  PRUint64 method_flags[2];
+  method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] = revocation_method_flags;
+  method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] = revocation_method_flags;
+
+  if (use_crl) {
+    method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] |=
+        CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD;
+  }
+  if (use_ocsp) {
+    method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] |=
+        CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD;
+  }
+
+  CERTRevocationMethodIndex preferred_revocation_methods[1];
+  if (use_ocsp) {
+    preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp;
+  } else {
+    preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_crl;
+  }
+
+  CERTRevocationFlags revocation_flags;
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_defined_methods =
+      arraysize(method_flags);
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags;
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
+      arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods);
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods;
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
+      revocation_method_independent_flags;
+
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_defined_methods =
+      arraysize(method_flags);
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags;
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
+      arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods);
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods;
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
+      revocation_method_independent_flags;
+
+  std::vector<CERTValInParam> cvin;
+  cvin.reserve(5);

[bulach, 2010/10/21 10:21:33]

nit: not sure why 5 as there are three push_back below.. if relevant, it may be
clearer to have a 
const int kExplainWhyHere = 5; of some kind.

+  CERTValInParam in_param;
+  // No need to set cert_pi_trustAnchors here.
+  in_param.type = cert_pi_revocationFlags;
+  in_param.value.pointer.revocation = &revocation_flags;
+  cvin.push_back(in_param);
+  if (policy_oids && num_policy_oids > 0) {
+    in_param.type = cert_pi_policyOID;
+    in_param.value.arraySize = num_policy_oids;
+    in_param.value.array.oids = policy_oids;
+    cvin.push_back(in_param);
+  }
+  in_param.type = cert_pi_end;
+  cvin.push_back(in_param);
+
+  SECStatus rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+                                     &cvin[0], cvout, NULL);
+  if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+    rv = RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds(cert_handle, num_policy_oids,
+                                            &cvin, cvout);
+  }
+  return rv;
+}
+
+// PKIXVerifyCert calls this function to work around some bugs in
+// CERT_PKIXVerifyCert.  All the arguments of this function are either the
+// arguments or local variables of PKIXVerifyCert.
+SECStatus RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds(
+    X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle, int num_policy_oids,
+    std::vector<CERTValInParam>* cvin, CERTValOutParam* cvout) {
+  // We call this function when the first CERT_PKIXVerifyCert call in
+  // PKIXVerifyCert failed,  so we initialize |rv| to SECFailure.
+  SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+  int nss_error = PORT_GetError();
+  CERTValInParam in_param;
+
+  // If we get SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER, we may be missing an intermediate
+  // CA certificate, so we retry with cert_pi_useAIACertFetch.
+  // cert_pi_useAIACertFetch has several bugs in its error handling and
+  // error reporting (NSS bug 528743), so we don't use it by default.
+  // Note: When building a certificate chain, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert may
+  // incorrectly pick a CA certificate with the same subject name as the
+  // missing intermediate CA certificate, and  fail with the
+  // SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE error (NSS bug 524013), so we also retry with
+  // cert_pi_useAIACertFetch on SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE.
+  if (nss_error == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER ||
+      nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) {
+    DCHECK_EQ(cvin->back().type,  cert_pi_end);
+    cvin->pop_back();
+    in_param.type = cert_pi_useAIACertFetch;
+    in_param.value.scalar.b = PR_TRUE;
+    cvin->push_back(in_param);
+    in_param.type = cert_pi_end;
+    cvin->push_back(in_param);
+    rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+                             &(*cvin)[0], cvout, NULL);
+    if (rv == SECSuccess)
+      return rv;
+    int new_nss_error = PORT_GetError();
+    if (new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS ||
+        new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_AIA_LOCATION_TYPE ||
+        new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE ||
+        new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_LDAP_RESPONSE ||
+        !IS_SEC_ERROR(new_nss_error)) {
+      // Use the original error code because of cert_pi_useAIACertFetch's
+      // bad error reporting.
+      PORT_SetError(nss_error);
+      return rv;
+    }
+    nss_error = new_nss_error;
+  }
+
+  // If an intermediate CA certificate has requireExplicitPolicy in its
+  // policyConstraints extension, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert fails with
+  // SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED because we didn't specify any
+  // certificate policy (NSS bug 552775).  So we retry with the certificate
+  // policy found in the server certificate.
+  if (nss_error == SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED &&
+      num_policy_oids == 0) {
+    SECOidTag policy = GetFirstCertPolicy(cert_handle);
+    if (policy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+      DCHECK_EQ(cvin->back().type,  cert_pi_end);
+      cvin->pop_back();
+      in_param.type = cert_pi_policyOID;
+      in_param.value.arraySize = 1;
+      in_param.value.array.oids = &policy;
+      cvin->push_back(in_param);
+      in_param.type = cert_pi_end;
+      cvin->push_back(in_param);
+      rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+                               &(*cvin)[0], cvout, NULL);
+      if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        // Use the original error code.
+        PORT_SetError(nss_error);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return rv;
+}
+
+// Decodes the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate.  Returns
+// NULL if the certificate doesn't have the extension or the extension can't
+// be decoded.  The returned value must be freed with a
+// CERT_DestroyCertificatePoliciesExtension call.
+CERTCertificatePolicies* DecodeCertPolicies(
+    X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle) {
+  SECItem policy_ext;
+  SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(
+      cert_handle, SEC_OID_X509_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, &policy_ext);
+  if (rv != SECSuccess)
+    return NULL;
+  CERTCertificatePolicies* policies =
+      CERT_DecodeCertificatePoliciesExtension(&policy_ext);
+  SECITEM_FreeItem(&policy_ext, PR_FALSE);
+  return policies;
+}
+
+// Returns the OID tag for the first certificate policy in the certificate's
+// certificatePolicies extension.  Returns SEC_OID_UNKNOWN if the certificate
+// has no certificate policy.
+SECOidTag GetFirstCertPolicy(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle) {
+  CERTCertificatePolicies* policies = DecodeCertPolicies(cert_handle);
+  if (!policies)
+    return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+  ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies scoped_policies(policies);
+  CERTPolicyInfo* policy_info = policies->policyInfos[0];
+  if (!policy_info)
+    return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+  if (policy_info->oid != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+    return policy_info->oid;
+
+  // The certificate policy is unknown to NSS.  We need to create a dynamic
+  // OID tag for the policy.
+  SECOidData od;
+  od.oid.len = policy_info->policyID.len;
+  od.oid.data = policy_info->policyID.data;
+  od.offset = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+  // NSS doesn't allow us to pass an empty description, so I use a hardcoded,
+  // default description here.  The description doesn't need to be unique for
+  // each OID.
+  od.desc = "a certificate policy";
+  od.mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
+  od.supportedExtension = INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION;
+  return SECOID_AddEntry(&od);
+}
+
+bool CheckCertPolicies(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle,
+                       SECOidTag ev_policy_tag) {
+  CERTCertificatePolicies* policies = DecodeCertPolicies(cert_handle);
+  if (!policies) {
+    LOG(ERROR) << "Cert has no policies extension or extension couldn't be "
+                  "decoded.";
+    return false;
+  }
+  ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies scoped_policies(policies);
+  CERTPolicyInfo** policy_infos = policies->policyInfos;
+  while (*policy_infos != NULL) {
+    CERTPolicyInfo* policy_info = *policy_infos++;
+    SECOidTag oid_tag = policy_info->oid;
+    if (oid_tag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+      continue;
+    if (oid_tag == ev_policy_tag)
+      return true;
+  }
+  LOG(ERROR) << "No EV Policy Tag";
+  return false;
+}
+
+// Studied Mozilla's code (esp. security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp
+// and nsNSSCertHelper.cpp) to learn how to verify EV certificate.
+// TODO(wtc): A possible optimization is that we get the trust anchor from
+// the first PKIXVerifyCert call.  We look up the EV policy for the trust
+// anchor.  If the trust anchor has no EV policy, we know the cert isn't EV.
+// Otherwise, we pass just that EV policy (as opposed to all the EV policies)
+// to the second PKIXVerifyCert call.
+bool VerifyEV(X509Certificate* certificate) {
+  net::EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = net::EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance();
+
+  CERTValOutParam cvout[3];
+  int cvout_index = 0;
+  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor;
+  cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL;
+  int cvout_trust_anchor_index = cvout_index;
+  cvout_index++;

