Add sanbdoxed_pages to allow extension/app pages to be served in a sandboxed, unique origin

chrome/renderer/extensions/extension_dispatcher.cc

Index: chrome/renderer/extensions/extension_dispatcher.cc
diff --git a/chrome/renderer/extensions/extension_dispatcher.cc b/chrome/renderer/extensions/extension_dispatcher.cc
index 8226de81f55566ed5a7a4b22761903b17b629b15..c4bb06d8e4f610d23c504595fc33c03c3d87e136 100644
--- a/chrome/renderer/extensions/extension_dispatcher.cc
+++ b/chrome/renderer/extensions/extension_dispatcher.cc
@@ -896,6 +896,16 @@ Feature::Context ExtensionDispatcher::ClassifyJavaScriptContext(
   if (extension_group == EXTENSION_GROUP_CONTENT_SCRIPTS)
     return Feature::CONTENT_SCRIPT_CONTEXT;
 
+  // We have an explicit check for sandboxed pages first since:

[Mihai Parparita -not on Chrome, 2012/06/05 22:21:57]

I ended up having to add this, since API bindings were still getting inserted (I
thought it was tryserver test flakiness, but it was just luck that the test
passed locally).

Let me know if you can think of a cleaner way to handle this.

+  // 1. Sandboxed pages run in the same process as regular extension pages, so
+  //    the extension is considered active.
+  // 2. ScriptContext creation (which triggers bindings injection) happens
+  //    before the SecurityContext is updated with the sandbox flags (after
+  //    reading the CSP header), so url_info.url().securityOrigin() is not
+  //    unique yet.
+  if (extensions_.IsSandboxedPage(url_info))
+    return Feature::WEB_PAGE_CONTEXT;
+
   if (IsExtensionActive(extension_id))
     return Feature::BLESSED_EXTENSION_CONTEXT;