Support for using OS-native certificates for SSL client auth....

net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslplatf.c

Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslplatf.c
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslplatf.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslplatf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7311ed084216cf40b1de92c3e46e30ecd7e8e00d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslplatf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,570 @@
+/*
+ * Platform specific crypto wrappers
+ *
+ * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
+ * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
+ * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
+ *
+ * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
+ * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
+ *
+ * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
+ * Netscape Communications Corporation.
+ * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
+ * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Contributor(s):
+ *   Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
+ * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
+ * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
+ * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
+ * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
+ * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
+ * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
+ * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
+ * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
+ * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
+ * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
+ *
+ * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
+/* $Id$ */
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "certt.h"
+#include "keythi.h"
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "cryptohi.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+
+#ifdef NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH
+CERTCertificateList*
+hack_NewCertificateListFromCertList(CERTCertList* list)
+{
+    CERTCertificateList * chain = NULL;
+    PRArenaPool * arena = NULL;
+    CERTCertListNode * node;
+    int len;
+
+    if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(list))
+        goto loser;
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(4096);
+    if (arena == NULL)
+        goto loser;
+
+    for (len = 0, node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(list); !CERT_LIST_END(node, list);
+        len++, node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
+    }
+
+    chain = PORT_ArenaNew(arena, CERTCertificateList);
+    if (chain == NULL)
+        goto loser;
+
+    chain->certs = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, len);
+    if (!chain->certs)
+        goto loser;
+    chain->len = len;
+
+    for (len = 0, node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(list); !CERT_LIST_END(node, list);
+        len++, node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
+        // Check to see if the last cert to be sent is a self-signed cert,
+        // and if so, omit it from the list of certificates. However, if
+        // there is only one cert (len == 0), include the cert, as it means
+        // the EE cert is self-signed.
+        if (len > 0 && (len == chain->len - 1) && node->cert->isRoot) {
+            chain->len = len;
+            break;
+        }
+        SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &chain->certs[len], &node->cert->derCert);
+    }
+
+    chain->arena = arena;
+    return chain;
+
+loser:
+    if (arena) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+#if defined(XP_WIN32)
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformKey(PlatformKey key)
+{
+    CryptReleaseContext(key, 0);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+    if (info->provider != NULL) {
+        PORT_Free(info->provider);
+        info->provider = NULL;
+    }
+    if (info->container != NULL) {
+        PORT_Free(info->container);
+        info->container = NULL;
+    }
+    info->provType = 0;
+    info->removable = PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_InitPlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+    info->provider  = NULL;
+    info->container = NULL;
+    info->provType  = 0;
+    info->removable = PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_PlatformAuthTokenPresent(PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+    HCRYPTPROV prov = 0;
+
+    if (!info || !info->provider || !info->container)
+        return PR_FALSE;
+
+    if (info->removable == PR_FALSE)
+        return PR_TRUE;
+
+    if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&prov, info->container, info->provider,
+                              info->provType, CRYPT_SILENT))
+        return PR_FALSE;
+
+    CryptReleaseContext(prov, 0);
+    return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_GetPlatformAuthInfoForKey(PlatformKey key,
+                              PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+    DWORD bytesNeeded = 0;
+    DWORD implementationType = 0;
+    ssl_InitPlatformAuthInfo(info);
+    bytesNeeded = sizeof(info->provType);
+    if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_PROVTYPE, (BYTE*)&info->provType,
+                           &bytesNeeded, 0))
+        goto error;
+
+    bytesNeeded = 0;
+    if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_CONTAINER, NULL, &bytesNeeded, 0))
+        goto error;
+    info->container = (char*)PORT_Alloc(bytesNeeded);
+    if (info->container == NULL)
+        goto error;
+    if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_CONTAINER, (BYTE*)info->container,
+                           &bytesNeeded, 0))
+        goto error;
+
+    bytesNeeded = 0;
+    if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_NAME, NULL, &bytesNeeded, 0))
+        goto error;
+    info->provider = (char*)PORT_Alloc(bytesNeeded);
+    if (info->provider == NULL)
+        goto error;
+    if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_NAME, (BYTE*)info->provider,
+                           &bytesNeeded, 0))
+        goto error;
+
+    bytesNeeded = sizeof(implementationType);
+    if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_IMPTYPE, (BYTE*)&implementationType,
+                           &bytesNeeded, 0))
+        goto error;
+    if (implementationType & (CRYPT_IMPL_REMOVABLE | CRYPT_IMPL_UNKNOWN))
+        info->removable = PR_TRUE;
+
+    goto done;
+error:
+    ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(info);
+
+done:
+    return;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_PlatformSignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, PlatformKey key, SECItem *buf, 
+                        PRBool isTLS)
+{
+    SECStatus    rv             = SECFailure;
+    PRBool       doDerEncode    = PR_FALSE;
+    SECItem      hashItem;
+    /* TODO(rsleevi): Should AT_SIGNATURE also be checked if doing client
+     * auth? 
