Move the render process host tests in content to chrome. These test chrome specific behavior with t…

content/browser/child_process_security_policy_unittest.cc

Index: content/browser/child_process_security_policy_unittest.cc
===================================================================
--- content/browser/child_process_security_policy_unittest.cc	(revision 148774)
+++ content/browser/child_process_security_policy_unittest.cc	(working copy)
@@ -176,12 +176,6 @@
   p->GrantRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL(content::kTestNewTabURL));
   EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL(content::kTestNewTabURL)));
 
-  p->GrantRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL(content::kTestHistoryURL));
-  EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL(content::kTestHistoryURL)));
-
-  p->GrantRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL(content::kTestBookmarksURL));
-  EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL(content::kTestBookmarksURL)));

[Charlie Reis, 2012/07/27 19:51:09]

Shouldn't we check these in a chrome test instead of just removing them?

[jam, 2012/07/27 19:54:45]

I guess I didn't understand how this is different from the above check. is it
because in chrome, that's different?

are you saying I should create a new test in chrome, since that uses its own
Content*Client interfaces, and just move those 4 lines to it?

[Charlie Reis, 2012/07/27 20:03:19]

To be honest, I'm not sure why there are separate tests for NTP, history, and
bookmarks, but it might be to ensure that the NTP isn't special cased (i.e.,
that the whole chrome:// origin is granted).

@msw: You appear to have added these checks in
http://codereview.chromium.org/7068007.  Can you say anything about why all
three are needed?
Yes, that's what I was suggesting.  That way we get the chrome:// URLs out of a
content test, but still keep the test coverage (assuming this bit of coverage is
worthwhile).

[msw, 2012/07/27 20:59:05]

I don't remember exactly why I added these checks. "chrome:" isn't registered as
a WebSafeScheme afaict, but "about:" is a PseudoScheme. I suspect the purpose is
to ensure that PseudoScheme "about:" URL grants are denied, while (unknown?)
"chrome:" URL grants are accepted. If that's the case, it seems fine to remove
redundant "chrome:" URL checks. John, you removed some redundant "about:" URL
checks in crrev.com/120891 but I would gladly defer this decision to someone
with a clearer understanding of this security policy code (perhaps "chrome:"
should actually be a psuedo scheme too?).

[Charlie Reis, 2012/07/27 21:35:43]

Ok.  LGTM, then, but it might be good to get Tom's eyes on it to be sure we're
not losing any important coverage for CanRequestURL.

-
   p->Remove(kRendererID);
 }