[bulach, 2010/10/21 10:21:33]

nit: ++cvout_index;

+  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end;
+  ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout);
+
+  SECStatus status = PKIXVerifyCert(certificate->os_cert_handle(),
+                                    true,
+                                    metadata->GetPolicyOIDs(),
+                                    metadata->NumPolicyOIDs(),
+                                    cvout);
+  if (status != SECSuccess)
+    return false;
+
+  CERTCertificate* root_ca =
+      cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert;
+  if (root_ca == NULL)
+    return false;
+  SHA1Fingerprint fingerprint =
+      X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_ca);
+  SECOidTag ev_policy_tag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+  if (!metadata->GetPolicyOID(fingerprint, &ev_policy_tag))
+    return false;
+
+  if (!CheckCertPolicies(certificate->os_cert_handle(), ev_policy_tag))
+    return false;
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+namespace x509_chain {
+
+int VerifySSLServer(X509Certificate* certificate, const std::string& hostname,
+                    int flags, CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
+  verify_result->Reset();
+  if (!certificate || !certificate->os_cert_handle())
+    return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+
+  // Make sure that the hostname matches with the common name of the cert.
+  SECStatus status = CERT_VerifyCertName(certificate->os_cert_handle(),
+                                         hostname.c_str());
+  if (status != SECSuccess)
+    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
+
+  // Make sure that the cert is valid now.
+  SECCertTimeValidity validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes(
+      certificate->os_cert_handle(), PR_Now(), PR_TRUE);
+  if (validity != secCertTimeValid)
+    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
+
+  CERTValOutParam cvout[3];
+  int cvout_index = 0;
+  // We don't need the trust anchor for the first PKIXVerifyCert call.
+  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_certList;
+  cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.chain = NULL;
+  int cvout_cert_list_index = cvout_index;
+  cvout_index++;
+  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end;
+  ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout);
+
+  bool check_revocation = (flags & VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
+  if (check_revocation) {
+    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
+  } else {
+    // EV requires revocation checking.
+    flags &= ~VERIFY_EV_CERT;
+  }
+  status = PKIXVerifyCert(certificate->os_cert_handle(), check_revocation,
+                          NULL, 0, cvout);
+  if (status != SECSuccess) {
+    int err = PORT_GetError();
+    LOG(ERROR) << "CERT_PKIXVerifyCert for " << hostname
+               << " failed err=" << err;
+    // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert rerports the wrong error code for
+    // expired certificates (NSS bug 491174)
+    if (err == SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID &&
+        (verify_result->cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID) != 0)
+      err = SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE;
+    int cert_status = MapCertErrorToCertStatus(err);
+    if (cert_status) {
+      verify_result->cert_status |= cert_status;
+      return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
+    }
+    // |err| is not a certificate error.
+    return MapSecurityError(err);
+  }
+
+  GetCertChainInfo(cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain,
+                   verify_result);
+  if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
+    return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
+
+  if ((flags & VERIFY_EV_CERT) && VerifyEV(certificate))
+    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
+  return OK;
+}
+
+}  // namespace x509_chain
+
+}  // namespace net