+     */
+    DWORD        keySpec        = AT_KEYEXCHANGE;
+    HCRYPTKEY    hKey           = 0;
+    DWORD        argLen         = 0;
+    ALG_ID       keyAlg         = 0;
+    DWORD        signatureLen   = 0;
+    ALG_ID       hashAlg        = 0;
+    HCRYPTHASH   hHash          = 0;
+    DWORD        hashLen        = 0;
+    unsigned int i              = 0;
+
+    buf->data = NULL;
+    if (!CryptGetUserKey(key, keySpec, &hKey)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    argLen = sizeof(keyAlg);
+    if (!CryptGetKeyParam(hKey, KP_ALGID, (BYTE*)&keyAlg, &argLen, 0)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    switch (keyAlg) {
+        case CALG_RSA_KEYX:
+        case CALG_RSA_SIGN:
+            hashAlg       = CALG_SSL3_SHAMD5;
+            hashItem.data = hash->md5;
+            hashItem.len  = sizeof(SSL3Hashes);
+            break;
+        case CALG_DSS_SIGN:
+        /* TODO: Support CALG_ECDSA once tested */
+        case CALG_ECDSA:
+            if (keyAlg == CALG_ECDSA) {
+                doDerEncode = PR_TRUE;
+            } else {
+                doDerEncode = isTLS;
+            }
+            hashAlg       = CALG_SHA1;
+            hashItem.data = hash->sha;
+            hashItem.len  = sizeof(hash->sha);
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+            goto done;
+    }
+    PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
+
+    if (!CryptCreateHash(key, hashAlg, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+        goto done;    
+    }
+    argLen = sizeof(hashLen);
+    if (!CryptGetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHSIZE, (BYTE*)&hashLen, &argLen, 0)) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+        goto done;
+    }
+    if (hashLen != hashItem.len) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+        goto done;
+    }
+    if (!CryptSetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHVAL, (BYTE*)hashItem.data, 0)) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+        goto done;
+    }
+    if (!CryptSignHash(hHash, keySpec, NULL, CRYPT_NOHASHOID,
+                       NULL, &signatureLen) || signatureLen == 0) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+        goto done;
+    }
+    buf->len  = signatureLen;
+    buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
+    if (!buf->data)
+        goto done;    /* error code was set. */
+
+    if (!CryptSignHash(hHash, keySpec, NULL, CRYPT_NOHASHOID,
+                       (BYTE*)buf->data, &signatureLen)) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* CryptoAPI signs in little-endian, so reverse */
+    for (i = 0; i < buf->len / 2; ++i) {
+        unsigned char tmp = buf->data[i];
+        buf->data[i] = buf->data[buf->len - 1 - i];
+        buf->data[buf->len - 1 - i] = tmp;
+    }
+    if (doDerEncode) {
+        SECItem   derSig = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
+
+        /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */
+        rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len);
+        if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+            PORT_Free(buf->data);     /* discard unencoded signature. */
+            *buf = derSig;            /* give caller encoded signature. */
+        } else if (derSig.data) {
+            PORT_Free(derSig.data);
+        }
+    }
+
+    PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", buf->data, buf->len));
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+done:
+    if (hHash)
+        CryptDestroyHash(hHash);
+    if (hKey)
+        CryptDestroyKey(hKey);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) {
+        PORT_Free(buf->data);
+        buf->data = NULL;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+#elif defined(XP_MACOSX)
+#include <Security/cssm.h>
+
+/*
+ * In Mac OS X 10.5, these two functions are private but implemented, and
+ * in Mac OS X 10.6, these are exposed publicly.  To compile with the 10.5
+ * SDK, we declare them here.
+ */
+OSStatus SecKeychainItemCreatePersistentReference(SecKeychainItemRef itemRef, CFDataRef *persistentItemRef);
+OSStatus SecKeychainItemCopyFromPersistentReference(CFDataRef persistentItemRef, SecKeychainItemRef *itemRef);
+
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformKey(PlatformKey key)
+{
+    CFRelease(key);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+    if (info->keychain != NULL) {
+        CFRelease(info->keychain);
+        info->keychain = NULL;
+    }
+    if (info->persistentKey != NULL) {
+        CFRelease(info->persistentKey);
+        info->persistentKey = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_InitPlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+    info->keychain = NULL;
+    info->persistentKey = NULL;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_PlatformAuthTokenPresent(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+    if (!info || !info->keychain || !info->persistentKey)
+        return PR_FALSE;
+
+    // Not actually interested in the status, but it can be used to make sure
+    // that the keychain still exists (as smart card ejection will remove
+    // the keychain)
+    SecKeychainStatus keychainStatus;
+    OSStatus rv = SecKeychainGetStatus(info->keychain, &keychainStatus);
+    if (rv != noErr)
+        return PR_FALSE;
+
+    // Make sure the individual key still exists within the keychain, if
+    // the keychain is present
+    SecKeychainItemRef keychainItem;
+    rv = SecKeychainItemCopyFromPersistentReference(info->persistentKey,
+                                                    &keychainItem);
+    if (rv != noErr)
+        return PR_FALSE;
+
+    CFRelease(keychainItem);
+    return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_GetPlatformAuthInfoForKey(PlatformKey key,
