VerifyKernelHeader() fills a KernelImage*

src/platform/vboot_reference/vboot_firmware/include/kernel_image_fw.h

 /* Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
  * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
  * found in the LICENSE file.
  *
  * Data structure and API definitions for a verified boot kernel image.
  * (Firmware Portion)
  */
 
 #ifndef VBOOT_REFERENCE_KERNEL_IMAGE_FW_H_
 #define VBOOT_REFERENCE_KERNEL_IMAGE_FW_H_
@@ skipping 119 matching lines @@
  *
  * The signing key to use for kernel data verification is returned in
  * [kernel_sign_key], This must be free-d explicitly by the caller after use.
  * The kernel signing algorithm is returned in [kernel_sign_algorithm] and its
  * length in [kernel_len].
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, error code on failure.
  */
 int VerifyKernelHeader(const uint8_t* firmware_key_blob,
                        const uint8_t* kernel_header_blob,
+                       uint64_t kernel_header_blob_len,
                        const int dev_mode,
-                       const uint8_t** expected_kernel_signature,
-                       RSAPublicKey** kernel_sign_key,
-                       int* kernel_sign_algorithm,
-                       uint64_t* kernel_len);
+                       KernelImage *image,
+                       RSAPublicKey** kernel_sign_key);
 
 /* Performs a chained verify of the kernel blob [kernel_blob]. If
  * [dev_mode] is 0 [inactive], then the pre-processed public signing key
  * [root_key_blob] is used to verify the signature of the signing key,
  * else the check is skipped.
  *
+ * On success, fills in image with the kernel header and preamble fields.
+ * Note that pointers in the image directly point into the input
+ * kernel_header_blob.  image->kernel_data is set to NULL, since it's not
+ * part of the header and preamble data itself.
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, error code on failure.
  *
  * NOTE: The length of the kernel blob is derived from reading the fields
  * in the first few bytes of the buffer. This might look risky but in firmware
  * land, the start address of the kernel_blob will always be fixed depending
  * on the memory map on the particular platform. In addition, the signature on
  * length itself is checked early in the verification process for extra safety.
  */
 int VerifyKernel(const uint8_t* signing_key_blob,
@@ skipping 32 matching lines @@
  * BOOT_KERNEL_A_CONTINUE          Boot from Kenrel A
  * BOOT_KERNEL_B_CONTINUE          Boot from Kernel B
  * BOOT_KERNEL_RECOVERY_CONTINUE   Jump to recovery mode
  */
 int VerifyKernelDriver_f(uint8_t* firmware_key_blob,
                          kernel_entry* kernelA,
                          kernel_entry* kernelB,
                          int dev_mode);
 
 #endif  /* VBOOT_REFERENCE_KERNEL_IMAGE_FW_H_ */