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Unified Diff: vboot_firmware/lib/vboot_kernel.c

Issue 2745007: Major refactoring of structures, with unit tests. (Closed) Base URL: ssh://gitrw.chromium.org/vboot_reference.git
Patch Set: Implemented LoadFirmware2() Created 10 years, 6 months ago
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Index: vboot_firmware/lib/vboot_kernel.c
diff --git a/vboot_firmware/lib/vboot_kernel.c b/vboot_firmware/lib/vboot_kernel.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c04b922ed00b206292f0fd76da747d17a1e7d766
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vboot_firmware/lib/vboot_kernel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
gauravsh 2010/06/10 14:44:13 TODO REview
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ *
+ * Functions for loading a kernel from disk.
+ * (Firmware portion)
+ */
+
+#include "boot_device.h"
+#include "cgptlib.h"
+#include "load_kernel_fw.h"
+#include "rollback_index.h"
+#include "utility.h"
+#include "vboot_kernel.h"
gauravsh 2010/06/10 14:44:13 nit: this include should go first.
+
+#define KBUF_SIZE 65536 /* Bytes to read at start of kernel partition */
+
+int LoadKernel2(LoadKernelParams* params) {
+
+ VbPublicKey* kernel_subkey = (VbPublicKey*)params->header_sign_key_blob;
+
+ GptData gpt;
+ uint64_t part_start, part_size;
+ uint64_t blba = params->bytes_per_lba;
+ uint64_t kbuf_sectors = KBUF_SIZE / blba;
+ uint8_t* kbuf = NULL;
+ int found_partitions = 0;
+ int good_partition = -1;
+ uint16_t tpm_key_version = 0;
+ uint16_t tpm_kernel_version = 0;
+ uint64_t lowest_key_version = 0xFFFF;
+ uint64_t lowest_kernel_version = 0xFFFF;
+ int is_dev = ((BOOT_FLAG_DEVELOPER & params->boot_flags) &&
+ !(BOOT_FLAG_RECOVERY & params->boot_flags));
+ int is_normal = (!(BOOT_FLAG_DEVELOPER & params->boot_flags) &&
+ !(BOOT_FLAG_RECOVERY & params->boot_flags));
+
+ /* Clear output params in case we fail */
+ params->partition_number = 0;
+ params->bootloader_address = 0;
+ params->bootloader_size = 0;
+
+ if (is_normal) {
+ /* Read current kernel key index from TPM. Assumes TPM is already
+ * initialized. */
+ if (0 != GetStoredVersions(KERNEL_VERSIONS,
+ &tpm_key_version,
+ &tpm_kernel_version))
+ return LOAD_KERNEL_RECOVERY;
+ } else if (is_dev) {
+ /* In developer mode, we ignore the kernel subkey, and just use
+ * the SHA-512 hash to verify the key block. */
+ kernel_subkey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ /* Read GPT data */
+ gpt.sector_bytes = blba;
+ gpt.drive_sectors = params->ending_lba + 1;
+ if (0 != AllocAndReadGptData(&gpt))
+ break;
+
+ /* Initialize GPT library */
+ if (GPT_SUCCESS != GptInit(&gpt))
+ break;
+
+ /* TODO: TERRIBLE KLUDGE - fake partition attributes */
+ FakePartitionAttributes(&gpt);
+
+ /* Allocate kernel header buffers */
+ kbuf = (uint8_t*)Malloc(KBUF_SIZE);
+ if (!kbuf)
+ break;
+
+ /* Loop over candidate kernel partitions */
+ while (GPT_SUCCESS == GptNextKernelEntry(&gpt, &part_start, &part_size)) {
+ VbKeyBlockHeader* key_block;
+ VbKernelPreambleHeader* preamble;
+ RSAPublicKey* data_key;
+ uint64_t key_version;
+ uint64_t body_offset;
+
+ /* Found at least one kernel partition. */
+ found_partitions++;
+
+ /* Read the first part of the kernel partition */
+ if (part_size < kbuf_sectors)
+ continue;
+ if (0 != BootDeviceReadLBA(part_start, kbuf_sectors, kbuf))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Verify the key block */
+ key_block = (VbKeyBlockHeader*)kbuf;
+ if ((0 != VerifyKeyBlock(key_block, KBUF_SIZE, kernel_subkey)))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Check the key block flags against the current boot mode */
+ if (!(key_block->key_block_flags &&
+ ((BOOT_FLAG_DEVELOPER & params->boot_flags) ?
+ KEY_BLOCK_FLAG_DEVELOPER_1 : KEY_BLOCK_FLAG_DEVELOPER_0)))
+ continue;
+ if (!(key_block->key_block_flags &&
+ ((BOOT_FLAG_RECOVERY & params->boot_flags) ?
+ KEY_BLOCK_FLAG_RECOVERY_1 : KEY_BLOCK_FLAG_RECOVERY_0)))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Check for rollback of key version. Note this is implicitly
+ * skipped in recovery and developer modes because those set
+ * key_version=0 above. */
+ key_version = key_block->data_key.key_version;
+ if (key_version < tpm_key_version)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Get the key for preamble/data verification from the key block */
+ data_key = PublicKeyToRSA(&key_block->data_key);
+ if (!data_key)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Verify the preamble, which follows the key block */
+ preamble = (VbKernelPreambleHeader*)(kbuf + key_block->key_block_size);
+ if ((0 != VerifyKernelPreamble2(preamble,
+ KBUF_SIZE - key_block->key_block_size,
+ data_key))) {
+ RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for rollback of kernel version. Note this is implicitly
+ * skipped in recovery and developer modes because those set
+ * key_version=0 and kernel_version=0 above. */
+ if (key_version == tpm_key_version &&
+ preamble->kernel_version < tpm_kernel_version) {
+ RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for lowest key version from a valid header. */
+ if (lowest_key_version > key_version) {
+ lowest_key_version = key_version;
+ lowest_kernel_version = preamble->kernel_version;
+ }
+ else if (lowest_key_version == key_version &&
+ lowest_kernel_version > preamble->kernel_version) {
+ lowest_kernel_version = preamble->kernel_version;
+ }
+
+ /* If we already have a good kernel, no need to read another
+ * one; we only needed to look at the versions to check for
+ * rollback. */
+ if (-1 != good_partition)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Verify body load address matches what we expect */
+ if (preamble->body_load_address != (size_t)params->kernel_buffer) {
+ RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify kernel body starts at a multiple of the sector size. */
+ body_offset = key_block->key_block_size + preamble->preamble_size;
+ if (0 != body_offset % blba) {
+ RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify kernel body fits in the partition */
+ if (body_offset + preamble->body_signature.data_size >
+ part_size * blba) {
+ RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the kernel data */
+ if (0 != BootDeviceReadLBA(
+ part_start + (body_offset / blba),
+ (preamble->body_signature.data_size + blba - 1) / blba,
+ params->kernel_buffer)) {
+ RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify kernel data */
+ if (0 != VerifyData((const uint8_t*)params->kernel_buffer,
+ &preamble->body_signature, data_key)) {
+ RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Done with the kernel signing key, so can free it now */
+ RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
+
+ /* If we're still here, the kernel is valid. */
+ /* Save the first good partition we find; that's the one we'll boot */
+ if (-1 == good_partition) {
+ good_partition = gpt.current_kernel;
+ params->partition_number = gpt.current_kernel;
+ params->bootloader_address = preamble->bootloader_address;
+ params->bootloader_size = preamble->bootloader_size;
+ /* If we're in developer or recovery mode, there's no rollback
+ * protection, so we can stop at the first valid kernel. */
+ if (!is_normal)
+ break;
+
+ /* Otherwise, we're in normal boot mode, so we do care about
+ * the key index in the TPM. If the good partition's key
+ * version is the same as the tpm, then the TPM doesn't need
+ * updating; we can stop now. Otherwise, we'll check all the
+ * other headers to see if they contain a newer key. */
+ if (key_version == tpm_key_version &&
+ preamble->kernel_version == tpm_kernel_version)
+ break;
+ }
+ } /* while(GptNextKernelEntry) */
+ } while(0);
+
+ /* Free kernel buffer */
+ if (kbuf)
+ Free(kbuf);
+
+ /* Write and free GPT data */
+ WriteAndFreeGptData(&gpt);
+
+ /* Handle finding a good partition */
+ if (good_partition >= 0) {
+
+ /* See if we need to update the TPM */
+ if (is_normal) {
+ /* We only update the TPM in normal boot mode. In developer
+ * mode, the kernel is self-signed by the developer, so we can't
+ * trust the key version and wouldn't want to roll the TPM
+ * forward. In recovery mode, the TPM stays PP-unlocked, so
+ * anything we write gets blown away by the firmware when we go
+ * back to normal mode. */
+ if ((lowest_key_version > tpm_key_version) ||
+ (lowest_key_version == tpm_key_version &&
+ lowest_kernel_version > tpm_kernel_version)) {
+ if (0 != WriteStoredVersions(KERNEL_VERSIONS,
+ lowest_key_version,
+ lowest_kernel_version))
+ return LOAD_KERNEL_RECOVERY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!(BOOT_FLAG_RECOVERY & params->boot_flags)) {
+ /* We can lock the TPM now, since we've decided which kernel we
+ * like. If we don't find a good kernel, we leave the TPM
+ * unlocked so we can try again on the next boot device. If no
+ * kernels are good, we'll reboot to recovery mode, so it's ok to
+ * leave the TPM unlocked in that case too.
+ *
+ * If we're already in recovery mode, we need to leave PP unlocked,
+ * so don't lock the kernel versions. */
+ if (0 != LockKernelVersionsByLockingPP())
+ return LOAD_KERNEL_RECOVERY;
+ }
+
+ /* Success! */
+ return LOAD_KERNEL_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ // Handle error cases
+ if (found_partitions)
+ return LOAD_KERNEL_INVALID;
+ else
+ return LOAD_KERNEL_NOT_FOUND;
+}

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