+                              PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+    SecKeychainItemRef keychainItem = (SecKeychainItemRef)key;
+    OSStatus rv = SecKeychainItemCopyKeychain(keychainItem, &info->keychain);
+    if (rv == noErr) {
+        rv = SecKeychainItemCreatePersistentReference(keychainItem,
+                                                      &info->persistentKey);
+    }
+    if (rv != noErr) {
+        ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(info);
+    }
+    return;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_PlatformSignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, PlatformKey key, SECItem *buf, 
+                        PRBool isTLS)
+{
+    SECStatus       rv                  = SECFailure;
+    PRBool          doDerEncode         = PR_FALSE;
+    unsigned int    signatureLen;
+    OSStatus        status              = noErr;
+    CSSM_CSP_HANDLE cspHandle           = 0;
+    const CSSM_KEY *cssmKey             = NULL;
+    CSSM_ALGORITHMS sigAlg;
+    const CSSM_ACCESS_CREDENTIALS * cssmCreds = NULL;
+    CSSM_RETURN     cssmRv;
+    CSSM_DATA       hashData;
+    CSSM_DATA       signatureData;
+    CSSM_CC_HANDLE  cssmSignature       = 0;
+
+    buf->data = NULL;
+
+    status = SecKeyGetCSPHandle(key, &cspHandle);
+    if (status != noErr) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    status = SecKeyGetCSSMKey(key, &cssmKey);
+    if (status != noErr || !cssmKey) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* SecKeyGetBlockSize wasn't addeded until OS X 10.6 - but the
+     * needed information is readily available on the key itself.
+     */
+    signatureLen = (cssmKey->KeyHeader.LogicalKeySizeInBits + 7) / 8;
+    
+    if (signatureLen == 0) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    buf->len  = signatureLen;
+    buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
+    if (!buf->data)
+        goto done;    /* error code was set. */
+
+    sigAlg = cssmKey->KeyHeader.AlgorithmId;
+    switch (sigAlg) {
+        case CSSM_ALGID_RSA:
+            hashData.Data   = hash->md5;
+            hashData.Length = sizeof(SSL3Hashes);
+            break;
+        case CSSM_ALGID_ECDSA:
+        case CSSM_ALGID_DSA:
+            if (sigAlg == CSSM_ALGID_ECDSA) {
+                doDerEncode = PR_TRUE;
+            } else {
+                doDerEncode = isTLS;
+            }
+            hashData.Data   = hash->sha;
+            hashData.Length = sizeof(hash->sha);
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+            goto done;
+    }
+    PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashData.Data, hashData.Length));
+
+    /* TODO(rsleevi): Should it be kSecCredentialTypeNoUI? In Win32, at least,
+     * you can prevent the UI by setting the provider handle on the
+     * certificate to be opened with CRYPT_SILENT, but is there an equivalent?
+     */
+    status = SecKeyGetCredentials(key, CSSM_ACL_AUTHORIZATION_SIGN,
+                                  kSecCredentialTypeDefault, &cssmCreds);
+    if (status != noErr) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    signatureData.Length = buf->len;
+    signatureData.Data   = (uint8*)buf->data;
+    
+    cssmRv = CSSM_CSP_CreateSignatureContext(cspHandle, sigAlg, cssmCreds,
+                                             cssmKey, &cssmSignature);
+    if (cssmRv) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* See "Apple Cryptographic Service Provider Functional Specification" */
+    if (cssmKey->KeyHeader.AlgorithmId == CSSM_ALGID_RSA) {
+        /* To set RSA blinding for RSA keys */
+        CSSM_CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTE blindingAttr;
+        blindingAttr.AttributeType   = CSSM_ATTRIBUTE_RSA_BLINDING;
+        blindingAttr.AttributeLength = sizeof(uint32);
+        blindingAttr.Attribute.Uint32 = 1;
+        cssmRv = CSSM_UpdateContextAttributes(cssmSignature, 1, &blindingAttr);
+        if (cssmRv) {
+            ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+            goto done;
+        }
+    }
+
+    cssmRv = CSSM_SignData(cssmSignature, &hashData, 1, CSSM_ALGID_NONE,
+                           &signatureData);
+    if (cssmRv) {
+        ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    if (doDerEncode) {
+        SECItem derSig = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
+
+        /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */
+        rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len);
+        if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+            PORT_Free(buf->data);     /* discard unencoded signature. */
+            *buf = derSig;            /* give caller encoded signature. */
+        } else if (derSig.data) {
+            PORT_Free(derSig.data);
+        }
+    }
+
+    PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", buf->data, buf->len));
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+done:
+    if (cssmSignature)
+        CSSM_DeleteContext(cssmSignature);
+
+    if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) {
+        PORT_Free(buf->data);
+        buf->data = NULL;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+#else
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformKey(PlatformKey key)
+{
+}
+
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+}
+
+void
+ssl_InitPlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_PlatformAuthTokenPresent(PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+    return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_GetPlatformAuthInfoForKey(PlatformKey key, PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_PlatformSignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, PlatformKey key, SECItem *buf,
+                        PRBool isTLS)
+{
+    PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH */