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Unified Diff: sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.cc

Issue 149230: Linux: SUID sandbox support (Closed)
Patch Set: ... Created 11 years, 5 months ago
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Index: sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.cc
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.cc b/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..16ad531932d9dd7204078a70bb459b57dcea2d7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2009 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if !defined(CLONE_NEWPID)
+#define CLONE_NEWPID 20000000
+#endif
+
+static const char kSandboxPath[] = "/var/run/chrome-sandbox";
+static const char kChromeBinary[] = "/opt/google/chrome/chrome";
+
+// These are the magic byte values which the sandboxed process uses to request
+// that it be chrooted.
+static const char kMsgChrootMe = 'C';
+static const char kMsgChrootSuccessful = 'O';
+
+static void FatalError(const char *msg, ...) {
+ va_list ap;
+ va_start(ap, msg);
+
+ vfprintf(stderr, msg, ap);
+ fprintf(stderr, ": %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ fflush(stderr);
+ _exit(1);
+}
+
+static int CloneChrootHelperProcess() {
+ int sv[2];
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv) == -1) {
+ perror("socketpair");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ const pid_t pid = syscall(
+ __NR_clone, CLONE_FS | SIGCHLD, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ perror("clone");
+ close(sv[0]);
+ close(sv[1]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ // We share our files structure with an untrusted process. As a security in
+ // depth measure, we make sure that we can't open anything by mistake.
+ // TODO: drop CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
+
+ const struct rlimit nofile = {0, 0};
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &nofile))
+ FatalError("Setting RLIMIT_NOFILE");
+
+ if (close(sv[1]))
+ FatalError("close");
+
+ char msg;
+ ssize_t bytes;
+ do {
+ bytes = read(sv[0], &msg, 1);
+ } while (bytes == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+
+ if (bytes == 0)
+ exit(0);
+ if (bytes != 1)
+ FatalError("read");
+
+ if (msg != kMsgChrootMe)
+ FatalError("Unknown message from sandboxed process");
+
+ if (chdir(kSandboxPath))
+ FatalError("Cannot chdir into %s", kSandboxPath);
+
+ struct stat st;
+ if (stat("/", &st))
+ FatalError("stat");
+
+ if (st.st_uid || st.st_gid || st.st_mode & S_IWOTH)
+ FatalError("Bad permissions on chroot directory (%s)", kSandboxPath);
+
+ if (chroot(kSandboxPath))
+ FatalError("Cannot chroot into %s", kSandboxPath);
+
+ if (chdir("/"))
+ FatalError("Cannot chdir to / after chroot");
+
+ const char reply = kMsgChrootSuccessful;
+ do {
+ bytes = write(sv[0], &reply, 1);
+ } while (bytes == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+
+ if (bytes != 1)
+ FatalError("Writing reply");
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ if (close(sv[0])) {
+ close(sv[1]);
+ perror("close");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return sv[1];
+}
+
+static bool SpawnChrootHelper() {
+ const int chroot_signal_fd = CloneChrootHelperProcess();
+
+ if (chroot_signal_fd == -1)
+ return false;
+
+ // In the parent process, we install an environment variable containing the
+ // number of the file descriptor.
+ char desc_str[64];
+ snprintf(desc_str, sizeof(desc_str), "%d", chroot_signal_fd);
+
+ if (setenv("SBX_D", desc_str, 1)) {
+ perror("setenv");
+ close(chroot_signal_fd);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool MoveToNewPIDNamespace() {
+ const pid_t pid = syscall(
+ __NR_clone, CLONE_NEWPID | SIGCHLD, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ if (pid == -1)
+ return false;
+
+ if (pid)
+ syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool DropRoot() {
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("Still dumpable after prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
+ if (getresgid(&rgid, &egid, &sgid)) {
+ perror("getresgid");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (setresgid(rgid, rgid, rgid)) {
+ perror("setresgid");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
+ if (getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid)) {
+ perror("getresuid");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (setresuid(ruid, ruid, ruid)) {
+ perror("setresuid");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ if (argc == 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <renderer process> <args...>\n", argv[0]);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(argv[1], kChromeBinary)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "This wrapper can only run %s!\n", kChromeBinary);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!MoveToNewPIDNamespace())
+ return 1;
+ if (!SpawnChrootHelper())
+ return 1;
+ if (!DropRoot())
+ return 1;
+
+ execv(argv[1], &argv[1]);
+ FatalError("execv failed");
+
+ return 1;
+}
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